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The personalization of advertising offers firms tremendous potential. If done right, firms can address 
consumers with more relevant ads, leading to more positive consumer responses. Nevertheless, firms 
are struggling with how to design personalization strategies and face the challenge to correctly assess 
advertising effectiveness. With this research, we advance the understanding of advertising personalization 
and its implications for firms, consumers, and ad platforms. 
With the help of a large-scale field experiment, we present evidence for how firms should design their 
personalization strategies. We find that high levels of personalization specificity pay off for firms. At the 
same time, socially targeting personalized ads, where names of consumers’ friends are included in the ad 
text, leads to less positive consumer responses.
To advance the understanding of privacy concerns in advertising personalization, we conduct a lab 
experiment using eye tracking technology. Our findings reveal that firms cannot use intrusive ads, that 
cause privacy concerns, to attract consumers’ attention. Such a strategy is harmful as it decreases 
consumers’ overall attention towards ads, eventually leading to less positive consumer responses.
An examination of contracts between firms and ad platforms exposes that these contracts might not be in 
the economic interest of firms. We conduct a large field experiment and our analysis reveals that currently 
implemented contracts between ad platforms and firms lead to an incentive misalignment that is harmful 
for firms. While ads generally increase consumers’ likelihood to purchase, firms pay more for ads that are 
not providing higher value to them.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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Introduction
Consumers are confronted with a plethora of advertising in their daily lives. From
more traditional advertising types such as print ads in magazines, billboard ads on
their way to work, and TV ads in between their favorite show, to the relatively new
forms of digital advertising. While traditional forms of advertising have decreased
in their relative market share over the past years, digital advertising has increased
its market share and keeps growing at a two digit rate (Liu, 2016). Since the first
digital advertising campaign conducted by AT&T on the website HotWired in 1994,
digital advertising has enjoyed enormous growth and is now the fastest growing type
of advertising (McStay, 2010). Worldwide digital advertising spending is predicted to
surpass $200 billion in 2017 (McNair, 2017).
There are several reasons for the tremendous success of digital advertising. While it
remains elusive to offer a complete list of success factors, we want to present some of
the dominant aspects that paved the route of success for digital ads.
Notably, consumers spend an exceeding amount of their time online. The average
US adult spends 5 hours and 53 minutes per day with internet connected devices
(EMarketer, 2017b). With more than half of the planet’s population predicted to use
the internet in 2019 (EMarketer, 2017a), an enormous amount of consumers can be
reached online. These trends in consumer behavior are being monitored by firms that
want to reach consumers with their product offerings. Digital advertising represents
the right media to address consumers in online environments where they spend an
increasing amount of their time.
2 Introduction
Compared to traditional advertising, e.g. large billboards, digital advertising is
less bound in space (McStay, 2010). While traditional advertising largely relies on
consumers’ ability to recall advertising that might become relevant only later - imagine
an ad for a chocolate bar that can only influence a consumer’s purchase decision
when entering a supermarket - digital advertising can influence consumers more
directly. Hyperlinks that are connected to digital ads allow firms to steer consumers
to websites on which they offer consumers more information on their products and
the opportunity to purchase directly. Digital advertising allows firms to have a more
immediate influence on consumers’ purchase decisions.
The major operational aspects that separate digital advertising from traditional
forms of advertising are the potential to use fine grained individual-level consumer data
to adjust, optimize, and monitor digital advertising as well as the ability to measure
its performance. The technological capability to dynamically adjust digital advertising
to the preferences of consumers is called Advertising Personalization (Bleier and
Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013). Advertising personalization offers
firms a huge potential, as it allows them to address consumers with more relevant ads
that trigger more positive consumer responses to these ads.
While firms have identified personalization as a way to improve their interaction
with consumers, only few firms consider their personalization strategies to be in
advanced stages (McCarthy, 2017). Consumers’ privacy concerns regarding the use of
their personal data for personalization purposes increases the difficulty for firms to
define their personalization strategies, especially in an advertising context (Awad and
Krishnan, 2006; Sutanto et al., 2013).
Next to the challenges related to defining and implementing an ad personalization
strategy, firms aim to justify their investments in advertising by measuring its return.
Advertising Performance Measurement aims to capture the impact that advertising has
on firms’ financial performance. Although ad platforms, that offer firms the technology
to address consumers with digital ads, report ad performance measures, research has
started to question whether these performance measures are a good representation of
firms’ return on ad spend (Johnson et al., 2017a).
The ability to personalize ads and the ability to measure ad performance have been
largely enabled by developments in information and communication technologies (ICT)
over the last years. With this dissertation, we aim to help firms to overcome challenges
related to (1) Advertising Personalization and (2) Advertising Performance
Measurement.
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1.1 Advertising Personalization
With the availability of individual-level data on consumers’ characteristics and behavior,
firms gained the ability to predict consumers’ preferences and personalize digital ads for
individual consumers. Ad personalization is defined as the firm-initiated adjustment
of ad content towards the preferences of consumers (Arora et al., 2008). Digital
advertising allows marketers to personalize advertisements for individual consumers
using, among others, information about consumers’ demographics, interests, location,
browsing behavior, and even social connections. Generally, several information stimuli,
including oﬄine and online organic content as well as advertising, are competing for
consumers’ attention simultaneously. One major way for firms to differentiate from
other content providers and advertisers that compete for consumers’ attention, is to
increase ad relevance through ad personalization.
1.2 Advertising Performance Measurement
Next to the opportunities to increase ad relevance by adjusting ad content to the
individual preferences of consumers, the ability to track consumers’ reactions to digital
ads allows firms to actually measure to what extent marketing campaign objectives
are met. Digital advertising has been praised as being much more measurable than
traditional advertising. With specific data on variables such as how many consumers
have been confronted with ads, clicked on them, and conducted a purchase after
having seen an ad, firms become able to assess the return on investments in advertising.
Advertising performance measurement allows firms to assess their return on investments
in advertising and how to allocate their marketing budgets in a smarter fashion.
1.3 Research Motivation
While technically, firms can make use of ICT to personalize their ads and measure
consumers’ behavioral responses to ads, there are several theoretical questions and
practical challenges that remain unanswered. With this dissertation, we aim to con-
tribute to the literature on advertising personalization and the economics of digital
advertising. This dissertation is guided by the research question:
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How do firms’ advertising personalization strategies affect consumer
responses and how can these consumer responses be assessed using ad
platforms’ reporting systems?
Industry reports point out that while marketers classify personalization as the
most important marketing capability, they simultaneously perceive personalization
as the biggest challenge within their organizations (Adobe Systems Inc., 2014). The
potential to increase advertising relevance through ad personalization depends on
how accurately firms can predict consumers’ preferences. A non-accurate prediction of
consumer preferences, where consumers are addressed with ads featuring products that
they do not like, has been shown to lead to consumer resistance and annoyance (Arora
et al., 2008). Previous research presents inconclusive findings with respect to the
question to what extent advertising should be personalized. Some work argues generic
ads outperform more personalized dynamic retargeting ads that are personalized based
on consumers’ browsing behavior (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013). Only when consumers
have construed preferences, meaning that they have narrowed down their preferences
to a specific product and are close to making a purchase decision (Simonson, 2005),
a higher level of ad personalization leads to more positive consumer responses to
ads. Contradicting these findings, other work in the area of personalized advertising
claims that ads that apply a higher degree of ad personalization lead to more positive
consumer responses than less personalized ads (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a). For
both researchers and practitioners it remains challenging to unite such contradictory
findings.
Personalization of advertising hinges on the availability of consumer-level data that
can be used to generate information regarding consumers’ preferences. To achieve
accurate preference predictions, especially for higher levels of ad personalization, firms
need to have access to such data. While technically, data on consumers’ characteristics
and online behaviors can be recorded, consumers tend to be concerned about their data
being used for advertising purposes (Sutanto et al., 2013). Although personalization
of digital advertising increases ad relevance for consumers, it simultaneously triggers
consumer privacy concerns. This phenomenon is described as personalization privacy
paradox in the information systems literature (Awad and Krishnan, 2006; Malheiros
et al., 2012; Sutanto et al., 2013). Data that is required for personalization of ads
might be data that consumers are not willing to share deliberately. Recent policy
changes implemented by the European Union strengthen and underline consumers’
right to privacy. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) establishes clear
1.3 Research Motivation 5
standards that define how firms have to manage consumers’ data and how firms can
process this data (EUR-Lex, 2016). Consumers’ perception of inappropriate use of their
personal information for personalization purposes leads to so called personalization
reactance (White et al., 2008). Research has shown that consumers have an interest
in limiting third parties’ access to their personal information (Utz and Kramer,
2009). Especially in advertising contexts, where consumers perceive personalization
as less beneficial compared to personalization of other services, consumers are more
privacy sensitive when it comes to the use of their personal data (Awad and Krishnan,
2006; Sutanto et al., 2013). It remains challenging for firms to adequately balance
personalization gains with consumer privacy concerns. Research can help firms to
develop strategies that take the personalization privacy paradox into account in an
advertising personalization context.
To assess which advertising personalization strategy is most beneficial for firms and
most acceptable for consumers, firms need be able to measure consumers’ responses to
ads accurately. Simultaneously, managers need to be able to interpret ad measurement
reports correctly to draw the right conclusions for business strategy. Essentially, firms
need to assess whether their investments in advertising pay off. While, arguably,
in a first step we need to increase managers’ understanding of how to evaluate
advertising performance, the identification of the economic return on investments in
advertising remains challenging (Dalessandro et al., 2012). Despite the claim that
digital advertising allows firms to measure advertising performance, most digital
advertising contexts do not allow firms to answer the fundamental economic question:
How much additional profit did my firm generate when advertising compared to when
not serving advertising to consumers? Firms struggle with implementing well-designed
experiments to identify the economic effect of ads both because of the methodological
challenge but also due to technical limitations. Work in the area of economics of
advertising has suggested a design for an information system that would allow ad
platforms, that handle the buying of ad impressions on behalf of firms, to correctly
identify the return on ad investments and report this metric to firms (Johnson et al.,
2017a). Until now, it remains questionable whether ad platforms are willing to carry
the costs of implementing such information systems. Current ad reporting standards
allow ad platforms to report inflated performance measures. Reporting the actual
economic effect of advertising might decrease marketers’ perception of ad performance
and simultaneously their willingness to invest in advertising leading to a revenue
decrease for ad platforms. Furthermore, related work has started to question whether
contracts between firms and ad platforms, to which firms outsource the bidding
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for ad impressions, are favorable for firms (Johnson and Lewis, 2015). The practical
implications of incentives in these outsourcing contracts need to be assessed empirically,
to offer a better understanding whether current contract specifications are harmful to
firms.
1.4 Practical Relevance
Renting out advertising space has become the main source of revenue for Internet
companies like Google, Facebook, Yahoo, and TripAdvisor. Such a revenue model
requires companies to attract high volumes of traffic with their services that makes
it attractive for firms to address consumers with ads on their platforms. Most social
media platforms are financed by this revenue model called advertising model (Schu-
mann, 2014). The massive rise in the number of social media users, the high demand
of reliability and availability of services, as well as the urge to ever develop new
applications for the platforms to keep users interested, has created financial pressure
on social media platform providers. This financial pressure demands to work under a
financially feasible business model in which these services, that are mostly expected
to be free, can be provided for no charge. While services are provided to users free
of charge, users are confronted with advertising that generates revenue for platform
providers by renting out advertising space on their websites.
When implementing an advertising revenue model, platform providers face the
constant need to satisfy both advertisers as well as consumers. This is the case as
online platforms benefit from both positive direct and indirect network externalities.
Positive direct network externalities describe that users utility for a service or product
increases in the number of users on their side of the market (Katz and Shapiro, 1994).
Positive indirect network externalities describe that users of a product or service on
one side of the market benefit from an increase in the number of users on the other
side of the market (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994). Users
value online platforms, e.g. social network sites, higher in case there are more users
present that they can communicate with (direct network externality). At the same
time, advertisers value an online platform higher if there are more consumers that
they can advertise to (indirect network externality) (Clements, 2004).
Despite the positive indirect network externalities for advertisers with an increase
in the number of users on an online platform, consumers tend to prefer advertising
free environments and try to avoid advertising (Dre`ze and Hussherr, 2003; Gal-Or
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et al., 2018). This conflict is amplified by high demands on the return on ad spend
from advertisers, leading to platforms introducing additional and novel ways to indi-
vidually address consumers with more relevant advertising. One way to accommodate
advertisers’ interest to serve more relevant ads is to offer opportunities for advertising
personalization. At the same time, advertising personalization leads to an increase in
consumers’ concerns about the utilization of their personal data (Sutanto et al., 2013).
Therefore, platforms are constantly struggling with balancing the interests of both
users and advertisers while operating under a financially feasible business model.
Our research is of significant interest to the major stakeholders on the demand side
of digital advertising: firms, consumers, and ad platforms. We shed light on which
advertising personalization strategy benefits firms and how personalization of ads
affects consumers’ concerns regarding the use of their personal information. These
insights help ad platforms to balance advertisers’ and consumers’ interests. Further,
we investigate the economic value of digital advertising and whether ad platforms
optimize the ad allocation process in the economic interest of firms or solely in their
own interest.
1.5 Dissertation Overview
We conceptualize the context of advertising personalization, more specifically the
demand side of advertising personalization, as the relationship between three major
stakeholders (see Figure 1.1). A firm has an interest to serve ads to a consumer that
can be addressed with digital advertising via an ad platform that is mediating the
relationship between firm and consumer. In the different chapters of this dissertation,
we focus on different aspects of the relationships between what we consider the three
main stakeholder on the demand side of digital advertising.
This dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we investigate, with the
help of a field experiment, how specific advertising personalization should be and
whether consumers should be socially targeted in personalized advertising. Chap-
ter 3 zooms into how consumers perceive personalized digital ads, allocate their
attention, and respond to personalized ads given that their personal information
was used which triggers consumer privacy concerns. Chapter 4 focuses on the em-
pirical assessment of the economic relationship between firms and ad platforms and
whether this relationship is governed by a contract that leads to a beneficial outcome
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for firms. Below we present the abstracts of the three main chapters in this dissertation.
Advertising Strategy
Ad Allocation Process Consumer Response
Ad Exposure
ConsumerAd PlatformFirm
Chapter 4: Pay 
For What You Get 
– Incentive 
Misalignments in 
Programmatic 
Advertising: 
Evidence from a 
Randomized Field 
Experiment
Chapter 3: Social 
Influence and 
Visual Attention in 
the Personalization 
Privacy Paradox: 
An Eye Tracking 
Study
Chapter 2: Personalization Specificity in Social Retargeting: 
A Field Experiment
Figure 1.1: Dissertation Overview
Chapter 2 - Abstract This study investigates the effectiveness of personalization
specificity and social targeting in the context of social retargeting. Social retargeting
combines the features of social advertising, in which consumers are targeted based
on social connections, and retargeting, for which consumers’ browsing behavior is
used to personalize ad content to consumers’ preferences. We compare consumers’
responses to product- and category-specific advertising personalization in a large-scale
randomized field experiment in collaboration with a major e-retailer and assess the
impact of socially targeting consumers in the context of personalized advertising.
Contradicting prior empirical findings, our results indicate that product-specific ads
generally outperform less personalized category-specific ads. While theory suggests a
positive effect, we find that social targeting leads to less positive consumer responses
to personalized ads. Further, socially targeted consumers are not more responsive
to more personalized product-specific ads. We show that our results remain robust
and driven by ad personalization when controlling for temporal targeting, how deep
consumers browse the e-retailer’s website, and consumer characteristics. Our study
contributes to the IS and marketing literature related to personalization in digital
advertising and provides valuable suggestions for firms’ personalization strategies.
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Chapter 3 - Abstract The personalization privacy paradox suggests that the per-
sonalization of advertising increases ad relevance but simultaneously triggers privacy
concerns as firms make use of consumers’ information. We combine a lab experiment
with eye tracking and survey methodology to investigate the role of informational social
influence and attention in the personalization privacy paradox for digital advertising.
We find that informational social influence increases consumers’ likelihood to click on
ads but does not reduce consumer privacy concerns originating in personalization. Our
findings contradict the presence of a negativity bias directing consumers’ attention
to negatively perceived stimuli. We show that privacy concerns decrease consumers’
attention towards personalized ads, subsequently leading to a decrease in ad clicks and
supporting a positive role of visual attention for advertising performance. By objec-
tively measuring visual attention, we obtain a richer understanding of how consumers
process information and make decisions. We show that privacy concerns, triggered by
personalization, negatively influence ad performance through a decrease in attention
towards ads.
Chapter 4 - Abstract In programmatic digital advertising, firms outsource the
bidding for ad impressions to ad platforms. We theoretically assess the contracts
governing this outsourcing relationship and find evidence for a potential incentive
misalignment. Based on the contract structure, advertising platforms have an incentive
to target consumers with higher inherent purchase probabilities independent of the
effect of ads on consumers’ purchase probabilities. Nevertheless, the implications of
such an incentive structure for the firm are not straightforward and depend on both the
ad platform’s actual behavior and the correlation between absolute and incremental
purchase probabilities. With the help of a large-scale randomized field experiment,
addressing 20,918 individual consumers with ads, we empirically investigate the
implications of the bidding optimization deployed by the ad platform for the firm.
Our unique data set allows us to both causally assess the impact of ads on consumers’
purchase probabilities and whether this impact is heterogeneous depending on the
bids placed for consumers’ ad impressions. In accordance with incentives specified in
contracts between firm and ad platform, we find that ad platforms target consumers
that are more likely to purchase independent of the effect of ads on their purchase
probability. We find no significant correlation between the inherent purchase probability
of consumers and the increase in purchase probabilities caused by ads. More expensive
ads do not have a higher impact on consumers’ purchase probabilities. Therefore, ad
platforms bidding optimization does not align with the economic interest of firms.
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Firms try to adjust their willingness to pay for purchases reported by the ad platform
to match the platform’s actual success contribution. Nevertheless, this adjustment
remains without effect as it does have no influence on the incentive structure in
the outsourcing contract. Advertising platforms’ increasing capabilities to use large
amounts of individual level data to predict consumers’ inherent purchase probabilities
increase the severity of this issue and emphasize the empirically confirmed incentive
misalignment.
1.6 Declaration of Contributions
The majority of this work has been conducted independently by the author. More pre-
cisely, the author was responsible for defining the research questions and scope of the
research, integrating the work with related literature, analyzing data, interpretation
of results, and writing the chapters included in this dissertation. Nonetheless, this
work benefited from discussions with co-authors that helped to trigger a process of
critical thinking and improvements of the chapters.
Chapter 1: This chapter was independently written by the author.
Chapter 2: This chapter is joint work with Prof. T. Li. The majority of this work
has been conducted independently by the author. While Prof. T. Li supported the
author via discussions with the final definition of the research question, the author
conducted most of the work for this chapter. This included the identification of related
literature and theoretical relevance, convincing a partner firm to conduct the field
experiment, setting up the field experiment, collection all relevant data, analyzing
the data, as well as consolidating all relevant findings and writing the chapter. The
co-author helped to improve the work along the way with suggestions for improvements.
Chapter 3: This chapter is joint work with Prof. T. Li, and Prof. P.A. Pavlou. For
this work the co-authors provided valuable feedback regarding the design and execution
of the lab experiment as well as help to improve the presentation of the contributions
of the work. The majority of the chapter including the design of the experiment, the
implementation of the experiment including the set up of the eye tracking device,
programming of personalized websites, and design of the experimental procedure,
data extraction, analysis, definition of theoretical and practical contributions, and
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writing of the chapter was done by the author. The work benefited from the help of
two student assistants that led participants one-by-one through the lab experiment
making use of ERIM’s Research Participation Pool (ERPS).
Chapter 4: This chapter is joint work with Prof. R. Telang and Dr. R. Belo. The
majority of the conceptual work of this paper was conducted during the author’s
research visit to the Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh. During
this time, Prof. R. Telang provided feedback in regular sessions that allowed the
author to improve the work significantly. The majority of the work including field data
collection, data analysis, identification of related literature, definition of theoretical
and practical contributions, consolidation of findings, and writing the chapter was
conducted by the author. Both co-authors provided valuable feedback and inputs that
significantly improved the chapter. This work benefited from the financial support of
the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam that partially funded the
authors research visit to Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh.
Chapter 5: This chapter was independently written by the author.

2
Personalization Specificity in Social Retargeting:
A Field Experiment
1
2.1 Introduction
Worldwide digital advertising spending is predicted to surpass $200 billion in 2017
(McNair, 2017). This number indicates that countless firms, in addition to digital
content providers, are competing for consumers’ attention with digital advertising
online. One major way to differentiate from other firms competing for consumers’
attention is to increase ad relevance through ad personalization (Arora et al., 2008).
In advertising personalization firms adjust their ad content to consumers’ preferences
with the aim to positively influence consumer responses to ads. In a study by Adobe,
marketers named marketing personalization as the most important marketing capability
while being the biggest challenge within their organizations (Adobe Systems Inc., 2014).
Although, most firms are in the process of implementing personalization strategies
1Earlier versions of this study appeared in the following conference proceedings or were presented
at the below mentioned conferences and workshops:
• Frick, T.W. & Li, T. (2016). Personalization in Social Retargeting: A Field Experiment. In
International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Dublin, Ireland.
• Frick, T.W. & Li, T. (2016). Social Retargeting: A Field Experiment. In Statistical Challenges
in eCommerce Research Symposium (SCECR), Naxos, Greece.
• Frick, T.W. & Li, T. (2016). Social Retargeting: A Field Experiment. In The Economics
of Information and Communication Technologies, ZEW Conference, Centre for European
Economics Research, Mannheim, Germany.
• Frick, T.W. & Li, T. (2015). Social Retargeting: A Randomized Field Experiment. In 37th
ISMS Marketing Science Conference, Baltimore, US.
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and have recognized their potential value, only 6% of firms consider themselves in
advanced stages of implementing their personalization strategy (McCarthy, 2017).
Advertising personalization relies on the availability of consumer data to personalize
ad content. One online space where this consumer data, such as demographics and
interests, is available is social networking sites. In 2015, the biggest social networking
site, Facebook, introduced the functionality to dynamically retarget consumers by
making use of their external browsing behavior to personalize advertising. The objective
of this paper is to examine the effects of this new form of advertising called Social
Retargeting, which combines the features of retargeting and social advertising.
In retargeting, consumers’ browsing behavior is used to infer their preferences
and target them with personalized ads on external websites (Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015a; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013). While research generally finds that personalized
communication with consumers has positive effects on consumer-firm interactions
(Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Tam and Ho, 2005; Hoffman and Novak, 1996; Komiak
and Benbasat, 2006), it remains unclear how specific ad personalization should be.
Arora et al. (2008) point out the costs and benefits of different levels of personalization.
Less specific personalization requires less detailed information on consumers and
reduces the risk of preference misclassification which leads to negative responses to
ads. More specific personalization allows firms to match consumers’ preferences more
closely, and decrease consumers’ search costs through more specific recommendations.
In social advertising, advertisers target consumers by using their social connections
to infer their preferences and make these social connections explicit in the ad text
to foster consumers’ identification with the advertised product (Tucker, 2016). We
define the combination of these advertising techniques, using consumers’ underlying
social networks to target them with ads and making these social connections explicit
in the ad text, as Social Targeting. Prior research suggests that social targeting
has a positive effect on consumer responses to ads through homophily of connected
users and informational social influence (Bakshy et al., 2012). Recent work, however,
points towards the tendency of consumers not to comply with informational social
influence from their peers when signaling their identity on social networking sites (Sun
et al., 2017). Although consumers want to identify with a favorable social group, they
simultaneously strive for uniqueness (Chan et al., 2012).
Until now, it remains unclear how socially targeted consumers respond to personal-
ized ads which create the perception of unique recommendations for consumers. Both
personalization and social targeting have been shown to individually lead to positive
consumer responses. However, a combination of personalization and social targeting
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has not been investigated so far. In this paper, we answer the following research
questions: (1) How do consumers respond to different levels of ad personalization
specificity? (2) Do consumers that are socially targeted respond differently to different
levels of personalization specificity?
To answer these research questions, we conducted a large-scale randomized field
experiment in collaboration with a major European e-retailer on the advertising
platform of Facebook. We randomly assigned 198,234 individual consumers to one
of two types of ads with different levels of ad personalization specificity: (1) In the
category-specific (low specificity) ad personalization condition, consumers see ads that
advertise a product category they had previously visited. (2) In the product-specific
(high specificity) ad personalization condition, consumers see ads that advertise a
specific product matching their browsing behavior. We measure and analyze consumer
responses to these ads by recording whether consumers click on an ad and/or make a
purchase.
We find that consumers respond more positively to product-specific than category-
specific ads regarding both click and purchase probabilities. With respect to social
targeting, surprisingly, we find that socially targeted consumers, who according to
previous studies would respond more positively to ads (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker,
2016), are in fact less likely to click on personalized ads and/or make a purchase
after being exposed to personalized ads. Perhaps most interestingly, we find that
social targeting does not lead to higher consumer acceptance for more specific ad
personalization. On the contrary, social targeting decreases consumers’ probability
to click on more personalized ads, suggesting a conflict between more specific ad
personalization and social targeting.
We use the uniqueness theory (Chan et al., 2012) to explain why social targeting
has a negative effect on consumer responses to social retargeting. Consumers receive
two different, and likely conflicting, information signals from socially retargeted ads.
On the one hand, the retargeted ad is uniquely personalized for a consumer. On
the other hand, however, the ad is shown with a consumer’s friend endorsements
in ad texts, suggesting similarities rather than uniqueness. The inclusion of social
identities, friends’ names, depersonalizes the ad that was meant for the individual
receiver. Thus the reduction in ad effectiveness happens through a decrease in the
perceived personalization. Consumers strive for uniqueness and wish to be different
from their peers where the feeling of being too similar leads to emotional reactance
(Berger and Heath, 2008). Our results suggest that the conflict between a uniquely
personalized ad and social identities is stronger for product-specific ads (compared
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to category-specific ads), further supporting our argument. The conflict between a
uniquely personalized product ad and social identities is stronger for more specific ad
personalization.
Our results remain robust when considering consumers’ preference development,
more detailed information on consumers’ browsing behavior, and demographic in-
formation on consumers. The effects we observe are also economically significant.
Product-specific personalization leads to an increase in click probability of 120% and
a 214% increase in purchase probability compared to category-specific personalization.
Socially targeted consumers have a 13% lower click probability and a 62% lower
purchase probability than non-socially targeted consumers.
Our study contributes to the literature in the area of advertising personalization in
several ways. First, we contribute to the discussion of adequate levels of advertising
personalization by investigating the effects of personalization specificity. We focus on
the question of how specific personalization, in terms of recommending a category
or product, should be. Previous research found that generic brand ads outperform
dynamically retargeted ads (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013). Our results challenge
this empirical finding by showing that consumers react more positively to more
specific ad personalization. We attribute the difference in findings to our cleaner
experimental design. In previous work, dynamically retargeted ads displayed several
products, potentially confounding the experimental treatment with differences in
visual attractiveness of ads and effects originating in the composition of choice sets
presented to consumers. A visually less attractive ad design or consumers’ difficulty
in deciding which product to click might decrease ad performance of dynamically
retargeted ads compared to generic brand ads. For our study, we carefully designed
our experimental ad treatments to make sure we isolate the effects of category- and
product-specific ad personalization and identify their effects on consumer responses in
a cleaner fashion.
In addition, our results provide evidence that the effectiveness of more specific ad
personalization decreases slower as the time between a consumer’s website visit and
her ad exposure increases. This finding contradicts prior findings that suggest the
opposite effect (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a). Such difference might originate in the
fact that we focus on advertising search good related products, consumer electronics,
where consumers face lower consumption uncertainty. Previous studies investigated
ad personalization effectiveness in the context of experience goods, holiday services
(Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013) and sports fashion (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a).
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Second, to our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the effect of social
targeting in the context of personalized ads. While prior research found positive effects
of social targeting (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker, 2016), our results, surprisingly, show
that socially targeted consumers react less positive to personalized ads. This negative
effect is enhanced for more specific ad personalization. We use the uniqueness theory
and distinguish between social identities and personal identity to explain the reactance
behavior of consumers.
The increasing popularity of using social networks to reach consumers underlines
the importance of our study to business practice. Our findings suggest that firms can
benefit more when they readdress consumers with highly personalized product-specific
ads, especially as soon as possible after consumers’ website visits. Firms need to be
very cautious about the current practice of socially targeting consumers by default in
social advertising as it likely leads to negative consumer responses to personalized ads.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. First, we will provide the
underlying theoretical foundation of our study. We develop hypotheses for the effects
of personalization specificity, social targeting, and their interaction. Next we present
our method, empirical model, and results. To conclude, we discuss our findings, present
theoretical and practical implications, and point out limitations and potential for
future research.
2.2 Theory
Advertising personalization is defined as firm-initiated adjustment of advertising con-
tent towards the preferences of consumers with the goal to improve consumer responses
to ads (Arora et al., 2008). Personalized communication with consumers has been
found to increase customer loyalty and consumers’ attention towards marketing com-
munication (Ansari and Mela, 2003). In the information systems literature, advertising
personalization is categorized as decision personalization, supporting consumers to
more easily identify and choose products that match their preferences (Thirumalai and
Sinha, 2013). Matching consumers’ preferences that change dynamically with advertis-
ing content remains challenging for firms. Consumers (re)construct their preferences,
utilizing accumulated and relevant experiences and gathering additional information
which ultimately leads to stabilized preferences (Hoeﬄer and Ariely, 1999).
Prior literature demonstrated positive effects of personalized advertising based on
consumers’ past browsing behavior, commonly called retargeting (Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
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2015a; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013). For this type of advertising firms make use of
information on consumers’ browsing behavior on their website to readdress consumers
with ads matching this behavior on external websites. Generally, browsing behavior,
especially which products consumers browse, has been pointed out as a good indicator
of consumers’ preferences. Nevertheless, recent studies investigating the optimal level of
personalization in advertising come to inconsistent conclusions. Related work finds that
less personalized generic brand ads outperform dynamically personalized ads, which
only work better for consumers that have narrowly defined preferences (Lambrecht
and Tucker, 2013). In contrast, Bleier and Eisenbeiss (2015a) claim that a high degree
of content personalization in ads leads to more positive consumer responses than less
personalized ads.
Although personalization has been shown to positively affect consumers’ reactions
to advertising, firms are struggling with how specific advertising personalization should
be. While less specific personalized advertising uses consumers’ inferred preferences to
recommend a product category, highly specific personalized advertising recommends
a specific product. Firms need to decide which level of personalization specificity
yields the highest returns for them. This decision is difficult as, based on theory,
there are arguments for the superiority of both category-specific and product-specific
advertising personalization. To demonstrate the conflict in theoretical reasoning we
develop competing hypotheses in the following sections.
2.2.1 Category-Specific Ad Personalization
Although more specific advertising personalization offers the chance to increase ad-
vertising relevance for consumers, its success is highly dependent on the preference
prediction accuracy underlying the personalization. Misclassification of consumer
preferences, for example presenting a consumer with a product that she dislikes, can
lead to consumer resistance and annoyance (Arora et al., 2008). Theory suggests that
category preferences are more likely to be classified accurately as consumer preferences
for product categories are more stable than preferences for specific products (Simonson,
2005; Tam and Ho, 2006). Product-specific preferences are constructed up until the mo-
ment of the product purchase. Previous studies found that, on average, generic brand
ads outperform ads for specific products (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013). Therefore,
less specific personalization can be more favorable than highly specific personalization
as it decreases the risk of misclassifying consumer preferences triggering consumer
annoyance.
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Triggered by consumer privacy concerns, consumers might react negatively to ads
when they have concerns that too much of their personal information is being used to
personalize ads. The dilemma of personalization leading to an increase in ad relevance
but simultaneously increasing consumer privacy concerns is called personalization-
privacy paradox in the information systems literature (Awad and Krishnan, 2006;
Lee et al., 2011; Sutanto et al., 2013). Research indicates that consumers are more
concerned about personalization when their awareness of personalization is increased,
for example through the inclusion of their names in promotional e-Mails (Wattal
et al., 2012). When confronted with highly specific personalization, consumers have
higher privacy concerns stemming from the use of their personal information. These
arguments lead us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a Competing): Category-Specific Personalization leads to a
more positive consumer response than Product-Specific Personalization in Social
Retargeting.
2.2.2 Product-Specific Ad Personalization
When consumers browse particular products, advertisers can infer that consumers
may be interested in these or similar products. Showing ads with a specific product,
allows advertisers to be closer to the actual preferences of a consumer. Using more
details on consumers’ browsing behavior and advertising specific products that match
consumers’ preferences allows advertisers to achieve higher ad relevance (Bleier and
Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Tam and Ho, 2005). More relevant advertising content is processed
with more cognitive effort and therefore more likely to influence consumers’ preference
construction (Ho and Bodoff, 2014). Advertising content that is in line with consumers’
preferences is more likely to be considered via the central route of persuasion (Tam
and Ho, 2005). A consumer that has looked at a particular product is more likely to
have invested time and effort in product evaluation to narrow down her choice set. In
this case, consumers may perceive less specific ads, that advertise a product category,
as less relevant, as these ads refer to a step in their purchase process that they have
already taken.
Moreover, consumers consider product-specific ads more relevant as they are more
likely to recognize that these ads are personalized to their preferences. Previous re-
search found that perceived personalization increases consumers’ intention to adopt
recommendations (Komiak and Benbasat, 2006). An increase in perceived personaliza-
tion was also found to decrease consumers’ ad avoidance (Baek and Morimoto, 2012).
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In the context of social networks, perceived personalization has been found to increase
consumers’ perceived ad relevance as well as their intention to click on ads (Keyzer
et al., 2015).
Consumers use a specificity heuristic when assessing the quality of recommendations
(Palmeira and Spassova, 2012): More specific recommendations are evaluated more
favorably. More extreme advertising claims for reputable advertisers have been shown
to positively influence ad credibility (Goldberg and Jon Hartwick, 1990). Another
advantage for consumers in more specific personalization is that they receive customized
offers that allow them to more easily make decisions (Xiao and Benbasat, 2007). While
less specific personalization requires consumers to choose between different product
options, product-specific recommendations can reduce choice overload effects and
minimize search costs (Ansari and Mela, 2003). This allows consumers to make
purchase decisions more efficiently. Assisting consumers in making their choices can
help consumers to overcome the confusion originating especially in large product
assortments (Thirumalai and Sinha, 2013). These arguments dispute the favorability
of less specific personalization in advertising and lead us to derive the following
competing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b (H1b Competing): Product-Specific Personalization leads to a
more positive consumer response than Category-Specific Personalization in Social
Retargeting.
2.2.3 Social Targeting
Social network platforms have extensive information about their users. This information
includes demographics, preferences and interests, as well as social connections. Recent
research has focused on what can be inferred from consumers’ social connections and
how this information can be leveraged, e.g. for the purpose of personalization (Aral
and Walker, 2011; Muchnik et al., 2014). One way to leverage social connections
for marketing purposes is social targeting. In social targeting, firms use consumers’
social connections to infer their preferences and subsequently address consumers whose
preferences match with the firm’s product offerings. Next to that, the social connections
underlying the targeting are made explicit in the ad text as social endorsements with
the aim to increase consumers’ trust in the advertiser and the perceived relevance of
the ad. These types of ads are then called social advertising, where “ads are targeted
based on underlying social networks and highlight when a friend has ‘liked’ a product
or organization” (Tucker, 2016, p. 1). We define social targeting as the combination
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of using consumers’ underlying social networks to target them and making these
connections explicit in the ad text as social endorsements. While most research finds
that leveraging social connections to socially target consumers has positive implications
on ad performance (Bakshy et al., 2012), more recently, there are examples in which
consumers do not generally react positively to socially targeted ads (Tucker, 2016).
Again, we reveal the conflicts in theories used to explain the effects of social targeting
by developing competing hypotheses.
Positive Effect of Social Targeting
Prior research has shown that users that are connected in social networks are likely
to share similar preferences, which is referred to as homophily of connected users
(Aral et al., 2009). This preference similarity of connected users can be used to infer
consumers’ preferences. Knowing the preferences of a consumer’s friends, firms can
target and personalize advertising content based on these social connections. Prior
studies found that social network friends of consumers with a high affinity for a brand,
are likely to have an affinity for this brand as well (Provost et al., 2009). Furthermore,
consumers are usually influenced by their peers’ actions when forming their preferences
(Tucker, 2016). In social advertising, the social connections underlying the targeting
are made explicit. Names of users that are fans of the advertising brand as well as
friends with the targeted consumer are displayed in advertisements. This so-called
social endorsement is supposed to increase ad effectiveness by exploiting a user’s
social network via social influence. The use of social endorsements provides a positive
influence on how individuals perceive advertising on social media (Bakshy et al.,
2012). This type of influence resulting from socially endorsed advertising is called
informational social influence (Kwahk and Ge, 2012). Informational social influence
helps individuals to accept externally received information to be true (Deutsch and
Gerard, 1955). In social advertising this means a socially endorsed ad is viewed as being
more credible. Consumers perceive the information that their friends are connected to
the advertising brand as evidence for the quality of the ad content. Prior research found
evidence of a persuasive effect (informational social influence) of social endorsements
in social advertising being present in addition to a targeting effect as users with similar
interests tend to be connected (homophily of connected users) (Bakshy et al., 2012).
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a Competing): Social Targeting leads to a more positive con-
sumer response in Social Retargeting.
22 Personalization Specificity in Social Retargeting: A Field Experiment
Negative Effect of Social Targeting
There are also theoretical arguments that point towards a negative effect of social
targeting. Recent work shows that consumers tend to not conform with their friends’
actions in the context of social networks when they want to express their personality
(Sun et al., 2017). Despite the fact that informational social influence has been shown to
trigger conformity (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955) consumers are simultaneously striving
for uniqueness (Chan et al., 2012). Uniqueness theory describes consumers’ drive to
be different from others where “too much similarity leads to a negative emotional
reaction” (Berger and Heath, 2008, p. 594). Uniqueness theory combines the urge of
individuals to identify themselves with others (social identities) as well as the need to
differentiate themselves to define their personal identity (Snyder and Fromkin, 1980).
Individuals tend to adhere to favorable social identities while simultaneously defining
their personal identity through differentiation (Brewer, 1991). While the personal
identity is unique, social identities are related to common characteristics that are
popular in a certain social group and adopted by individuals.
In the context of personalized advertising, consumers are confronted with a conflict
when being socially targeted. Advertisers address them with ads that are personalized
to their preferences giving consumers the impression that recommendations are made
uniquely for them. This should allow consumers to identify with the personal offers that
matches their preferences. However, by using social connections to target consumers
and making these social connections explicit in the ads the presented recommendations
are being depersonalized. Social identities “depersonalize the self-concept” (Brewer,
1991, p. 476). The fact that consumers see ads that recommend products specifically
for them does conceptually not match with the social endorsement of friends which
results in a decrease in perceived personalization. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b Competing): Social Targeting leads to a more negative con-
sumer response in Social Retargeting.
2.2.4 Personalization Specificity and Social Targeting
We showed that there are theoretical arguments for both a positive and negative effect
of social targeting on consumer responses to social retargeting ads. The investigation
of the moderating role of social targeting on personalization specificity can give us
deeper insights into the theoretical explanation for this effect.
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If socially targeted consumers react more positively to personalized ads, social
targeting should also positively moderate the relationship between personalization
specificity and consumer responses to ads. To increase the accuracy of personalization
in advertising, firms can leverage consumers’ social networks. Consumers that are
connected with friends that like a product on social networks are more likely to have
preferences that favor this product as well (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker, 2016). The fact
that connected consumers share similar preferences (homophily of connected users)
allows advertisers to gain additional information on consumers’ preferences. By using
information on consumers’ social connections, firms can achieve higher accuracy in the
prediction of consumer preferences leading to an increase in ad relevance and more
positive consumer responses (Arora et al., 2008). This increase in accuracy allows
firms to make more specific product recommendations to consumers.
Further, social endorsements that are included in socially targeted ads, allow con-
sumers to understand that their friends are connected to the advertiser, leading to
an increase in trust in the advertiser (Bakshy et al., 2012). Trust has been shown to
decrease consumers’ reactance and privacy concerns towards personalized recommen-
dations (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015b; Komiak and Benbasat, 2006). Therefore, in
the presence of a positive direct effect of social targeting on consumer responses to
personalized ads, we expect social targeting to positively moderate product-specific
ad personalization.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a Competing): Social Targeting positively moderates the effect
of Product-Specific Ad Personalization on consumer responses to Social Retargeting
ads.
On the contrary, the theoretical arguments for a negative effect of social targeting on
consumer responses to social retargeting point towards a negative moderating effect of
social targeting on product-specific ad personalization. As argued above, the inclusion
of friends’ names in the advertising text that endorse an ad depersonalizes the ad which
conflicts with the personalized recommendation made by the advertiser (Brewer, 1991).
This conflict is stronger when the ad personalization is more specific, as consumers
perceive such a product recommendation as more unique and therefore as conflicting
more strongly with the inclusion of social identities in the ad. When a product-specific
ad triggers a higher degree of perceived personalization with consumers, the presence of
social identities, through the inclusion of friends’ names in the ad text, depersonalizes
the ad more strongly. A friend endorsement for a product category still allows a
consumer to differentiate from friends by choosing a product within the advertised
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category. But a friend endorsement for a specific product leaves a consumer with
a limited ability to differentiate and make a unique product choice signalling her
personal identity. Therefore, in the case of a negative direct effect of social targeting,
we expect that social targeting is negatively moderating the effect of highly specific
ad personalization on consumer responses to personalized ads.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b Competing): Social Targeting negatively moderates the ef-
fect of Product-Specific ad Personalization on consumer responses to Social Retargeting
ads.
2.3 Field Experiment
We conducted a large-scale randomized field experiment in collaboration with a major
European e-commerce company to investigate the effectiveness of different levels of
personalization specificity in social retargeting. Our partner company sells a wide
range of products with a focus on consumer electronics. For our study, we focus
on the product categories of laptops, cameras, tablet computers, smart phones, and
televisions. For the experiment, we solely advertise to consumers in the newsfeed area
of Facebook as the newsfeed is generally the focal area for consumers and captures
most of their attention (Wishpond, 2014).
Consumers that browsed the partner company’s website, viewed at least a category-
level page, and were active users of Facebook, were eligible to participate in our
experiment. Using their browsing behavior, we randomly assigned either category- or
product-specific personalized social retargeting ads to these consumers. The random
assignment to the two personalization treatments took place on our partner company’s
website by assigning one of two conditions to consumers’ Facebook pixels (a cookie
stored on consumers’ computers that can be read by Facebook). Consumers that then
visited Facebook were treated with ads matching this assignment. This assignment
method offers an advantage over conventional cookie targeting. Once consumers reach
Facebook’s website without deleting their cookie, they are allocated to their assigned
treatment group. Facebook stores this assignment linked to a consumer’s user account.
This way, consumers remain in a treatment group even if they delete their cookies after
reaching Facebook. If consumers delete their cookie before reaching Facebook, they
are not addressed with advertising and remain eligible to participate in the experiment
in case they re-visit our partner company’s website and receive a new, independent
assignment to a treatment group. Additionally, we address the hypothetical case that
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consumers are assigned to both treatment groups, i.e. because of technical issues, by
excluding consumers with a double assignment from the experiment. This way, we
can guarantee a clean between-subject design for our personalization treatments.2
Throughout the experiment, consumers remained in their respective treatment groups.3
We operationalized personalization specificity by displaying ads that were related to
either the last visited product category (category-specific) or the last visited product
(product-specific). We made sure that the two types of ads were exactly the same
besides the product and category attributes as shown in Figure 2.1. In contrast to
former studies that, based on the chosen personalization algorithm, displayed several
products to consumers simultaneously, we only advertised a single category or product
per ad. This way, we aim to isolate the effect originating from category- and product-
specific personalization and rule out alternative explanations originating from the
difference in visual appeal or confounding factors originating from the composition of
choice sets that are presented to consumers in ads with several products. Category
ads displayed the three most popular products within a product category (in terms of
sales) in a single ad image.
By default, ads were socially targeted when consumers were via one or several
friends connected to the Facebook page of our partner company. Socially targeted
ads displayed the name(s) of the friend(s) that liked our partner company’s Facebook
page by stating “[Friend Name] likes [Company Name]” at the top of the ad (see
Figure 2.1a). Generally, Facebook’s advertising algorithm displays friend connections
to the advertising firm whenever possible. This means that friend connections need
to be present and the friend that is supposed to appear as an endorser in the ad
has not withdrawn Facebook’s right to use her name for advertising purposes in her
account settings (Tucker, 2016). Notably, our social targeting operationalization does
not represent an experimental treatment variable but rather a consumer characteristic,
i.e. being connected to the advertiser’s Facebook page, that is used by the advertiser
to target consumers and which is made explicit in the ad text.
We ran our field experiment for 28 consecutive days in May 2015. Overall, our exper-
iment generated 3,476,626 impressions for 198,234 individual consumers. Consumers
2We further discuss the limited potential of contamination through social interactions with ads
in Appendix A2.1.
3We run all ad campaigns with the same budget restrictions, the firm’s willingness to pay per
1,000 impressions (CPM). This way the ad platform, Facebook, has no incentive to select different
types of consumers into the ad treatment groups when being paid per impression. This differs from
campaigns that are optimized based on consumers’ propensity to respond as common in cost per click
(CPC) or cost per acquisition (CPA) optimized campaigns. We do not detect a systematic difference
in the costs per impression for consumers in the two ad treatment groups.
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Figure 2.1: Experiment Conditions
were shown a maximum of two ads on a daily basis. We measure the ad effectiveness
using both clicks and purchases. Clicks measure how many times consumers have
clicked on a social retargeting ad. Purchases indicate how many times consumers
have purchased from our partner company within 28 days after clicking an ad. The
Facebook ad reporting tool does attribute purchases to a consumer’s last clicked
ad impression before the purchase. The ads generated 25,577 clicks, leading to an
overall average click-through rate of 0.736%, and 1,070 purchases (within 28 days after
having clicked on an ad), resulting in an average click-to-conversion rate of 4.183%.
Consumers were excluded from the experiment after conducting a purchase with our
partner firm to avoid serving consumers ads of products they had already purchased.
2.4 Analysis and Results
Figure 2.2 presents model-free evidence of the average click-through and purchase rates
of consumers that are confronted with either category-specific personalized or product-
specific personalized ads. We compare average click-through rates and purchase rates
(from impression to sale). For both measures highly personalized product-specific ads
outperform less personalized category-specific ads. These model-free results offer an
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Figure 2.2: Consumer Response for Category-Specific and Product-Specific Ad Per-
sonalization.
initial hint on the more positive consumer response to more specific ad personalization,
however, social targeting, seasonality effects of different sales dates, and heterogeneous
popularity of different product categories might influence consumer responses to ads.
To control for the impact of these factors on consumer responses, we move on to
estimate logistic regression models. These logistic regression models take the binary
nature of our consumer response variables, i.e. click and purchase, into account.
We analyze the data from our field experiment on an ad impression-level. An ad
impression represents the event of displaying an ad to a consumer. Our model estimates
the unobserved probability of a positive consumer response to an ad, i.e. a click or a
purchase,4 for an ad impression i. We denote the probability of a positive consumer
response as Pr(Consumer Responsei = 1) and model the latent probability, denoted
by Ui, by using a logit function of personalization specificity and social targeting
as well as additional control variables. We assume an independent and identically
distributed extreme value distribution of the error term.
Pr(Consumer Responsei = 1) =
exp(Ui)
1 + exp(Ui)
Ui = β0 + β1 product-specifici +β2 social targeting i +
β3 product-specifici×social targeting i + γXi + i
4We define consumer response as a consumer’s binary response decision. For our different analyses
we exchange the binary dependent variables with a focus on click and purchase behavior.
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Where β0 is the constant term. product-specifici is equal to 1 when an impression
features a product-specific ad, 0 when featuring a category-specific ad. The bi-
nary variable social targeting i is equal to 1 when an ad is targeted to consumers
that are via friends connected to our partner company’s Facebook page and in-
cludes a social endorsement, otherwise 0. The coefficient for the interaction term,
product-specifici× social targeting i, allows us to asses whether socially targeted con-
sumers react differently to product-specific ad personalization. Xi represents a vector
of ad controls including day, product category, country, and device (mobile and desk-
top) fixed effects. As our ad treatments are randomized, one purpose for including
the control variables is to increase efficiency in our estimations. At the same time,
our social targeting variable is not a randomized treatment. Therefore the control
variables help us to to rule out biases originating in heterogeneity such as seasonality in
sales dates, differences in product category attractiveness, cultural differences between
consumers in different countries, as well as different responsiveness across devices. i
represents the idiosyncratic error term. Table 2.1 gives the summary statistics for our
main variables.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics (n = 3,476,626)
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
click 0.0074 0.0855 0 1
purchase 0.0003 0.0175 0 1
product-specific 0.3272 0.4692 0 1
social targeting 0.8221 0.3824 0 1
2.4.1 Likelihood to Click
The results of our logistic regressions estimating the click probabilities are summa-
rized in Table 2.2. Column (1) presents our model with only the control variables
for dates, product categories, countries, and devices. In column (2) we include the
binary treatment variable product-specifici to estimate the effect of highly personalized
product-specific ads compared to less personalized category-specific ads on click proba-
bilities. We find that high levels of personalization specificity significantly increase the
likelihood of an ad impression leading to a click (βproduct-specific = .742, p < .001). This
confirms the findings from our model-free comparison between category- and product-
specific ads. Furthermore, this result confirms the positive effects of more specific
advertising personalization and supports hypothesis H1B. In column (3) we enter the
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main effect of social targeting i. This variable essentially estimates whether consumers
that are connected to the firm and see (a) social endorsement(s) in an ad react differ-
ently to social retargeting ads compared to consumers that are not socially targeted.
Contrary to prior findings in the literature, we find that socially targeted ad impres-
sions lead to lower click-through probabilities (βsocial targeting = −.176, p < .001) thus
supporting hypothesis H2B. Next, we include the interaction between product-specifici
and social targeting i into our model to investigate whether consumers that are so-
cially targeted react differently to product-specific ad personalization. We find that
consumers that are connected to the advertiser are less likely to click on highly person-
alized ads (βproduct-specific× social targeting = −.070, p = .025). This means that highly
personalized ads are in fact less effective for consumers that are connected with the
advertiser and see a social endorsement. This contradicts the notion that connected
consumers are more likely to accept higher levels of personalization. In contrast to the
literature, our finding points out that there is a conflict between personalization and
social targeting, in which social connections are made explicit. This conflict seems to
be stronger when ad personalization is more specific, supporting hypothesis H3B.
Table 2.2: Logistic Regressions for Click Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Click Click Click Click
product-specific 0.742∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028)
social targeting −0.176∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022)
product-specific × social targeting −0.070∗∗
(0.031)
date controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −4.052∗∗∗ −4.320∗∗∗ −4.177∗∗∗ −4.205∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.034)
Observations 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626
Chi2 2,647.067 6,046.068 6,169.709 6,174.713
-2 Log Likelihood 299,593.098 296,194.097 296,070.456 296,065.451
AIC 299,661.098 296,264.097 296,142.456 296,139.451
BIC 300,105.191 296,721.252 296,612.672 296,622.730
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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As the interpretation of interaction coefficients in logistic regression is not straight-
forward, we calculate the marginal effects of our logit model estimates (Forman, 2005;
Luo et al., 2013). We find, consistent with the coefficients in our logit model, that ads
with product-specific personalization that are not socially targeted perform better.
The marginal effect for the interaction between product-specifici× social targeting i is
−.0005 (p < .05). We further assess the economic implications of our findings (see
Appendix A2.2, Table A2.2). We see that product-specific ad personalization leads to
an absolute increase of 0.61% in click probability and a relative increase of 120.38%
compared to category-specific personalization. Product-specific ads lead on average to
around 6 additional clicks per 1,000 impressions compared to category-specific ads.5
For our experiment with around 3.5 million impressions, treating consumers with
solely product-specific ads instead of category-specific ads would result in an increase
of 21,425.25 clicks.6 Similarly we see that social targeting decreases the probability of
a click by 0.10% in absolute terms and 13.03% relative to non-socially targeted ads.
When product-specific ads are socially targeted, this decrease is even stronger with
additional 0.05% decrease in absolute click probability.
2.4.2 Likelihood to Purchase
We repeat the estimation process using the dependent variable purchasei. As for
clicks, we model the latent probability of a purchase by using a logit function of
personalization specificity and social targeting.7
In line with our findings for click probabilities, we see that product-specific social
retargeting ads increase purchase probabilities (βproduct-specific = 1.090, p < .001)
(Table 2.3 column(2)). We find that the effect of product-specific personalization
remains positive and significant also when entering the main effect of social targeting as
well as their interaction effect. Again, we confirm that product-specific personalization
leads to a more positive consumer response than category-specific personalization,
supporting hypothesis H1B. We also find a significant negative effect for social targeting
on the probability to purchase (βsocial targeting = −1.026, p < .001), supporting
hypothesis H2B. In line with the analysis for click probabilities, we see that more specific
ad personalization is less favorable for socially targeted ads. However, the result is not
5We multiply the absolute increase in clicks by 1,000 impressions to get to this figure.
6We multiply the absolute increase in clicks by 3.5 million impressions to get to this figure.
7In our model for purchase probabilities, we measure social targetingi as the percentage of
socially endorsed impressions for a specific ad attribute combination since the advertising platform
does not provide exact data that allow linking a socially targeted impression with a purchase. For
more information on the structure of our data please consult Appendix A2.3.
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significant and does therefore not provide full support for hypothesis H3A. As in our
model for click probabilities, the marginal effect of product-specifici× social targeting i
is, with −.00002 (p = .871), negative. Nevertheless, this effect is not significant for
purchase probabilities.
Table 2.3: Logistic Regressions for Purchase Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Purchase Purchase Purchase Purchase
product-specific 1.090∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.378)
social targeting −1.026∗∗∗ −0.973∗∗
(0.215) (0.387)
product-specific × social targeting −0.075
(0.463)
date controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −7.231∗∗∗ −7.677∗∗∗ −6.836∗∗∗ −6.878∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.143) (0.226) (0.346)
Observations 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626
Chi2 107.319 418.820 439.780 439.806
-2 Log Likelihood 19,320.559 19,009.058 18,988.098 18,988.072
AIC 19,388.559 19,079.058 19,060.098 19,062.072
BIC 19,832.652 19,536.213 19,530.315 19,545.350
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Again, we provide a table in the appendix that presents the economic implications
of our findings (see Appendix A2.2, Table A2.3). Product-specific ad personalization
leads to an absolute increase of 0.04% in purchase probability and a relative increase
of 213.92% compared to category-specific personalization. Product-specific ads lead on
average to around 0.37 purchases more per 1,000 impressions.8 For our experiment with
around 3.5 million impressions this would lead to an increase of 1,301.30 purchases
when solely serving product-specific ads instead of category-specific ads.9 Social
targeting decreases the probability of a purchase by 0.03% in absolute terms and
62.22% relative to non-socially targeted ads. When product-specific ads are socially
targeted, this decrease is slightly stronger, but not significant.
8We multiply the absolute increase in purchases by 1,000 impressions to get to this figure.
9We multiply the absolute increase in purchases by 3.5 million impressions to get to this figure.
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2.4.3 Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of the results in our main analysis we analyze our data on
different levels of aggregation and re-estimate our models with alternative dependent
variables and different estimators. First, we analyze our data on a consumer level.10
We find results consistent with our main analyses (see Appendix A2.4, Table A2.4).
Second, we estimate our models for click probabilities replacing our dependent
variable clicks with unique clicks, measuring only one click per consumer in case a
consumer clicks on an ad several times. We find that our results are consistent with
the results for clicks (see Appendix A2.5, Table A2.5).
Third, for our estimates for both click and purchase probabilities, our results remain
consistent when estimating probit and linear probability models with the same model
specifications (see Appendix A2.6, Table A2.6). In fact, we find that social targeting
negatively moderates the positive impact of product-specific personalization on pur-
chase probabilities in our linear probability model estimating purchase probability,
supporting hypothesis H3B.
Fourth, we analyze the effect of our focus variables on purchase probability by
operationalizing a purchase as a buying event within 7 days after seeing an ad instead
of 28 days after having clicked on an ad (see Appendix A2.7, Table A2.7). Our results
remain largely consistent.
Last, due to the structure of our dataset, we are analyzing our data on an impression-
level and are not able to control for consumer-specific variables. One consumer-specific
variable that might potentially bias our results is the frequency of ad impressions per
consumer. This might be the case if the frequency of ad impressions per consumer
differs between consumers in our two personalization treatment groups as well as for
socially targeted and non-socially targeted consumers. A higher average frequency of
impressions per consumer for any of these focus ad attributes is likely to decrease the
effectiveness of a single impression. To control for the frequency of impressions we
generate a variable measuring the number of uniquely addressed consumers per ad
attribute combination and control for this variable in our analysis (see Appendix A2.8).
Our results remain consistent.
10Strictly speaking, we analyze our data for unique consumer, campaign, day combinations. Our
data allows us to infer how many individual consumers were addressed per campaign and how often
these consumers clicked on an ad or conducted a purchase on a specific day of the campaign. Facebook
aggregates data on campaign level and does not allow us to follow consumers throughout the duration
of the campaigns. Therefore, we decide to conduct our main analysis on an ad impression level.
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2.5 Additional Analysis
Our results provide important insights into advertising personalization in social
retargeting. To make sure that it is personalization that is driving our results and
that we have operationalized our personalization specificity treatment adequately,
we run additional analyses. We investigate to what extent our results remain stable
when controlling for (1) temporal targeting, as well as the (2) browsing behavior
of consumers. To mitigate the concern that our social targeting variable is not an
experimental treatment and socially targeted consumers might react differently to
personalized ads due to unobserved consumer characteristics we re-run our analysis
controlling for (3) consumer demographics.
2.5.1 Temporal Targeting and Preference Development
Temporal targeting aims at addressing consumers at the point in time when they are
most receptive towards marketing messages (Luo et al., 2013). Timing is an essential
aspect of addressing consumers with personalized advertisements as consumers develop
their preferences over time through consideration processes and gathering of further
experiences (Hoeﬄer and Ariely, 1999; Simonson, 2005). Timing is especially crucial for
personalized advertising techniques that base their preference predictions on consumers’
browsing behavior. An increase in the time between observing consumers’ behavior
and addressing consumers with personalized ads based on this behavior is likely to
be correlated with a change in consumers’ preferences. The theory of constructive
preferences argues that preferences evolve over time as consumers generate more
experiences that influence their product preferences (Simonson, 2005). Therefore,
advertising that is personalized based on consumer behavior loses its effectiveness
with a decrease in recency of the related consumer behavior. Our personalized ads,
both category- and product-specific, should generally decrease in performance over
time in case they are being perceived as personalized.
We introduce the variable temporal targeting i into our model, which is a continuous
variable indicating the time between a consumer’s website visit and an ad impression
in days. A lower value for temporal targeting i indicates a higher degree of temporal
targeting - fewer days between the consumer’s website visit and the ad impression. We
run our models including temporal targeting i for both click and purchase probabilities,
but focus on the temporal distance between website visit and ad impression from one
to seven days. The data for our additional analysis consists of 1,457,527 impressions
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for 148,588 individual consumers.11 Reducing the temporal distance window allows us
to further assess the robustness of our results when focusing on a smaller time window
compared to our main analysis in which consumers are addressed with ads up to 4
weeks after their website visit.
It is likely that more active consumers, i.e. who visit Facebook more frequently, are
more likely to be addressed with a smaller temporal distance to their website visit.
These active consumers are also more likely to click on ads and purchase products
online, which has been coined activity bias in previous work (Lewis et al., 2011).
This activity bias might amplify the effect of our temporal targeting coefficient as
the variable measures not only the effect originating in the increase in time between
a website visit and the confrontation with an ad, but also the effect of a decrease
in consumers’ activeness. To control for this issue, we simultaneously introduce the
variable consumer activenessi which measures the average number of reactions to a
unique ad attribute combination per impression.12 This variable gives a good indication
of how active consumers respond to an ad. Intuitively, a higher rate of actions towards
ads indicates more active consumers, which should also be more likely to click and
purchase.
Table 2.4 shows the results of our temporal targeting models. We first focus on the
inclusion of temporal targeting i and its interplay with product-specific personalization
(Column 1 and 3). Then we investigate the impact on the whole model including social
targeting (Column 2 and 4). Generally, we find that product-specific personalization
consistently outperforms less personalized category-specific ads in terms of click
probability. Furthermore, as expected, we find that consumers respond less positive
to ads with a decrease in temporal targeting. This points towards an adequate
operationalization of personalization in our ads. With a decrease in the recency of
consumers’ behavior used for our personalization the performance of both ads decreases
as consumers preferences evolve over time. In addition, we find a significant and positive
coefficient for the interaction between product-specifici and temporal targeting i on click
probabilities. This suggests that highly personalized ads decrease in performance slower,
which contradicts earlier findings (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Simonson, 2005).
11The reason for focusing on ad impressions served within the first 7 days after consumers’ website
visits is that for larger temporal distances the granularity of our data moves from a daily- to a
weekly-level. The focus on impressions within the first 7 days leads to a decrease in the sample size
used for this analysis.
12The variable measures the average number of reactions per impression on a unique ad attribute
combination. These reactions include things such as likes, comments, and shares as response to an
ad. More details on the structure of our data can be found in Appendix A2.3.
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Table 2.4: Logistic Regressions for Click and Purchase Probabilities Controlling for
Temporal Targeting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Click Click Purchase Purchase
product-specific 0.278∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.432
(0.031) (0.046) (0.142) (0.413)
social targeting −0.088∗∗∗ −0.310
(0.031) (0.397)
product-specific × social targeting −0.011 0.283
(0.043) (0.473)
temporal targeting −0.190∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.035) (0.035)
product-specific × temporal targeting 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.036 0.037
(0.009) (0.009) (0.045) (0.045)
consumer activeness 13.884∗∗∗ 13.873∗∗∗ 6.762∗∗∗ 6.758∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.149) (0.150)
date controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −4.127∗∗∗ −4.053∗∗∗ −7.234∗∗∗ −6.975∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.050) (0.209) (0.391)
Observations 1,457,527 1,457,527 1,457,527 1,457,527
Chi2 25,102.828 25,121.694 1,555.911 1,556.517
-2 Log Likelihood 146,893.266 146,874.400 10,541.392 10,540.787
AIC 146,969.266 146,954.400 10,617.392 10,620.787
BIC 147,432.572 147,442.090 11,080.698 11,108.477
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In column (2) (Table 2.4) we enter social targeting i, as well as the interaction with
product-specifici into our model. Our results remain mostly consistent. While product-
specific personalization increases click probabilities, social targeting decreases the
likelihood of a click. Again, temporal targeting shows a significant and negative effect
pointing to a decrease in performance of social retargeting ads over time. Although
the coefficient remains negative, we do not find a significant effect for the interaction
between product-specific personalization and social targeting.
We replicate our analysis but exchange clicki with purchasei as binary dependent
variable. We estimate logistic regression to assess the impact of temporal targeting
on purchase probabilities (see Table 2.4, column (3-4)). Again, we see a positive
and significant effect of product-specific personalization. This effect does not remain
significant when including social targeting in the model. The coefficient for temporal
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targeting confirms, for both models estimating purchase probabilities, that our ads
decrease in performance with an increase in temporal distance between website visit and
ad confrontation. This once more supports our operationalization of ad personalization.
As consumers develop their preferences over time, the performance of our personalized
ads decreases with an increase in the temporal distance to a consumer’s website visit.
2.5.2 Browsing Depth and Preference Development
Consumers’ browsing depth, i.e. how deep consumers browse a firm’s website, can give
a good indication about how well consumers have defined their preferences (Bleier and
Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013; Moe, 2003). To confirm that the higher
performance of highly personalized, product-specific ads is coming from a higher level
of personalization specificity and not from confounding factors like ad attractiveness,
we assess to what extent personalization that is closer to consumers’ browsing behavior
leads to more positive consumer responses. We assume that product-specific ads
perform better when they resemble consumers’ browsing behavior more closely, since
they predict consumers’ preferences more accurately. To assess this relationship, we
distinguish between consumers that have solely browsed category pages and consumers
that have browsed specific product pages. We introduce a binary variable indicating
if a consumer browsed product pages (product browsingi = 1) or only category-level
pages (product browsingi = 0) before ad exposure.
13 We expect to find a positive and
significant effect for the interaction of product-specifici and product browsingi. Since
consumers are more likely to recognize personalization that happens immediately after
their website visit, we restrict the time window of our analysis, as before, to include
impressions served within the first to seventh day after a consumer’s website visit.
Table 2.5 shows the results of our models including product browsingi. We find a
significant and positive effect of product-specific personalization on click probability
(Column (1)). We also find that the interaction between product-specific personalization
and product browsing is positive and significant for click probabilities. This supports
the argument that the increase in ad performance is caused by an increase in the
specificity of ad personalization. More specific ad personalization works better when
matching consumers’ browsing behavior more closely.
13During our experiment, consumers that browsed only category-level pages and were assigned to
the product-specific personalization treatment were presented with one of the top three products
within the browsed category. These consumers should perceive the personalization less relevant,
compared to the consumers that are addressed with products that they actually viewed during
product page browsing.
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Table 2.5: Logistic Regressions for Click and Purchase Probabilities Controlling for
Browsing Depth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Click Click Purchase Purchase
product-specific 0.646∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 1.175∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.041) (0.118) (0.421)
social targeting −0.101∗∗∗ −0.562
(0.030) (0.420)
product-specific × social targeting −0.062 −0.290
(0.041) (0.504)
product browsing −0.032 −0.032 −0.106 −0.107
(0.024) (0.024) (0.119) (0.119)
product-specific × product browsing 0.126∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.068 0.089
(0.033) (0.033) (0.157) (0.157)
date controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −4.161∗∗∗ −4.077∗∗∗ −7.480∗∗∗ −7.008∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.046) (0.190) (0.393)
Observations 1,457,527 1,457,527 1,457,527 1,457,527
Chi2 3,270.856 3,316.398 234.898 245.180
-2 Log Likelihood 168,824.907 168,779.364 11,862.406 11,852.123
AIC 168,898.907 168,857.364 11,936.406 11,930.123
BIC 169,350.020 169,332.862 12,387.519 12,405.621
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
When focusing on the influence of product browsing on purchase probabilities we see
that product-specific personalization does lead to more positive consumer responses,
consistent with our main results (see Table 2.5 column (3)). The interaction coefficient
of product-specific personalization and product browsing is positive but not significant
when estimating our models for purchase probabilities.
These models can also serve as a falsification test for whether simply a reminder
effect instead of personalization of social retargeting is driving our results. While
theoretically, personalization aims at matching a consumer’s preferences as close as
possible with an ad, a lot of retargeting algorithms simply advertise the consumer’s last
visited product. As the last visited product is the most recent memory of a consumer’s
browsing journey there might be a reminder effect of such an ad that encourages the
consumer to pick up their shopping process where they left. In case such a reminder
effect is driving our results, we would expect that advertising that matches consumers’
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browsing behavior more closely, would always lead to more positive consumer responses.
In contrast, we find that product-specific personalization also performs better for
consumers that only browse category pages, as visible in the positive coefficient of the
direct effect of product-specific personalization. This is a good indication that it is
the specificity of personalization that leads to more positive consumer responses not a
reminder effect.
2.5.3 Consumer Demographics
As our social targeting operationalization does not represent an experimental treatment
variable, we run the risk that the effect that we find for social targeting is confounded by
other factors, omitted from our analysis. A major concern is that consumers self-select
into being connected to our partner company on Facebook. These consumers are by
default socially targeted and see socially endorsed ads. Next to that, these consumers
are also likely to be different from consumers that are not connected with our partner
company on Facebook. This difference in unobserved consumer characteristics might
drive the negative effect of social targeting on consumer responses to social retargeting
ads. To investigate that, we make use of the fact that the Facebook advertising tool
gives us access to additional demographic information on the consumers that we
address with ads. More precisely, we make use of age and gender information of
consumers in our analysis to see whether demographic factors, that are likely to be
correlated with other unobserved consumer characteristics, change the coefficient of
our social targeting variable. We re-run our main models for both click and purchase
probabilities and include gender and age information as control variables.14
Table 2.6 gives the results of our analysis.15 For the model for click probabilities, we
find that the results are consistent with our main models. We find that when controlling
for age categories and gender, although decreasing in magnitude, the negative effect
of social targeting and the interaction between product-specific personalization and
social targeting are still negative and significant.
14For a limited number of consumers, Facebook does not have the gender or age information and
returns the value unknown. We include these categories as baselines in our analysis, also because we
are not interested in what the actual effect of age or gender is but whether there are other confounding
factors that explain the effect of social targeting.
15For both logistic models the number of observations deviates slightly from the number of
observations in our main models. This is the case as some age categories do perfectly predict that no
click or purchase occurs. Observations for these categories are therefore excluded from the models.
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Table 2.6: Logistic Regressions for Click and Purchase Probabilities Controlling for
Consumer Characteristics
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Click Purchase
product-specific 0.795∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.397)
social targeting −0.108∗∗∗ −0.365
(0.022) (0.415)
product-specific × social targeting −0.067∗∗ −0.303
(0.031) (0.487)
age 13-17 1.069 omitted
(1.034)
age 18-24 −0.506∗∗∗ 0.870
(0.167) (1.086)
age 25-34 −0.539∗∗∗ 1.050
(0.166) (1.084)
age 35-44 −0.246 1.219
(0.166) (1.084)
age 45-54 0.036 1.341
(0.167) (1.085)
age 55-64 0.290 1.342
(0.177) (1.140)
female 0.035 −0.397
(0.101) (0.413)
male 0.195∗ −0.015
(0.101) (0.411)
date controls Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes
Constant −3.931∗∗∗ −8.237∗∗∗
(0.137) (1.070)
Observations 3,476,619 3,476,585
Chi2 7,367.108 502.428
-2 Log Likelihood 294,951.426 18,925.425
AIC 295,041.426 19,013.425
BIC 295,629.197 19,588.133
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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This strengthens our argument that the negative effect is actually driven by the
conflicting effect of making the social targeting explicit in personalized advertising.
When estimating the model for purchase probabilities, we find that the effects for social
targeting and the interaction of social targeting with product-specific personalization
are negative but non-significant. Although, this does not allow us to confirm our
hypothesis that social targeting does negatively influence purchase probabilities, we
do also find no support for a positive impact of social targeting on consumer responses
to personalized ads as suggested in previous research (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker,
2016).
2.6 Discussion
With the growing availability of detailed online data on consumers and their online
behaviors, opportunities in advertising personalization are constantly increasing. This
research is among the first studies to investigate the effects of advertising personaliza-
tion in social retargeting. More specifically, we investigate how consumers respond
to personalization specificity in ads and whether their responses change when being
socially targeted. We distinguish between two different levels of personalization speci-
ficity: category-specific and product-specific personalization. In collaboration with
our partner company, we ran a field experiment to readdress consumers on Facebook
after their website visits with these two types of personalized ads, using consumers’
browsing behavior observed on the company’s e-commerce website to infer consumer
preferences. To assess consumers’ reactions to ads we measure clicks and/or purchases.
Our results offer several important insights into how consumers respond to ad
personalization. First, consumers generally respond more positively to product-specific
than category-specific personalization. This finding is in line with the notion that
highly personalized digital advertising matches consumer preferences more closely
and is therefore perceived as more relevant by consumers (Arora et al., 2008). Our
finding contradicts prior research that showed that less personalized generic brand ads
perform better than more personalized ads, unless consumers have narrowed down their
preferences and are close to making their purchase decision (Lambrecht and Tucker,
2013). We attribute the difference in findings to our cleaner experimental design that
allows us to isolate the effects of personalization specificity unconfounded of other
mechanisms. We make sure that our two ad treatments differ solely in the level of
personalization specificity. Previous research, that showed that dynamically retargeted
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ads perform worse than generic brand ads, potentially suffers from effects originating
in the differences in ad designs. Less visually attractive dynamic retargeting ads or
the fact that dynamic retargeting ads display several products making it more difficult
for consumers to decide which product to click might cause dynamic retargeting ads
to perform worse than generic brand ads.
To make sure it is the level of personalization specificity that drives our results, we
rule out alternative explanations and further investigate the underlying mechanisms.
In case a reminder effect was driving the finding that product-specific ads lead to
more positive consumer responses, we would expect such ads to work better for
only consumers that browsed actual product pages. These consumers would then be
reminded of their last visited product and could pick up their purchase process where
they left. However, we find product-specific ads also work better for consumers that
browsed only the category pages. Furthermore, we find that both personalized ad
treatments decrease in performance with an increase in the time between a consumers’
website visit and an ad impression. This is because consumers develop their preferences
over time rendering personalization based on previously observed consumer behavior
less relevant (Simonson, 2005). We also find that highly personalized ads work better
for consumers with more developed preferences, indicated by their browsing behavior.
Both of these findings suggest that our ads are being perceived as personalized by
consumers leaving us confident to have adequately operationalized ad personalization.
Second, we investigate the effects of social targeting on consumer responses to
personalized ads. We find that, surprisingly, socially targeting consumers with per-
sonalized ads has a negative effect on consumer responses. This finding contradicts
previous findings that suggested a positive impact of social targeting because of
homophily of connected users and informational social influence (Bakshy et al., 2012;
Tucker, 2016). These studies point out that (1) advertisers should be able to predict
consumers’ preferences more accurately as consumers’ preferences should be similar to
the preferences of their connected peers (homophily); and (2) displaying friends’ names
in an ad leads to more trust in the advertiser and a higher perceived ad relevance
(social influence). However, our results show that in the context of personalized ads,
social targeting in fact negatively influences consumer responses.
We explain this result using the uniqueness theory (Chan et al., 2012), which
reconciles consumers’ need to identify themselves with others (social identities) and
their urge to be different with the goal to define their personal identity (Brewer, 1991;
Snyder and Fromkin, 1980). The distinction we draw between social identity and
personal identity in uniqueness theory is important in our context, which distinguishes
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our work from earlier research in social advertising. The focus of our study lies on
personalized advertising, rather than advertising in general. Research has pointed
out the conflict between social identities and individuals self-concepts where the
emphasis of social identities can lead to a depersonalization process (Brewer, 1991).
We argue that through the inclusion of friends’ names in the ad text, consumers are
confronted with social identities that depersonalize ads presented to them. Seeing ads
that recommend products specifically for consumers trigger an increase in perceived
personalization. However, the inclusion of social identities via friend endorsements does
conflict with personalized recommendations. Therefore, social endorsements decrease
consumers’ feeling that an ad has been uniquely personalized to their preferences
leading to a lower propensity to positively respond to personalized ads.
If social targeting interferes with the personalization of advertising as it conflicts
with consumers’ perception of uniqueness, this conflict should be enhanced for more
specific personalization. Thus, we also tested if social targeting negatively moderates
personalization specificity. We empirically find that ads that are more specific in their
personalization, and are therefore perceived as more unique, are more severely harmed
by social targeting. Our results are robust when controlling for consumer demographics
(age and gender).
2.6.1 Theoretical Contributions
Despite the increasing popularity of social targeting and ad personalization, studies
investigating personalized advertising on social networks are scarce. While prior
research has considered the respective effect of ad personalization (Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015a; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013) and social targeting (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker,
2014, 2016) in isolation, we offer a first consideration of the combination of ad
personalization and social targeting.
First, we advance the discussion on adequate levels of advertising personalization
(Arora et al., 2008). By analyzing consumer responses to personalization specificity
in digital ads, we challenge prior findings that claimed that less personalized ads
lead to more positive consumer responses in most cases (Lambrecht and Tucker,
2013). We affirm that more specific ad personalization, that offers consumers a more
specific product recommendation in personalized ads, leads to more positive consumer
responses.
Second, we are the fist to jointly investigate advertising personalization and social
targeting. By investigating these advertising techniques jointly, we are able to identify
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performance limitations caused by a combining these advertising techniques. This way,
we are able to promote a better understanding of ad personalization and its limitations.
We find that socially targeted consumers are less responsive to personalized ads,
contradicting prior findings that assert the positive effect of social targeting (Bakshy
et al., 2012; Tucker, 2016). Although social targeting has been considered in the
advertising literature, no prior work to our knowledge has explored the combined effect
of social targeting and ad personalization. We show that the use of friends’ names
to personalize ads has a negative effect on consumer responses to personalized ads.
We also find that social targeting negatively moderates the effect of personalization
specificity. That is, consumers react less positive to ads that recommend a specific
product to them based on their preferences when they see that their friends endorse
the ad, leading to the depersonalization of the ad.
2.6.2 Practical Implications
Advertising personalization enjoys an increasing popularity in the digital advertising
industry with most marketers praising its higher response and engagement rates
(EMarketer, 2015). However, advertisers struggle to find the optimal specifications
for their personalized ads. Our results shed light on their question of how specific
advertising personalization should be and inform ad platforms and policy makers.
First our research can help marketers to define their personalization strategy. Our
research suggests that more specific ad personalization leads to more positive consumer
responses. Furthermore, personalized advertising decreases in performance with an
increase in the time between a consumers’ website visit and the confrontation with a
personalized ad. We recommend firms to retarget consumers with highly specific ad
personalization as soon as possible after their website visits.
From a technical perspective, highly specific advertising personalization requires
firms to implement more complex systems that are more costly to maintain compared
to systems for less specific ad personalization (Zhang and Wedel, 2009). Although we
cannot directly address the question of whether the implementation of such systems
is financially beneficial for a firm, we can provide evidence that more specific ad
personalization leads to more positive consumer responses, which could justify the
financial investment for such systems.
Next, our findings challenge Facebook’s default strategy to socially target consumers
whenever possible. We find that socially targeting consumers decreases, rather than
increases, advertising performance in the context of personalized ads. While ads that
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are more specific and closer to consumers’ preferences lead to more positive consumer
responses, exploiting and using consumers’ social connections seems to come at a cost.
Currently, advertisers do not have the option to not include social endorsements in
social ads. Our empirical evidence suggests that social networking ad platforms should
reevaluate their policies and assess whether socially targeted ads do underperform
untargeted ads contingent on the type of advertising, e.g. personalized advertising.
In light of recent events social networking sites, such as Facebook, should consider
limiting their use of consumers’ information for commercial purposes. Our results show
that for personalized advertising, social targeting actually decreases ad performance,
suggesting removing social endorsements from ads might be beneficial for both users
and advertisers.16
2.6.3 Limitations and Future Research
Although our study provides valuable new insights into the personalization of digital
advertising, some limitations need to be considered when interpreting our findings.
First, our study focuses on the comparison of different levels of advertising personal-
ization specificity. Therefore, our results offer insights into which level of personalization
specificity leads to more positive consumer responses. Future research can examine
the overall effectiveness of personalized ads by comparing treated consumers with non-
treated consumers or to consumers that are addressed with non-personalized ads.17
Such approach would represent the assessment of ad effectiveness more adequately as
promoted by recent research (Johnson et al., 2017a,b; Lewis and Rao, 2014).
Second, we address consumers with ads that are personalized based on their browsing
behavior. Therefore, only consumers that have indicated their interest in our partner
firm’s products, by visiting the firm’s website, are eligible to be participants of our
experiment. Although such a selection might raise concerns regarding to what extent
our findings can be generalized out of sample, such a selection is common in the practice
of advertising personalization. Previous work discussed the issue that consumers need
16In March 2018, the New York Times published an article on information from 87 million Facebook
profiles being harvested for commercial purpose by data analytics company Cambridge Analytica
(Meredith, 2018). Next to the media attention and concerns of social network users this led to an
investigation by the Federal Trade Commission into whether Facebook had violated user privacy
regulations.
17A major reason for not using non-personalized ads as the baseline in our experiment is that our
partner company knew they had worse performance compared to personalized ads. Therefore, our
partner company was not willing to invest marketing budget in such an ad treatment.
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to be profiled before they can be addressed with personalized advertising (Thirumalai
and Sinha, 2013).
Furthermore, such a selection of consumers has raised concerns regarding the
presence of an activity bias that might confound ad effectiveness estimates (Lewis
et al., 2011). The term activity bias describes that more active consumers are more
likely to be addressed with ads. Such a selection leads to an upwards bias in ad
effectiveness estimates as these more active consumers are more likely to respond
positively to ads than the ’average’ consumer. With respect to our study, we are likely
to generally select more active consumers, consumers that visit our partner firm’s
website, into our sample. Furthermore, we are more likely to address more active
consumers (more frequently) with ads as they are more likely to log into their Facebook
accounts allowing us to serve ads to them. In our case, such an activity bias should
influence both treatment groups, category- and product-specific ads, symmetrically,
therefore not biasing our estimates in a way that limits how we can compare category-
with product-specific ads. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this activity bias might
influence our out of sample generalizability as less active consumers are less likely to
be part of our sample.
Third, it is worth noting that our social targeting operationalization does not
represent a randomized treatment variable in our field experiment. As such we run the
risk that unobserved consumer characteristics might bias our results. More specifically,
consumers that are connected to the advertiser via a friend might be different from
consumers that are not connected. Recent work has pointed out that unobserved
consumer characteristics can heavily bias ad effectiveness estimates that are not derived
from randomized experiments (Gordon et al., 2018). We try to remedy this issue by
controlling for consumer demographics (i.e., gender and age). We find that results
remain consistent with our main models, mitigating the concern of omitted variable
bias. Future research could consider the type of relationship between a consumer and
the ’friends’ displayed as endorsers, and investigate the moderating role of tie strength
between consumers and the friend(s) endorsing the ad more closely.
Fourth, it would be useful to understand the generalizability of the observed
effects for different product categories. Our partner company is specialized in selling
consumer electronics. Such search goods have lower consumption uncertainty compared
to experience goods, making it easier for consumers to assess the quality of the product
within an ad, and allowing firms to personalize ads more accurately. Previous research
that studied personalized ads focuses on ads for experience goods such as sports
fashion (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a) and holiday services (Lambrecht and Tucker,
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2013). Future research could investigate to what extent the type of advertised product
influences consumer responses.
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Appendices
A2.1 Social Actions per Ad Type
We provide some descriptive statistics regarding the frequency of social interactions
(shares, comments, likes) with the ads in Table A2.1 to give some insights on potential
contamination of our experimental treatments. More precisely, by conducting a social
interaction with an ad, this ad might potentially appear in the newsfeed of a consumer’s
friend displaying this social interaction together with the ad. We have no numbers
on how often advertising was displayed to individual consumers because of social
actions. In line with our main analyses, in which we find product-specific ads to
outperform category-specific ads, we also find that consumers more frequently interact
with product-specific ads. Based on the numbers presented in the table we consider
the problem of contamination as limited for the following reasons: (1) We find that the
absolute numbers of social actions are low compared to our sample size of 3,476,626
impressions. (2) A social action on an ad is not sufficient to determine that the ad
a consumer interacted with will be displayed to friends. This selection depends on
the Facebook algorithm that determines which content to serve to consumers on the
platform. (3) Given that an ad appears on a friend’s newsfeed, this friend needs to be
part of the experiment for the ad to represent an actual contamination.
Table A2.1: Social Actions per Ad Type
CS Ad PS Ad CS Ad [%] PS Ad [%] Total Total [%]
Post Shares 28 38 0.0012% 0.0033% 66 0.0019%
Post Comments 44 104 0.0019% 0.0091% 148 0.0043%
Post Likes 904 1062 0.0386% 0.0934% 1966 0.0565%
CS = category-specific; PS = product-specific
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A2.2 Economic Implications of Product-Specific
Personalization and Social Targeting
Table A2.2: Economic Implications for Clicks
Marginal Effect (%) Change (%) Absolute (pM) Absolute (Exp.)
product-specific 0.61% 120.38% 6.12 21, 425.25
social targeting −0.10% −13.03% −0.96 −3, 370.85
product-specific × social targeting −0.05% −0.46 −1, 592.50
Change (%) = the change in percentage compared to the baseline;
Absolute (pM) = absolute effect per 1,000 impressions;
Absolute (Exp.) = absolute effect for 3.5 million impressions in experiment
Table A2.3: Economic Implications for Purchases
Marginal Effect (%) Change (%) Absolute (pM) Absolute (Exp.)
product-specific 0.04% 213.92% 0.37 1, 301.30
social targeting −0.03% −62.22% −0.35 −1, 224.65
product-specific × social targeting −0.00% −0.02 −66.50
Change (%) = the change in percentage compared to the baseline;
Absolute (pM) = absolute effect per 1,000 impressions;
Absolute (Exp.) = absolute effect for 3.5 million impressions in experiment
A2.3 Data Structure Experiment
To be able to analyze the data from our experiment on an ad impression level, we
need to structure our campaigns in a way that allows us to disentangle the different
ad attributes in our analysis. In this section, we present a short summary of our data
structure that will allow the reader to understand how we received information on such
a granular level from the Facebook ad reporting tool. We are able to disentangle our
aggregated data with the help of three features: (1) campaign set-up, (2) Facebook’s
breakdown functionality, (3) Facebook’s reporting structure.
A2.3.1 Campaign Set-Up
We structured our campaigns in a way that allows us to distinguish between unique
combinations of ad characteristics. More specifically we distinguish between eight
features with a different number of attributes:
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[Personalization Specificity] × [Product Category] × [Browsing Behavior] × [Device]
× [Temporal Distance] × [Date] × [Country]
This data structure leaves us with 22,400 unique combinations of ad features for which
we know how many impressions where shown, how many clicks generated, and how
many purchases conducted.
A2.3.2 Facebook’s Breakdown Functionality
With the help of Facebook’s breakdown functionality in the reporting tool we are able
to get insights into aggregated consumer characteristics for our unique ad attribute
combinations.
[Age Group]×[Gender]
Facebook distinguishes between 8 age categories (including unknown) and 3 genders
(including unknown). This leaves us, taking our unique ad attribute combinations into
account, with a total of 537,600 unique attribute combinations.
A2.3.3 Facebook’s Reporting Structure
In Facebook’s reporting tool we can distinguish between social impressions and non-
social impressions. This way we know how many impressions for a unique ad attribute
combination were socially targeted of the overall number of impressions served for
a specific ad attribute combination. Further, the tool gives us the number of overall
clicks as well as the number of clicks on socially targeted ads. This way, we can
distinguish between socially targeted and non-socially targeted ads as well as the
respective number of clicks resulting from the unique ad attribute combination. For
clicks we have therefore 1,075,200 potential unique combinations of ad attributes and
their respective number of clicks. For purchases, the reporting tool does not distinguish
between purchases resulting from socially targeted ads and purchases resulting from
non-socially targeted ads. Therefore, we make use of the variation in the share of
socially targeted ads per each of the 537,600 unique ad attribute combinations to
assess the influence of social targeting on consumers’ purchase probabilities.
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A2.4 Consumer Response Likelihood Analysis on
Consumer-Level
We analyze our data on a consumer- instead of impression-level to assess the robustness
of our results. More precisely, our data allows us to infer unique consumer, campaign,
day combinations. This means that we know how many unique consumers for each of
our specific campaigns was addressed on a specific day of the experiment. The same
consumers can be then addressed the following day, where we are not able to link
these consumers to the consumers addressed the previous day. Therefore, our sample
size for this analysis (2,794,878 consumer, campaign, day observations) is significantly
larger than the number of consumers addressed in the experiment (198,234 individual
consumers). Consumers are addressed with ads on several days of the experiment.
Nevertheless, such analysis allows us to control for the fact that consumers might have
seen several ads on a specific day of the campaign.
Table A2.4: Consumer-Level Logistic Regressions for Click and Purchase Probabilities
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Click Purchase
product-specific 0.751∗∗∗ 1.142∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.381)
social targeting −0.126∗∗∗ −0.821∗∗
(0.023) (0.390)
product-specific × social targeting −0.067∗∗ −0.129
(0.032) (0.466)
date controls Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes
Constant −4.001∗∗∗ −6.718∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.348)
Observations 2,794,878 2,794,878
Chi2 5515.568 415.684
-2 Log Likelihood 269905.689 18545.444
AIC 269979.689 18619.444
BIC 270454.891 19094.646
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A2.5 Likelihood to Click Estimates Using Unique
Clicks
To assess the robustness of our main model for clicks, we replace our dependent
variable for clicks with a different operationalization. We analyze the impact of our
focal variables on unique clicks. Unique clicks do not count repeated clicks of consumers
that click on the same ad several times but instead count such repeated clicks as single
click instance.
Table A2.5: Logistic Regressions for Click Probabilities Using Unique Clicks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Click Click Click Click
product-specific 0.749∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.029)
social targeting −0.171∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.023)
product-specific × social targeting −0.077∗∗
(0.033)
date controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −4.162∗∗∗ −4.434∗∗∗ −4.294∗∗∗ −4.326∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035)
Observations 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626
Chi2 2,253.963 5,393.747 5,499.897 5,505.379
-2 Log Likelihood 275,488.388 272,348.603 272,242.453 272,236.972
AIC 275,556.388 272,418.603 272,314.453 272,310.972
BIC 276,000.481 272,875.759 272,784.670 272,794.250
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A2.6 Alternative Estimators for Click and
Purchase Probabilities
Table A2.6: Alternative Estimators for Click and Purchase Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Probit Click LPM Click Probit Purchase LPM Purchase
product-specific 0.2930∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.3283∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0003) (0.1048) (0.0002)
social targeting −0.0492∗∗∗ −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.2630∗∗ −0.0002∗∗
(0.0078) (0.0001) (0.1043) (0.0001)
product-specific × social targeting −0.0315∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗ −0.0396 −0.0005∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0003) (0.1282) (0.0002)
date controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −2.1754∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ −3.0891∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0004) (0.0942) (0.0001)
Observations 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626
R-squared 0.0020 0.0001
Chi2 6,131.8350 438.7122
-2 Log Likelihood 296,108.3296 18,989.1659
AIC 296,182.3296 19,063.1659
BIC 296,665.6078 19,546.4441
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
LPM = linear probability model
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A2.7 Estimates for Post-View Purchase Probability
As robustness check, we replace our dependent variable for purchases with a different
operationalization. In our main analysis, we operationalize purchases as purchases
contingent on having clicked on an ad that are conducted within 28 days after the
click. In the robustness check below, purchases represent purchases that occur within
7 days after having been exposed to an ad.
Table A2.7: Logistic Regressions for Purchase Probabilities Using Post-View Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Purchase Purchase Purchase Purchase
product-specific 0.251∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.167
(0.029) (0.029) (0.177)
social targeting −0.459∗∗∗ −0.509∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.150)
product-specific × social targeting 0.101
(0.215)
date controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −6.411∗∗∗ −6.490∗∗∗ −6.108∗∗∗ −6.068∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.081) (0.121) (0.148)
Observations 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626
Chi2 635.752 710.709 728.232 728.453
-2 Log Likelihood 76,642.014 76,567.058 76,549.535 76,549.314
AIC 76,710.014 76,637.058 76,621.535 76,623.314
BIC 77,154.107 77,094.213 77,091.751 77,106.592
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A2.8 Robustness Check: Average Reach of Ad
Attribute Combination
As we analyze our data on impression-level and do only have access to user information
in an aggregated manner we are not able to directly control for how many impressions
are served for a specific consumer. Nevertheless, the frequency of impressions is an
important control measure as a higher frequency of impressions per user for any of
the ad features we are focusing on might bias our results. A higher frequency per
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consumer for a certain attribute is likely to lead to a decrease in the effectiveness per
ad impression for this respective attribute. Therefore, we generate a variable that
measures the average reach for each of our unique ad attribute combinations. This
variable indicates the number of consumers reached divided by the impressions served
for each unique ad attribute combination. In case each impression for an ad attribute
combination reaches a unique consumer the variable takes the value 1. We include
this variable into our analysis to control for potential issues due to an unequal average
impression frequency for our personalization-specificity treatment as well as our social
targeting variable. Our analysis yields results consistent with our main models (see
Table A2.8 and Table A2.9).
Table A2.8: Logistic Regressions for Click Probabilities Controlling for Average Reach
of Ad Attribute Combination
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Click Click Click
product-specific 0.646∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028)
social targeting −0.116∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022)
product-specific × social targeting −0.070∗∗
(0.031)
reach 2.334∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
date controls Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant −6.092∗∗∗ −5.943∗∗∗ −5.972∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.059) (0.061)
Observations 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626
Chi2 7,458.736 7,512.531 7,517.682
-2 Log Likelihood 294,859.901 294,806.107 294,800.956
AIC 294,931.901 294,880.107 294,876.956
BIC 295,402.118 295,363.385 295,373.295
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A2.9: Logistic Regressions for Purchase Probabilities Controlling for Average
Reach of Ad Attribute Combination
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Purchase Purchase Purchase
product-specific 0.938∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.376)
social targeting −0.663∗∗∗ −0.510
(0.215) (0.387)
product-specific × social targeting −0.221
(0.460)
reach 3.873∗∗∗ 3.727∗∗∗ 3.732∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.352) (0.352)
date controls Yes Yes Yes
product category controls Yes Yes Yes
country controls Yes Yes Yes
device controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant −10.661∗∗∗ −10.002∗∗∗ −10.131∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.379) (0.465)
Observations 3,476,626 3,476,626 3,476,626
Chi2 545.218 554.250 554.481
-2 Log Likelihood 18882.660 18873.628 18873.397
AIC 18954.660 18947.628 18949.397
BIC 19424.877 19430.906 19445.737
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3
Social Influence and Visual Attention in the
Personalization Privacy Paradox:
An Eye Tracking Study
1
3.1 Introduction
Personalization of marketing communication has been praised by advertising platforms
for its positive implications for advertising performance (Adobe Systems Inc., 2014).
By increasing availability and use of individual-level consumer data, advertising can be
personalized to match individual consumer preferences. Providers of personalization
technology point towards consumers’ positive reactions to advertising personalization,
such as increases in click and purchase probability, caused by an increase in ad
relevance. However, research shows that consumers are concerned about the use of their
information to personalize advertising content (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015b; Sutanto
et al., 2013; Tucker, 2014). Consumers experience information privacy concerns, which
negatively influence consumer responses to ads, as third parties use their information
1Earlier versions of this study appeared in the following conference proceedings or were presented
at the below mentioned conferences and workshops:
• Frick, T.W., Li, T. & Pavlou, P. (2017). The Role of Social Influence and Attention in
the Personalization Privacy Paradox: An Eye Tracking Study. In Statistical Challenges in
eCommerce Research Symposium (SCECR), Hanoi, Vietnam.
• Frick, T.W., Li, T. & Pavlou, P. (2016). Investigating the Impact of Social Influence on the
Personalization-Privacy Paradox: An Eye Tracking Study. In INFORMS Annual Meeting,
Nashville, US.
• Frick, T.W. & Li, T. (2015). Understanding Information Privacy Concerns in Social Advertising:
An Eye Tracking Study. In 37th ISMS Marketing Science Conference, Baltimore, US.
58 Social Influence and Visual Attention in the Personalization Privacy Paradox
for personalization purposes without being in control of their own data. “Information
privacy refers to the desire of individuals to control or have some influence over data
about themselves” (Be´langer and Crossler, 2011, p. 1017). Consumer privacy concerns
describe that consumers are concerned that they are not in control over the use of
their personal data.
Consumer privacy concerns tend to be especially present in contexts in which
consumers question the value that they gain from personalization and where they
perceive that third parties aim to monetize on their information, which is common in
advertising (Sutanto et al., 2013). This leads to the challenge for firms to adequately
balance an increase in ad relevance with the simultaneous increase in consumer
privacy concerns caused by ad personalization to avoid negative reactions to ads from
consumers. The simultaneous increase in ad relevance and consumer privacy concerns
through personalization has been coined personalization privacy paradox (Awad and
Krishnan, 2006; Sutanto et al., 2013). While consumers’ valuation of marketing content
increases as they are exposed to more relevant ads, they also experience higher privacy
concerns as the personalization comes at the cost of their personal data.
In contexts that are rich of individual-level data and therefore attractive for per-
sonalization purposes, such as social networking sites, consumers are likely to be
addressed with personalized ads that trigger privacy concerns (Tucker, 2014). Social
advertising allows firms to personalize ads based on demographics, interests, browsing
behavior, and, peculiar to social advertising, social connections. In social ads, the
social connections used to personalize ads are made explicit as social endorsements.
By including social endorsements in social ads, which are information cues on con-
sumers’ friends that like the advertising firm, firms try to trigger informational social
influence. Informational social influence describes that consumers are influenced in
their decision making by information about the actions of their peers (Kwahk and
Ge, 2012). For example, when a consumer sees that one of her friends likes a movie
on social media, this information will influence the consumer’s decision to watch this
movie. The information that the friend likes the movie is used to infer its quality.
Further, informational social influence leads individuals to perceive externally received
information to be true (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). Research has pointed out that
through informational social influence consumers perceive ads as more relevant and
credible (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker, 2016).
Although firms can make use of more detailed consumer profiles in social adver-
tising that improve personalization of ads, these ads are, due to incorporation of
detailed consumer data, also more likely to induce consumer privacy concerns. Despite
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the increasing popularity of social advertising, little is known about how it affects
consumers’ privacy concerns.
While the personalization privacy paradox has been investigated in the advertising
context before (Aguirre et al., 2015; Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015b; Lee et al., 2011;
Sutanto et al., 2013), we seek to contribute to the literature by investigating whether
consumers’ information privacy concerns can be mitigated through informational
social influence in social advertising. As informational social influence creates trust in
the advertising firm, consumers might display a higher acceptance for the use of their
personal information for personalization purposes.
To get a deeper understanding of consumers’ cognitive processes when evaluating
ads, we assess the role of visual attention in the personalization privacy paradox by
recording consumers’ eye movements. By measuring visual attention, which has been
identified as key coordination mechanism for information processing (LaBerge, 1995),
we can identify which information is being processed by an individual when evaluating
an ad (Wedel and Pieters, 2007).
While attention has been mostly viewed as an enabler for ad performance (Lee
and Ahn, 2012; Wedel and Pieters, 2007), research in the area of psychology points
towards the presence of a negativity bias directing consumers’ attention (Fiske, 1980;
Kanouse, 1984; Smith et al., 2003). The negativity bias in visual attention describes
that individuals are more likely to dedicate attention to stimuli that cause negative
emotions. By measuring both consumer privacy concerns, which have been shown
to cause negative emotions such as vulnerability (Aguirre et al., 2015), and visual
attention, we are able to get unique insights into the presence of such a negativity bias
for personalized advertising. This investigation is especially important as it challenges
the generally positive role of visual attention in advertising. The presence of such a
negativity bias directing consumers’ attention when exposed to personalized ads would
lead to higher attention towards ads that trigger higher consumer privacy concerns.
Visual attention would then not necessarily have positive implications for consumer
responses to ads but might negatively influence ad performance.
Our study aims to answer two research questions related to the personalization
privacy paradox in the context of advertising: (1) Can informational social influence
mitigate the increase in consumer privacy concerns caused by the personalization of
ads? (2) How does consumers’ attention, which is required to cognitively and affectively
process information in an advertisement, influence ad performance in the context of
the personalization privacy paradox?
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To answer these research questions, we conducted a multi-method study using a set
of lab experiments, eye tracking technology, and questionnaires, to investigate how
social advertising affects consumers’ privacy concerns by shaping their affective and
cognitive reactions. Consumers’ attention patterns give an excellent view on which
information of a marketing stimuli consumers process and present a basis to predict
consumers’ reactions (Wedel and Pieters, 2007).
For the experiments, we created different social advertising conditions in a lab
environment resulting in a 2×2×2 between-subject experimental design. We randomly
assigned participants to being confronted with (1) personalized or non-personalized
ads, (2) which were socially endorsed or not, and (3) advertised two different types of
products. We constructed personalized advertising based on experimental scenarios
and dynamically include participants’ actual social connections to socially endorse
ads. We measure consumer responses to the different ad conditions by investigating
whether participants in the experiment click on the ad presented to them.
We find that informational social influence leads to more positive consumer responses
to ads, measured as clicks. Nevertheless, informational social influence does not
mitigate privacy concerns triggered by the personalization of advertisements. Further,
our study disentangles the attentional processes within the personalization privacy
paradox. We find that personalization positively affects consumer responses to ads,
partially mediated by an increase in attention towards the ad. At the same time, our
analysis of serial mediation reveals that there is a significant negative indirect effect
as personalization increases privacy concerns which lead to a decrease in attention,
eventually decreasing advertising performance. This finding supports the notion of a
generally positive effect of attention on advertising performance and refutes the idea
that firms can leverage a negativity bias in attention to attract consumers’ eye balls.
Our results offer valuable insights for marketing practitioners: First, while informa-
tional social influence cannot mitigate privacy concerns triggered by personalized ads,
it directly affects ad performance. While former studies claimed that personalization of
ads does not increase attention compared to non-personalized ads for consumers with
low cognitive demand tasks (Bang and Wojdynski, 2016), we show that personalized
ads significantly increase attention, even for low cognitive demand tasks, such as
browsing on social networking sites. Notably, we show that intrusive ads, which cause
privacy concerns, will eventually decrease ad performance via a reduction in attention.
By taking a multi-method approach, we contribute to the IS literature shedding light
on the personalization privacy paradox in an advertising context. Our study differs
from former work on the personalization privacy paradox as we observe actual privacy
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concerns of consumers originating in confrontation with personalized ads. Most prior
studies focus on consumers’ willingness to be profiled for the personalization of services
prior to an actual confrontation with a personalized service (Awad and Krishnan,
2006). We acknowledge a clear difference between the assessment of consumers’ privacy
concerns ex ante and ex post the confrontation with a personalized service.
While several factors that mitigate privacy concerns in a personalization context
such as justification of personalization (White et al., 2008), trust (Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015b; Chellappa and Sin, 2005), control over personal information (Song et al., 2016;
Tucker, 2014), and communication media (Aguirre et al., 2016) have been investigated,
we are the first to assess the role of informational social influence in mitigating privacy
concerns caused by personalization. Although theory points towards a presence of such
a mitigation, we do not find empirical support for a moderating effect. Informational
social influence does not help marketers to overcome consumer privacy concerns in
personalized ads. This might be the case as the inclusion of friend connections in ads
represents a use of personal information in itself, triggering privacy concerns that
counterbalance the moderating effect of informational social influence.
To the best of our knowledge, we present the first study to empirically test the
simultaneous influence of personalization and privacy concerns on consumers’ attention
and the resulting effects on consumer responses to ads. We theoretically derive an
explanation for both a potential positive and negative effect of consumer privacy
concerns on attention towards a personalized ad. While research in psychology points
towards the presence of a negativity bias directing consumers’ attention, suggesting
an increase in attention with an increase in privacy concerns, we find that privacy
concerns do negatively influence consumers’ attention. This finding is in line with the
notion of attention being an enabler for ad performance and underlines the positive role
of visual attention in advertising. While consumers’ attention is limited and different
information stimuli are competing for consumers’ attention simultaneously (Desimone
and Duncan, 1995), we find that more intrusive ads cannot help firms to gain more of
consumers’ attention. Although more intrusive ads that increase consumers’ privacy
concerns might initially generate more attention towards an ad, the effect of privacy
concerns on attention overall is negative, leading to a decrease in ad effectiveness for
more intrusive ads.
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3.2 Related Literature
The investigation of the performance of personalized advertising dependent on adver-
tising characteristics and consumers’ perceptions of these characteristics has a long
history in marketing research (Arora et al., 2008). Related to that, several studies focus
on the cognitive processes within consumers that determine their reaction towards ads
(Pieters et al., 1999, 2010; Pieters and Wedel, 2012; Rosbergen et al., 1997; Wedel and
Pieters, 2000). Eye tracking methodology allows researchers to get an indication of
which information consumers process cognitively, as attention towards an information
element represents a prerequisite for cognitive processing (Wedel and Pieters, 2007).
Early research in the area of visual marketing investigated the predictive power of
eye fixation data on consumers’ ability to distinguish different print ads and purchase
probabilities (Treistman and Gregg, 1979). Leven (1991) found that consumers tend
to scan print ads before investigating them in detail. Rosbergen et al. (1997) point
out the importance of consumer heterogeneity when investigating consumer attention.
Consumers differ in the attention patterns they show towards ads. This finding is
especially crucial, as it shows that not only bottom-up, ad design features, but also
top-down factors, consumer characteristics, determine attention patterns. Related
studies showed that consumers’ goals significantly influence consumers’ attention
patterns (Pieters and Wedel, 2007).
Visual attention has also been found to represent an important mechanism when
trying to understand ad effectiveness and wear-out, where ads perform less well with an
increase in the number of a consumers’ exposures to an ad (Pieters et al., 1999). While
fixations on an advertisement’s brand and image increase brand memory, advertising
text has been found to not influence brand memory (Wedel and Pieters, 2000).
Another focal topic within the area of visual marketing is banner blindness. Banner
blindness describes consumers’ habit of training themselves to ignore digital banner
advertisements, therefore reducing ad banners’ ability to distract consumers from their
focal task (Dre`ze and Hussherr, 2003). Consumers’ attention patterns when confronted
with banner ads challenge the commonly used click-through success measure as their
attention leads to an increase in brand awareness independent of a click-through.
Researchers found that most consumers do actually fixate on banner ads at least once
and memorize ads that match website content better (Hervet and Gue, 2011). Other
research finds that animations in banners do decrease consumers’ attention as well as
the positive effect of attention on memory (Lee and Ahn, 2012).
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3.3 Theory
Because of the increase in the popularity of ad personalization technologies and the
intertwined requirement for granular consumer data, the topic of consumer privacy
has moved into the focus of both researchers and policy makers. Concurrent to the
increase in ad relevance through personalization, consumers are concerned that they
lose control over their personal information that is being used to adjust ads to their
preferences. Although advertising effectiveness seems to be positively influenced by
ad personalization, privacy concerns decrease advertising effectiveness creating the
necessity for firms to balance these two effects. In this section, we will provide the
underlying theoretical concepts for our study and develop the conceptual model that
guided our research. We will start by discussing advertising personalization and the
personalization privacy paradox. Next, we will introduce the concept of informational
social influence and how informational social influence might mitigate the effect of
ad personalization on consumer privacy concerns. Lastly, we will explain the role of
consumer attention related to cognitive processes that determine consumers’ reactions
towards ads. Firms are increasingly focusing on measuring consumers’ reactions to ads,
which we label consumer response in our study, to assess advertising performance.2
3.3.1 Advertising Personalization
Advertising personalization describes the firm-initiated adjustment of advertising
content towards the preferences of consumers (Arora et al., 2008) with the ultimate
goal to positively influence consumers’ perceptions and make them conduct business
with the advertiser (Ansari and Mela, 2003). Advertising content is adjusted to match
the preferences of either a consumer segment (one-to-n personalization) or an individ-
ual consumer (one-to-one). Advertising personalization has been studied in varying
contexts such as e-Mail marketing (Sahni et al., 2018; Wattal et al., 2012; White et al.,
2008), banner ads (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013), social
media advertising (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker, 2014, 2016), and mobile advertising
(Kim and Han, 2014). Prior research mostly points out the positive implications of
advertising personalization on ad performance. In the context of e-Mail marketing,
research finds that individually personalizing e-Mails by including consumers’ names in
the subject line positively influences open rates, sales leads, purchases, and consumer
retention while decreasing the number of consumers unsubscribing from an e-Mail
2In our analysis, we operationalize consumer response as consumers’ propensity to click on an ad.
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list (Sahni et al., 2018). Bleier and Eisenbeiss (2015a) show that highly personalized
banner ads do outperform less personalized ads. In the mobile advertising context,
personalization is found to have a positive relationship with ad informativeness, credi-
bility, and the entertaining aspects of an advertising message (Kim and Han, 2014).
In line with former findings we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Personalization of ads leads to more positive consumer re-
sponses to ads.
Although personalization has been found to have a positive impact on advertising
effectiveness through an increase in advertising relevance, research has also revealed the
negative implications of ad personalization through an increase in information privacy
concerns. “Information privacy refers to the desire of individuals to control or have
some influence over data about themselves” (Be´langer and Crossler, 2011, p. 1017).
To successfully personalize advertisements, advertisers require not only consumer
data to infer preferences but also consumers’ willingness to be profiled and to adopt
services that are personalized to their preferences (Chellappa and Sin, 2005). Highly
personalized advertisements require detailed information on consumers to adjust ad
content adequately to consumers’ preferences (Arora et al., 2008). Consumers’ feelings
of losing control over their private information that is being used by a third-party
causes information privacy concerns (Sutanto et al., 2013). Aguirre et al. (2015)
show that consumers feel vulnerable when realizing that advertisers collected their
information to personalize ads without their prior consent. This feeling of vulnerability
leads to negative consumer responses for personalized ads. The conceptual conflict
of personalization inducing both higher ad relevance and consumer privacy concerns
is coined personalization privacy paradox (Awad and Krishnan, 2006; Sutanto et al.,
2013).
3.3.2 Personalization Privacy Paradox
Although personalized content in digital advertising receives higher levels of attention
it also increases privacy concerns of users (Malheiros et al., 2012). Personalized
digital advertising faces the constant trade-off between relevance gain and privacy
cost in the form of personalization reactance - “that is, psychological resistance in
response to subjectively inappropriate personalization” (White et al., 2008, p. 40).
Personalization technologies rely on consumers’ personal information to match content
to their preferences (Sutanto et al., 2013). Nevertheless, by choice consumers tend to
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restrict third parties’ access to their personal information (Utz and Kramer, 2009).
The utilization of personal information by third parties leads to consumer privacy
concerns. Consumers have been found to be especially privacy sensitive about their
personal information in an advertising context (Awad and Krishnan, 2006). This
can be explained by the fact that personalized advertising is being perceived as less
beneficial compared to other personalized services, e.g. personalized music play lists. In
the context of e-Mail marketing, research found that consumers show personalization
reactance when confronted with highly personalized marketing communication which
is not justified by the advertiser (White et al., 2008) and that increasing the level
of personalization leads to higher perceived privacy risks of consumers (Song et al.,
2016). We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Personalization of ads increases consumer privacy concerns.
When looking at the impact of consumer privacy concerns, research found that
privacy concerns decrease consumers’ willingness to adopt personalized services (Sheng
et al., 2008; Song et al., 2016). When comparing users’ willingness to save personalized
offers from a mobile application, Sutanto et al. (2013) find that consumers are more
willing to do so in a privacy-safe version of the application. Privacy calculus theory
describes, that when deciding on whether to release personal information consumers
compare the costs in form of privacy concerns with the benefits gained from accessing
a service (Xu et al., 2011). When privacy concerns are too high they inhibit consumers
to adopt a service. Therefore, privacy concerns represent a cost that is factored
into consumers’ decision whether to adopt personalized services (Chellappa and Sin,
2005). When privacy costs are higher than the benefits gained from a personalized
advertisement consumers will react negatively. In the context of e-Mail marketing,
personalization reactance was found to decrease consumers’ willingness to accept
offers (White et al., 2008). Next to that, privacy concerns of consumers have been
found to increase ad avoidance (Baek and Morimoto, 2012) and to decrease consumers’
intentions to click on banner ads (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015b). In line with former
findings we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Consumer privacy concerns lead to negative consumer re-
sponses to ads.
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3.3.3 Informational Social Influence
Social Influence has been found to influence both consumers’ product evaluations and
decisions (Yadav et al., 2013). Normative social influence describes what is commonly
known as peer pressure, where individuals feel social pressure to follow the decisions
of their peers to belong to and not conflict with a certain social group. On the other
hand, informational social influence describes the informational signal that consumers
receive from their peers that is taken into account when evaluating their environment
(Burnkrant and Cousineau, 1975). Informational social influence helps consumers
to evaluate aspects of their environment, as information inferred from their peer’s
association with these aspects reduces uncertainty (Park and Lessig, 1977).
In this paper, we focus on peers’ association with a commercial product adver-
tised to consumers and how this association is affecting consumers’ responses to ads.
Consumers have the tendency to believe that their peers made product decisions
based on better information and are therefore inclined to follow their peers’ decisions
(Bonabeau, 2004). Informational social influence leads individuals to evaluate infor-
mation received from third-parties as trustworthy (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). With
increasing uncertainty, the influence of peers increases (Liu and Sutanto, 2012). It is
assumed that informational social influence plays a role for a wide range of product
categories (Yadav et al., 2013). In social advertising, advertisers try to tap into the
effect of informational social influence by making the association of consumers’ peers
with advertisers explicit to consumers. This allows consumers to decrease uncertainty
regarding the advertised product as they learn that their connected peers are in a
favorable relationship with the advertising brand. In social advertising, informational
social influence, operationalized as social endorsements, has been found to positively
influence consumers’ responses to ads (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker, 2014, 2016). We
follow this argumentation and hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Informational social influence leads to more positive consumer
responses to ads.
3.3.4 Informational Social Influence as Mitigation of Privacy
Concerns
Research in the area of the personalization privacy paradox has investigated potential
moderators that influence the strength of the relationship between personalization
and consumer privacy concerns. According to White et al. (2008), personalization
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reactance can be mitigated by justification of personalization and perceived utility of
the personalized service. Essentially, when consumers perceive the use of their personal
data as justified as it increases the quality of the service deploying the personalization,
they react less negative to the use of their data. Next to that, trust in the advertiser has
been shown to alleviate the effect of personalization on privacy concerns (Bleier and
Eisenbeiss, 2015b; Chellappa and Sin, 2005). Furthermore, when consumers’ perception
of control over their personal information increases, personalization induces lower levels
of privacy concerns (Song et al., 2016; Tucker, 2014). Moreover, the communication
medium through which the personalized communication is transmitted influences the
strength of the relationship between personalization and privacy concerns (Aguirre
et al., 2016).
In our study, we investigate whether informational social influence can mitigate
the relationship between advertising personalization and consumer privacy concerns.
In line with previous research, we argue that informational social influence leads to
consumers evaluating advertising more positively (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker, 2016).
Consumers evaluate information received from third-parties as more trustworthy
through informational social influence (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). This increase
in trust is likely decreasing consumers’ perceived privacy risks (Lee and Rha, 2016)
and feeling of vulnerability due to an invasion of their privacy (Aguirre et al., 2015).
Both perceived privacy risks (Lee and Rha, 2016) and trust in the advertiser (Bleier
and Eisenbeiss, 2015b) have been found to moderate the effect of personalization on
consumer privacy concerns.
Next to that, consumers are particularly affected by informational social influence if
it increases their understanding or helps them to deal with a problematic situation or
conflict (Burnkrant and Cousineau, 1975). This means that consumers are especially
prone to being influenced by others if they are facing a conflict for which they need to
find a solution. We argue that consumers are confronted with such a conflict when
facing the personalization privacy paradox induced by a personalized ad. Although,
consumers perceive the presented ad as more relevant they are concerned about
their privacy and that their personal information is being used without their consent.
With the aim to resolve this conflict, consumers are likely to process the information
that their friends seem to be in a favorable relationship with the advertiser. Such
information should decrease the effect of personalization on consumer privacy concerns.
We hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): Informational social influence mitigates the effect of personal-
ization on consumer privacy concerns.
3.3.5 Consumer Attention
Eye movements give a good indication of what information consumers are processing
as information acquisition requires consumers to direct the fovea, the central part of
the eye, towards the information that is being processed (Wedel and Pieters, 2007). By
identifying eye fixations, during which an individual’s eye is moving only very little,
researchers can learn which information is being processed by an individual. This is
important as the acquired information influences consumers’ preference development
and eventually choice. Attention has been pointed out as key coordination mechanism
for information processing (LaBerge, 1995). Attention for information can either be
captured bottom-up by stimuli or directed top-down guided by an objective of the
individual (Greenberg, 2012).
On a social networking site, consumers tend to freely browse their newsfeed in
a non-goal-directed but rather exploratory browsing mode, also described as low
cognitive demand task (Bang and Wojdynski, 2016), leading to a smaller amount
of top-down directed attention. At the same time, different posts in the newsfeed
area of a users’ social network feed, including news postings, friend postings, and
advertisements, are difficult to be distinguished. This means that bottom-up bias in
attention direction is minimal (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). This approach makes
sense for the social network site acting as ad platform, as consumers have been found
to train themselves to ignore easy to distinguish advertisements that inhibit stronger
bottom-up attention attraction, referred to as banner blindness (Lee and Ahn, 2012).
This leads to consumers evaluating on the spot to which content area they want to
dedicate their attention. Personalization acts here as a top-down guidance mechanism
for consumers’ attention allocation by biasing their attention towards the content
perceived as more relevant (Desimone and Duncan, 1995).
Research has shown, personalized content is more likely to catch consumers’ attention
and allows individuals to remember the advertising content as it entails personal
relevance and is easier to process for individuals (Ko¨ster et al., 2015). This is also the
case if personalization, as top down factor, is interfering with another top down factor,
such as a search task. Especially, when consumers are conducting high demanding
cognitive tasks, personalized ads have been shown to be particularly more effective
than non-personalized ads in catching consumers’ attention (Bang and Wojdynski,
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2016). Consumers have been found to spend twice as much time on ads that are
personalized, including their picture, than on non-personalized ads (Malheiros et al.,
2012).
Furthermore, web personalization, in the context of recommendation systems, has
been found to increase consumer engagement and attention which is required to
evaluate the presented content (Tam and Ho, 2005). When including name and
geographic information in ads in order to personalize them, researchers found a
significant increase in attention towards these ads compared to non-personalized ads
(Bang and Wojdynski, 2016). In line with former findings we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Personalization increases attention towards ads.
We know from eye tracking research that consumers’ attention directed to an
advertisement is necessary to cognitively process the information in an ad (Lee and
Ahn, 2012). While personalization acts as a top-down enabler, increasing the likelihood
that consumers spend attention on an ad, attention in itself is the basis for consumers
to form their opinions about an ad. Attracting consumers’ attention is especially
crucial in situations in which several stimuli are competing for consumers’ attention
simultaneously as described in the biased competition theory (Desimone and Duncan,
1995) and common in the digital advertising space. When consumers decide to dedicate
attention to a specific stimulus, this means that less attention can be spent on other
stimuli simultaneously as consumers’ attention is naturally limited.
This argumentation underlines the importance of attention in the information
processing stage, enabling the behavior stage (e.g. clicking, purchasing, etc.) (Ko¨ster
et al., 2015). Former research has shown that attention measures captured from eye
tracking are predictive of future sales (Wedel and Pieters, 2007). Further, attention
has been found to increase consumers’ elaboration of advertising content (Tam and
Ho, 2005). We hypothesize that attention positively influences consumers’ responses
to ads:
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Attention has a positive impact on consumers’ responses to
ads.
While theory suggests that personalization is increasing consumer attention to
ads, the relationship between consumer privacy concerns and consumers’ attention
directed towards an advertisement is less trivial. Although personalization increases
the degree to which consumers evaluate ad content by increasing their attention to the
ad, this increase in cognitive processing does not necessarily lead to a positive response
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to an ad (Tam and Ho, 2005). Related research finds that when personalizing a
holiday booking task in the lab and tracking participants’ eye movements, participants’
attention towards ads increases while consumers have simultaneously higher privacy
concerns (Ko¨ster et al., 2015). It remains unclear what the relationship between
consumer privacy concerns and attention is. Both a positive and negative effect of
privacy concerns on attention can be theoretically explained. Research in the area
of psychology has shown that individuals’ moods influence their attention patterns
(Wadlinger and Isaacowitz, 2006).
On the one hand, privacy concerns might increase consumers’ attention towards an
ad as consumers want to figure out who is using their personal information and for
what reason. In the case of personalized advertising, this would lead to two conflicting
effects of attention. Privacy concerns would increase consumers’ attention inducing
cognitive processing that fosters negative feelings related to a loss in privacy. At the
same time, personalization would increase the attention that fosters positive processing
of the ad content that is perceived as relevant. In such a case, the overall effect of
attention on consumers’ responses to ads depends on whether privacy concerns or
personalization represent the stronger top-down factor driving attention.
Malheiros et al. (2012) find, although not testing the actual effect of privacy concerns
on consumer attention, that personalized ads increase the attention significantly but
also increase consumer privacy concerns, triggering a more negative perception of
ads. This points towards a potential positive effect of privacy concerns on consumer
attention, where consumer attention might negatively influence consumers’ responses
to ads.
Research in the area of psychology has pointed towards the presence of what is called
negativity bias, also negativity effect, in information integration, which is the process
of forming one’s overall judgment regarding an object of interest (Kanouse 1984).
Individuals tend to suffer from selective attention mechanisms that favor negative
information over positive information (Fiske, 1980). The negativity bias is basically
describing that “our attention is automatically drawn to negative information more
strongly than it is automatically drawn to positive information” (Smith et al., 2003,
p. 171). Recent research showed that in a second screen setting, consumers dedicate
more attention to social media messages when these messages are negative than
when confronted with positive messages, supporting the presence of a negativity bias
(Ka¨tsyri et al., 2016). In line with the presence of a negativity bias we hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 8a (H8a Competing): Privacy concerns increase the attention to-
wards an ad.
Assuming that consumer attention increases with privacy concerns, challenges
the positive implication of attention on consumers’ responses to ads. When privacy
concerns, that reduce ad effectiveness (Aguirre et al., 2015; Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015b), increase consumer attention to ads, this points towards the presence of a
negative type of attention. Former research has shown that attention is required
to cognitively process ad content and evaluate advertising, whether positively or
negatively (Tam and Ho, 2005; Lee and Ahn, 2012).
At the same time, research has pointed out that attention is a positive enabler
for ad performance (Wedel and Pieters, 2007). Next to that, consumers have been
found to train themselves to avoid paying attention to banner ads that they evaluate
unfavorably, which points towards consumers trying to avoid negatively perceived
ad information (Dre`ze and Hussherr, 2003). These findings support the notion of a
negative effect of privacy concerns on attention, i.e. consumers’ negative feelings such
as perceived vulnerability (Aguirre et al., 2015) would actually decrease consumers’
attention towards an ad. The assumption of a negative effect of privacy concerns on
attention is in line with the notion of a positive effect of higher levels of attention
on advertising performance. While the negative emotions caused by privacy concerns
draw attention away from an ad, personalization, which leads to more relevant ad
content, increases attention supporting the notion of a positive effect of attention on
consumer responses to ads. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 8b (H8b Competing): Privacy concerns decrease the attention to-
wards an ad.
Figure 3.1 shows our conceptual model that guides our study and summarizes the
hypotheses established in the previous sections.
3.4 Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a scenario-based lab experiment in which
we made use of eye tracking technology to record participants’ eye movements. We
supplemented the experiment with a questionnaire that participants needed to fill
in after the experiment. During the experiment, we randomly allocated participants
to being exposed to different types of social ads. We manipulated whether the ads
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model
were (1) personalized or not, (2) whether they included a social endorsement, and
(3) distinguished between two types of products (sexually transmitted disease (STD)
treatment and gambling application).
3.4.1 Pre-Test
To identify suitable product categories for our experimental ads we ran a pre-test on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The aim of this pre-test was to make sure that our ads
would, despite the experimental lab setting, induce privacy concerns and allow us to
establish the personalization privacy paradox as the baseline model for our study.
We ran our pre-test using a scenario-based experiment in which we randomly
allocated participants to being confronted with either personalized or non-personalized
ads as well as one out of 5 different product categories: (1) weight loss consultation,
(2) gambling application, (3) money management program, (4) STD treatment, (5)
alcohol delivery service. Product categories had been pre-selected based on their
privacy sensitive nature and former research (Bansal et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2014).
This set up led to a 2×5 between-subject experimental design. Appendix A3.1 presents
an overview of the measures we use in the questionnaire presented to participants
during the scenario-based experiment.
For the 304 participants in the pre-test, we find that our personalized treatment is
being perceived as significantly more personalized (∆M = 1.947, t = 11.032, p < .001).
We identify the gambling application and the STD treatment as being the most privacy-
sensitive categories. Additionally, we are able to establish that privacy concerns are
largely driven by our personalization treatment when comparing the personalized
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with the non-personalized treatment group (∆M = .375, t = 2.099, p = .036). Also,
personalized ads are being perceived as significantly more relevant by participants
(∆M = 2.266, t = 12.322, p < .001).
These findings support the notion of the personalization privacy paradox. To
make sure that our results are not solely driven by user characteristics of Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, we replicate the study with a convenience sample from a Master’s
class at our university. Our findings are consistent. None of the pre-test participants
was eligible to participate in the main experiment of this study.
3.4.2 Experimental Procedure
After participants were recruited from our university’s participation pool, they sched-
uled individual appointments during which they visited the research lab. Students in
the participation pool are incentivized with additional course credits to participate in
the experiment. Before the start of the experiment, participants were introduced to
the experimental procedure and seated.
During the experiment, all instructions were presented on the screen to create a
standardized experimental experience for all participants and not introduce experi-
mental biases caused by the experimenter. Before starting the experiment, the eye
tracking device was calibrated to participants’ eye movements. We made use of a
9-point calibration and validation and required participants to not deviate more than
1.0 degrees in calibration accuracy. For participants that did not meet this requirement,
the calibration was repeated. In case the required accuracy was not met after several
trials, participant data was discarded from the analysis, as the values recorded for
their eye movements are not accurate enough to measure their attention towards the
ad.
After successful calibration, participants were confronted with one of three scenarios.
In case they had been randomly allocated to the personalized treatment, they were
facing a scenario text that explained that they had been searching for either an
(1) online poker platform to earn additional money (Gambling), or a (2) sexually
transmitted disease (STD) treatment to treat a potentially contracted STD (STD
treatment). In case participants had been allocated to the non-personalized treatment,
they faced a scenario text explaining that they had been looking for a new laptop. All
the scenario texts explained to participants that they had decided not to purchase the
respective product.
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Next, the instruction text pointed out that some days later the participant decided
to log into her Facebook account. Participants were then required to log into their
actual Facebook accounts. In a next step, they were redirected to a personalized
Facebook mock up page. These Facebook mock up pages included a post on a news
article and an advertisement. In case participants were in the personalized treatment
group, they were confronted with an ad that matched their search scenario. In case
participants had been randomly allocated to the non-personalized treatment, they
were confronted to the same ads with the difference that these ads were not matching
their search scenario (searching for a laptop).
We decided to operationalize the experimental manipulation for personalization
this way, as participants are questioned on their perceptions of the advertising and
not of the scenario. Presenting a different ad to participants in the non-personalized
treatment group would have meant that effects such as attractiveness of the advertised
product category or the advertising visual might have confounded our personalization
treatment. Through our operationalization, we made sure that observed differences in
participants’ behavior and responses regarding participants’ perception were driven
by perceived personalization.
Next to the personalization treatment, we randomly allocated participants to either
seeing ads including social endorsements or not. These social endorsements were
dynamically generated for participants by using their actual Facebook information.
By displaying profile pictures of actual friends, we made sure that the endorsements
were being perceived as realistic. While being on the Facebook mock-up page, we
allowed participants to browse freely for as long as they wanted. Both the news text
and the ad were clickable. After clicking on the news article, the ad, or closing the
browser window, the experiment ended.
After leaving the Facebook mock up page, we asked participants to fill in a ques-
tionnaire that would help us to explain the mechanisms underlying their behavior.
Appendix A3.2 presents the questions we used in the questionnaire presented to
participants after the scenario-based experiment. As a last step, participants were
debriefed. We explained to them that all products advertised were not real and that we
had shown them friends’ endorsements that were non-existent. We present a summary
of all variables used in our analyses, how they were operationalized, and the collection
method in Appendix A3.3.
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3.4.3 Sample
We conducted our final experiment in the research lab with students from a European
university. 290 students subscribed to our experiment. Data could not be recorded
for some students for varying reasons: (1) 29 students did not come or come too late
to their lab appointments, (2) 4 students were not able to log in to their Facebook
account as they could not reproduce their passwords, and (3) for 5 students, technical
issues led to their data not being recorded.
The 252 remaining students conducted the experiment. To guarantee the data quality
for our analysis, we needed to additionally discard data of several other students.
(4) For 3 students, it was obvious that they did not conduct the experiment with
the required attention and caution. Their records were excluded from the dataset.
(5) 17 participants did not meet the attention check in which they were required to
select a specific item (“Please select somewhat disagree for this statement”), (6) 27
participants did not meet the required eye tracking accuracy of a maximum deviation
of 1.0 degree, and (7) 18 participants were not able to recall the product category for
their ad between 5 options correctly3.
We exclude these 18 participants from our main analysis as we are assessing
participants’ perceptions of the ad in the questionnaire. Especially, when trying to
investigate a relationship between privacy concerns and attention, participants need
to process the ad information to some extent to inform their reactions. Attention
represents a prerequisite for cognitive processing (Wedel and Pieters, 2007). We assume
that testing whether participants recall the advertised product category gives a good
indication of whether participants processed the information in the ad. We also find
that participants that do not recall the ad spend significantly less attention on the ad.
Our final sample consists of 187 participants (Mage = 20.44, 42% male). Participants
had been randomly allocated to the different experimental treatments and product
categories eventually leading to a distribution of participants to treatments as depicted
in Table 3.1.
3We re-run our main analyses including the 18 participants that could not recall the product
categories advertised to them. Although these participants seem to not pay full attention, it might
be the case that consumers would not recall ad categories in real life as well, simply because they do
not pay attention towards advertisements or try to avoid them. Results for these analyses remain
mostly consistent and can be found in the appendix.
76 Social Influence and Visual Attention in the Personalization Privacy Paradox
Table 3.1: Distribution of Participants in Experimental Cells
Non-Personalized Personalized
Gambling STD Treatment Gambling STD Treatment Total
Non-Endorsed 26 21 23 26 96
Endorsed 20 22 23 26 91
Total 46 43 46 52 187
3.4.4 Manipulation Checks
We make use of post-experimental manipulation checks to confirm that our personalized
treatment was perceived as more personalized by participants. On a seven-point scale
from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”) (Kalyanaraman and Sundar,
2006), we find that participants perceive the ads in our personalized treatment as
significantly more personalized (∆M = 2.513, t = 13.240, p < .001). Further, when
asking our participants whether their ad included a social endorsement (“Yes”) or not
(“No”), a significantly higher share of participants in the social endorsement treatment
notice the social endorsement (“The displayed advertisement on Facebook showed my
friends who like the advertiser”) (∆M = .609, t = 10.953, p < .001).
3.4.5 Measures
We measured privacy concerns with 4 items adjusted from (Sheng et al., 2008) who
based their scale on (Dinev and Hart, 2004; Smith et al., 1996): “It bothers me that
the advertiser is able to track information about me”, “I am concerned that the
advertiser has too much information about me”, “It bothers me that the advertiser
is able to access information about me”, and “I am concerned that my information
could be used in ways I could not foresee”. Items were measured on a 7-point Likert
scale from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”) with an alpha reliability
of 0.91. We measure participants’ attention with the help of an infrared corneal
reflection eye tracker from SMI. This eye tracker “measures the distance and angle
of the reflection of infrared light from the center of the pupil to determine the point
of fixation of the person, after calibration” (Wedel and Pieters, 2007, p. 124). By
measuring attention with the help of an eye tracking device we gain access to a
behavioral measure of attention. Consistent with related research (Lee and Ahn, 2012;
Pieters and Wedel, 2004) we operationalize participants’ attention as fixation duration
on pre-defined areas of interest (AOIs). Fixation duration accounts for the time that
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individuals are focusing on the area of the advertising and processing its information.
We operationalized responses to ads as participants’ actual clicks on the presented ad.
3.5 Analysis
We present the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of our variables in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations
Pearson Correlations
n Mean SD alpha (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) male 187 0.42 0.50
(2) age 187 20.44 1.33 0.13
(3) gambling+ 187 0.49 0.50 −0.08 0.03
(4) personalization+ 187 0.52 0.50 0.06 −0.04 −0.05
(5) informational social influence+ 187 0.49 0.50 0.10 −0.05 −0.04 0.03
(6) privacy concerns 187 4.94 1.38 0.91 0.01 0.17∗ −0.08 0.26∗∗ 0.03
(7) attention 187 7.89 2.14 0.04 −0.10 −0.06 0.18∗ 0.02 −0.06
(8) click 187 0.33 0.47 0.13 −0.06 −0.10 0.58∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.08 0.27∗∗
**p<.01; *p<.05; +Binary treatment variables
We conduct a step-wise analysis to test the hypotheses that we established in our
theory section. We start by analyzing the impact of personalization and informational
social influence, our experimental treatments, on consumers’ responses to ads which
we operationalize as their likelihood to click on an ad. When looking at the average
click-through rate for the ads presented to participants (Mclick = 0.33), we notice that
this measure is unusually high in comparison to common click-through rates digital
ads achieve in the field.4 This difference originates in our controlled lab setting in
which participants can click on the news post, the ad, or leave the Facebook mock-up
page, compared to a real-life scenario in which consumers face many more options
to continue their browsing journey. As we are not interested in the actual height of
the probability to click but rather the differences between the different treatment
conditions, we are confident that we can conduct our analyses with this measure.
Our model estimates the probability of a consumer i clicking on an ad j. The
probability of a click is denoted as Pr(clickij = 1) . We model the latent probability of
a click, denoted by Uij , using a logit function of personalization, informational social
influence and additional control variables.
Pr(clickij = 1) =
exp(Uij)
1 + exp(Uij)
4Commonly click-through rates for social advertising are below 2% (Irvine, 2018).
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Uij = αij + β1personalizationij + β2informational social influenceij
+θXi + Υad categoryj + ij
personalizationij is a binary variable equal to 1 when an ad is personalized otherwise
zero. informational social influenceij equals 1 if the ad contains a participants’ friends
dynamically extracted from Facebook to display them as endorsers of the presented
advertisement, otherwise zero. Xi represents a vector of participant controls including
age and gender. The variable ad categoryj controls for the advertised product category.
ij represents the idiosyncratic error term. Table 3.3 presents the results from our
analysis.
We find that personalization is significantly increasing the probability of participants
to click on ads (βpersonalization = 3.512, p < 0.001) supporting hypothesis 1. At the
same time, we find that informational social influence leads to an increased click
propensity (βinformational social influence = 0.920, p = 0.023) supporting hypothesis 4.
5
Table 3.3: Logit Regression - Click Probability
(1) (2) (3)
DV: Click Logit Logit Logit
personalization 3.512∗∗∗ 3.647∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.586)
informational social influence 0.920∗∗
(0.405)
gender control Yes Yes Yes
age control Yes Yes Yes
product category control Yes Yes Yes
constant 2.138 0.633 0.047
(2.636) (3.297) (3.309)
Observations 187 187 187
Chi2 6.187 78.482 83.830
-2 Log Likelihood 231.405 159.109 153.762
AIC 239.405 169.109 165.762
BIC 252.329 185.265 185.148
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5We replicate the analysis including the 18 participants that could not recall the product category
advertised to them. Results are mostly consistent and can be found in Appendix A3.4.
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We move on to analyze the relationship between our treatment variables, person-
alization and informational social influence, and participants’ privacy concerns. We
conduct an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which we assess how privacy
concerns of participant i that is confronted with ad j are influenced by personalization
and informational social influence. We operationalize privacy concerns as the average
of our 4 respective survey items. We estimate the following model:
privacy concernsij = β0 + β1personalizationij
+β2informational social influenceij
+β3personalizationij × informational social influenceij
+θXi + Υad categoryj + i
In this model, β0 represents the constant term. β1 and β2 give the conditional effects
of personalization and informational social influence, which are both binary treatment
variables. With β3 we measure the impact of the interaction between personalization
and informational social influence. Again, Xi represents a vector of demographic
control variables including gender and age and ad categoryj controls for the advertised
product category. Table 3.4 shows our results.
Table 3.4: OLS Regression - Privacy Concerns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV: Privacy Concerns OLS OLS OLS OLS
personalization 0.728∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.196) (0.267)
informational social influence 0.092 0.127
(0.195) (0.308)
personalization × informational social influence −0.067
(0.401)
gender control Yes Yes Yes Yes
age control Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category control Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 1.312 0.696 0.610 0.579
(1.434) (1.377) (1.381) (1.413)
Observations 187 187 187 187
R-squared 0.037 0.107 0.108 0.108
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find that, as hypothesized (hypothesis 2 ), personalization increases privacy
concerns (βpersonalization = 0.728, p < 0.001). We do not find a significant coefficient
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for the effect of informational social influence or the interaction between personalization
and informational social influence. Therefore, our analysis does not support hypothesis
5.6
We move on to estimate the impact of our treatment variables, consumer privacy
concerns and attention, on consumers’ responses to ads. We do not estimate the effect
of informational social influence on privacy concerns in this model, as the previous
model has shown that there is no significant relationship between the variables. Instead,
we include informational social influence to control for its effect on consumer response.
To do so, we run a serial mediation model using the SPSS PROCESS plugin (Hayes,
2013). Our results are depicted in Figure 3.2.
We find that personalization does significantly increase privacy concerns (B = 0.73,
SE = .19, p < .001) but privacy concerns do not directly influence consumer response,
therefore not supporting hypothesis 3. Personalization does significantly increase
consumers’ attention towards an ad (B = 0.86, SE = .32, p = .009), supporting
hypothesis 6. We find that attention is positively influencing consumer response
(B = 1.02, SE = .35, p = .003), supporting hypothesis 7. Moreover, we find that
privacy concerns do not directly influence attention, therefore not supporting hypothesis
8A or 8B.
To test for mediation, we make use of bias-corrected bootstrapping and generate
95% confidence intervals around the indirect effects of privacy concerns and attention.
Next to that, we generate the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of the
serial mediation through both privacy concerns and attention. In case mediation is
present in our models the generated confidence intervals do not include zero (Hayes,
2013).
Our analysis, making use of 10,000 bootstraps and bias corrected confidence
intervals, shows that there is no significant indirect effect for privacy concerns
(ab = −.18, SE = .15; 95% LLCI = −.52, 95% ULCI = .08). We do find a significant
indirect effect for attention (ab = .87, SE = .50; 95% LLCI = .22, 95% ULCI = 2.2).
The indirect effect for the serial mediation was found to be significant (ab = −.13, SE =
.10; 95% LLCI = −.45, 95% ULCI = −.01). Personalization increases privacy con-
cerns, which subsequently decreases attention, eventually leading to a decrease in
consumer response. This finding is in line with the notion of the personalization privacy
paradox, which claims negative implications of privacy concerns on advertising perfor-
mance. We show in our model that through a decrease in attention, privacy concerns do
6We replicate the analysis including the 18 participants that could not recall the product category
advertised to them. Results are mostly consistent and can be found in Appendix A3.5.
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negatively influence advertising performance. Further, we find that informational social
influence does positively influence consumer response (B = .92, SE = .41, p = 0.02).
Table 3.5 gives an overview of which of our hypotheses was supported by our analysis.
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Figure 3.2: Results Serial Mediation Model
When replicating the serial mediation analysis including the 18 participants that
could not recall the product category advertised to them, we find that results remain
mostly consistent (see Appendix A3.6). Interestingly, we do not find support for the
serial mediation effect of personalization through privacy concerns and attention on
consumer response. Recalling the ad category seems to be correlated with the extent
to which participants process the ad content cognitively. We see that the effect of
personalization on privacy concerns seems to be stronger in our main model (excluding
the participants that were not able to recall the advertised product category). The
remaining effects in the chain from personalization through privacy concerns and
attention to consumer response remain very close to the effects in our main model.
Essentially, the serial mediation effect becomes insignificant as we include observations
from participants in the sample that spend less attention on the ad. A t-test reveals
that consumers that remember the advertised product category in the survey spend
significantly more attention (fixation duration) on the ad (∆M = 2254.87, t =
2.05, p = .04). Consumers that do not recall the advertised product category are likely
to process the ad information less thoroughly, decreasing the impact of personalization
on their privacy concerns.
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Table 3.5: Overview Hypotheses
Hypothesis Hypothesized Effect Support*
Hypothesis 1 personalization → consumer response (positive) S
Hypothesis 2 personalization → privacy concerns (positive) S
Hypothesis 3 privacy concerns → consumer response (negative) nS
Hypothesis 4 informational social influence → consumer response (positive) S
Hypothesis 5 informational social influence mitigating (personalization → privacy concerns) nS
Hypothesis 6 personalization → attention (positive) S
Hypothesis 7 attention → consumer response (positive) S
Hypothesis 8A privacy concerns → attention (positive) nS
Hypothesis 8B privacy concerns → attention (negative) nS
*nS = not supported, S = supported
3.6 Discussion
Our multi-method approach, combining a scenario-based experiment with eye tracking
and survey methodology, allows us to gain deeper insights into consumers’ evaluation
of personalized advertising. The focus of our research is twofold. First, we want to
investigate whether informational social influence can mitigate the effect of personal-
ization on consumer privacy concerns. Second, we want to shed light on what is the
mediating role of attention on consumers’ responses to ads when confronted with the
personalization privacy paradox. More specifically, we focus on the question whether
privacy concerns do actually increase consumer attention that subsequently negatively
influences consumers’ responses to ads, or if consumer privacy concerns do decrease
attention towards an ad, supporting a generally positive notion of the influence of
attention on consumers’ responses to ads.
In line with research in the area of ad personalization (Arora et al., 2008; Bleier
and Eisenbeiss, 2015b; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013) and supporting our hypothesis 1,
we find that personalization leads to more positive consumer responses to ads. Ads
that match consumers’ preferences are more likely to induce a favorable reaction from
consumers.
Supporting hypothesis 2 and the personalization privacy paradox, we find that
personalization increases consumer privacy concerns. Although, personalized ads
are perceived as more relevant by participants in our experiment, participants also
experience privacy concerns as their individual browsing information is being used
to personalize ads. These privacy concerns are likely to stem from the perceived lack
of control over personal information that the advertiser is using without consumers’
consent.
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We do find that the effect of privacy concerns on consumers’ responses to ads
is negative but not significant, therefore not supporting hypothesis 3 and partially
contradicting previous findings (Aguirre et al., 2015; Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a).
The reason for this might be, that privacy concerns that are induced do not impact
participants’ actions in our lab setting very strongly as they have the feeling of
conducting the experiment in a safe environment. Participants are not using a personal
device but a device provided by us.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that, in line with previous studies investigating
informational social influence in the ad context (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker, 2016),
informational social influence does positively influence consumers’ responses to ads,
supporting hypothesis 4.
We do not find informational social influence to be a moderator in the relationship
between personalization and consumer privacy, therefore not supporting hypothesis 5.
As the inclusion of social endorsements in ads represents a use of personal information
regarding social connections in itself, social endorsements might potentially trigger
privacy concerns. The privacy concerns originating in social endorsements might
counterbalance the moderating effect of informational social influence. Triggering
informational social influence with social endorsements does not seem to be a viable
option for advertisers to mitigate privacy concerns caused by the personalization of
ads. Still, informational social influence seems to remain an effective way to increase
ad performance through more positive consumer responses to ads.
Our full model gives insights into the role of attention as cognitive enabler in
processing advertising content. We find that personalization is, next to leading to
more positive consumer responses to ads, increasing consumers’ attention towards ads,
supporting hypothesis 6. This finding is in line with the notion that personalization is
a top-down factor steering consumers’ attention towards more relevant content (Bang
and Wojdynski, 2016). When consumers do cognitively process advertising content
and recognize its relevance, their attention is biased towards the ad which is perceived
as relevant.
We also find a significant direct relationship between attention and consumer
response, supporting hypothesis 7. This represents evidence for the positive role of
attention. Attention is necessary to process information in an ad (Lee and Ahn, 2012;
Tam and Ho, 2006), acting as enabler for the behavior a consumer decides to take
subsequently (Ko¨ster et al., 2015; Wedel and Pieters, 2007).
Using conditional process analysis, we find that the relationship between personaliza-
tion and consumer response is partially mediated by attention. This means that part
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of the positive effect of personalization on consumers’ responses to ads is operating
indirectly via an increase in consumers’ attention towards ads.
Additionally, we find that privacy concerns seem to not have a significant direct
effect on consumers’ attention towards an ad, therefore supporting neither hypothesis
8A nor 8B. While the direction of the effect of privacy concerns on attention is negative,
standing in favor of a generally positive effect of attention on consumer response, we
do not find a significant relationship.
Despite the non-significant direct relationship, we do find evidence for a serial
mediation effect from personalization through privacy concerns and attention to
consumer response. Having non-significant direct effects within a mediation path does
not mean that the indirect effects in conditional process models are non-significant as
they should be tested separately with a single test for significance (see Hayes (2013)).
We find that personalizing an advertisement increases consumers’ privacy concerns,
which subsequently leads to a decrease in attention towards the ad, eventually leading
to a negative influence on consumers’ responses to ads. This finding is in line with a
positive role of attention in consumers’ assessment process of advertisements. Higher
levels of attention are correlated with more positive consumer responses to ads. While
personalization can be seen as a top down factor that positively influences the attention
level of consumers by directing attention to more relevant content, privacy concerns
represent a top down factor that is directing attention away from negatively perceived
ad content. Although we do not find that privacy concerns do negatively influence
consumer response directly, they still play a role as mediator in our model hampering
consumer responses to ads.
Interestingly, this serial mediation effect becomes insignificant when re-running
the serial mediation model and including observations of participants that were not
able to recall the product category advertised to them (see Appendix A3.6). We find
that consumers that recall the product category spent significantly more attention
on the ad. As discussed earlier, attention is a prerequisite for cognitive processing of
information (Wedel and Pieters, 2007). This finding points towards privacy concerns
not only influencing attention, but attention also influencing to what extent consumers
process information potentially resulting in privacy concerns. For consumers that
do not cognitively process ad information, we are not able to find evidence for the
personalization privacy paradox. This is the case as these consumers are not able
to evaluate the personalized ad as being intrusive, invading their privacy, when not
dedicating a minimum amount of attention towards the ad.
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3.6.1 Practical Implications
Our research gives practitioners valuable insights into both the role of informational
social influence and consumers’ attentional mechanisms in the context of personalized
advertising.
We find that the inclusion of social endorsements, as typical in social advertising,
is justified through a direct positive impact on consumers’ responses to ads. Con-
sumers are significantly more likely to click socially endorsed ads than unendorsed
ads. Nevertheless, we also show that triggering informational social influence with
social endorsements cannot be considered a fruitful strategy to mitigate consumer
privacy concerns. Consumers’ acceptance of their personal information being used to
personalize ads seems to not increase when endorsing personalized ads.
Next to that, we disentangle the attention mechanisms within the personalization
privacy paradox. While the fact that privacy concerns have a negative influence
on advertising performance is vastly established (Aguirre et al., 2015; Bleier and
Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Tucker, 2014) we assess how consumers’ attention processes are
related to the conflict between personalization and privacy concerns. Consistent with
the notion of the positive impact of attention on consumers’ responses to ads, we
find that consumers reduce the level of attention towards an ad if they experience
privacy concerns. Practically, this means that more intrusive ads might initially catch
consumers’ attention but, as they decrease the overall level of attention that consumers
dedicate to an ad, consumers’ responses to these ads are more negative. Therefore,
we suggest to advertisers to abstain from using highly intrusive ads to compete for
consumers’ attention, as these ads decrease consumers’ attention, leading to a decrease
in ad performance.
3.6.2 Limitations
We conduct our study within the research lab of a university using university students
as subjects. This means that the external validity of our study might be limited. This
also becomes apparent in the inflated click-through probability in our scenario-based
experiment compared to commonly observed click-through probabilities for digital ads
in the field. In the field, social advertising click-through rates are below 2% (Irvine,
2018). At the same time, we are forced to choose this environment for our study to
support our multi-method approach, especially the assessment of privacy concerns
with the help of a questionnaire and the collection of attention measures employing
eye tracking.
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Furthermore, we confront participants in our experiment with very privacy sensitive
product advertisements for a gambling application or a STD treatment. We make this
choice as we want to induce privacy concerns with participants in a lab environment
that is likely to be perceived as safe. Potentially, participants might find it difficult to
relate to scenarios describing their interest in a gambling application or medical support
for a STD treatment. A t-test regarding the perceived realism of the situation (’I
found the described situation realistic.’, 7-point scale) shows that there is no significant
difference in participants’ perception between the personalized and non-personalized
treatment group (∆M = .051, t = .314, p = .753). Less privacy sensitive products
would likely not induce privacy concerns with participants and therefore not allow us
to assess the personalization privacy paradox.
We choose to manipulate the scenario texts to distinguish between the personal-
ization and the non-personalization treatment groups instead of manipulation the ad
copies. We make this choice as we are assessing participants’ reactions to the ads and
not to the scenario texts. Therefore, we want to avoid introducing confounding effects
with different advertising visuals and messages.
The operationalization of our attention variable does not only capture the attention
driven by our treatment variables and consumer privacy concerns. The main reason for
this is that, as previously mentioned, attention represents a prerequisite for consumers
to process information (Wedel and Pieters, 2007). Therefore, consumers first need
to dedicate their attention to the personalized ad before they can recognize that the
ad is personalized for them and that they might be concerned about their privacy
because of how the firm used their personal information. Our additional analysis in
Appendix A3.6 supports this notion. Experiment participants that do not recall the
advertised product category spent less attention on the ad, and most likely did process
the ad information less thoroughly. Furthermore, the effect of privacy concerns on
attention is smaller for these consumers, presumably because they did not process the
ad information thoroughly.
While it is likely that privacy concerns negatively influence consumers’ responses to
ads through a decrease in attention, one could argue that a certain level of attention
is necessary to actually cognitively process an ad, leading to privacy concerns in the
first place. Attentional processes enable cognitive processes that are necessary for
individuals to construct their opinions. To counteract this issue, we operationalize
attention as the overall attention spent on an ad up to the first click on a website
element. This way, we make sure that we assess attention related to the overall
cognitive processing of an ad. We follow the assumption that consumers need to spend
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a certain amount of attention on advertising to cognitively process the information
and then decide whether they want to investigate the ad further, i.e. dedicate more
attention towards the ad. The dynamic relationship between attention and cognitive
processes presents fruitful grounds for future research. By observing which ad elements
consumers focus on, researchers can get additional information on which information
stimuli influence consumers’ decision to continue paying attention to an ad or allocate
their attention somewhere else.
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Appendices
A3.1 Survey Measures Used in Pre-Test
Table A3.1: Survey Measures Used in Pre-Test
Construct Items Scale Source
Perceived Personalization (1) The content and in-
formation featured in the
advertisement targeted me
as a unique individual.
(2) This advertisement was
’personalized’ according to
my interests.
7-point (Kalyanaraman and Sun-
dar, 2006)
Privacy Concerns (1) It bothers me that the
advertiser is able to track
information about me. (2) I
am concerned that the ad-
vertiser has too much in-
formation about me. (3) It
bothers me that the adver-
tiser is able to access infor-
mation about me. (4) I am
concerned that my informa-
tion could be used in ways
I could not foresee.
7-point (Sheng et al., 2008) based
on (Dinev and Hart, 2004;
Smith et al., 1996)
Personal Relevance (1) This advertisement was
useless to me. (2) This ad-
vertisement was irrelevant
to me. (3) This advertise-
ment was not personally
important to me.
7-point (Campbell and Wright,
2008)
Intention to Click (1) I would like to click-
through the advertisement
to acquire further informa-
tion.
7-point (Yoo, 2007)
Constructs listed in same chronological order as asked in pre-test questionnaire.
A3.2 Survey Measures Used in Scenario-Based Experiment 89
A
3
.2
S
u
rv
e
y
M
e
a
su
re
s
U
se
d
in
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
-B
a
se
d
E
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t
T
a
b
le
A
3
.2
:
S
u
rv
ey
M
ea
su
re
s
U
se
d
in
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
-B
a
se
d
E
x
p
er
im
en
t
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
It
em
s
S
ca
le
S
o
u
rc
e
P
er
ce
iv
ed
P
er
so
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(M
a
n
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
C
h
ec
k
)
(1
)
T
h
e
co
n
te
n
t
a
n
d
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
fe
a
tu
re
d
in
th
e
a
d
-
v
er
ti
se
m
en
t
ta
rg
et
ed
m
e
a
s
a
u
n
iq
u
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l.
(2
)
T
h
is
a
d
v
er
ti
se
m
en
t
w
a
s
’p
er
so
n
a
li
ze
d
’
a
cc
o
rd
in
g
to
m
y
in
te
re
st
s.
7
-p
o
in
t
(K
a
ly
a
n
a
ra
m
a
n
a
n
d
S
u
n
-
d
a
r,
2
0
0
6
)
S
o
ci
a
l
E
n
d
o
rs
em
en
t
(M
a
n
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
C
h
ec
k
)
(1
)
T
h
e
d
is
p
la
y
ed
a
d
v
er
ti
se
m
en
t
o
n
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
sh
o
w
ed
m
y
fr
ie
n
d
s
w
h
o
li
k
e
th
e
a
d
v
er
ti
se
r.
Y
es
/
N
o
-
P
er
so
n
a
l
R
el
ev
a
n
ce
(1
)
T
h
is
a
d
v
er
ti
se
m
en
t
w
a
s
u
se
le
ss
to
m
e.
(2
)
T
h
is
a
d
-
v
er
ti
se
m
en
t
w
a
s
ir
re
le
va
n
t
to
m
e.
(3
)
T
h
is
a
d
v
er
ti
se
m
en
t
w
a
s
n
o
t
p
er
so
n
a
ll
y
im
p
o
rt
a
n
t
to
m
e.
7
-p
o
in
t
(C
a
m
p
b
el
l
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t,
2
0
0
8
)
P
ri
v
a
cy
C
o
n
ce
rn
s
(1
)
It
b
o
th
er
s
m
e
th
a
t
th
e
a
d
v
er
ti
se
r
is
a
b
le
to
tr
a
ck
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
b
o
u
t
m
e.
(2
)
I
a
m
co
n
ce
rn
ed
th
a
t
th
e
a
d
v
er
ti
se
r
h
a
s
to
o
m
u
ch
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
b
o
u
t
m
e.
(3
)
It
b
o
th
er
s
m
e
th
a
t
th
e
a
d
v
er
ti
se
r
is
a
b
le
to
a
cc
es
s
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
o
n
a
b
o
u
t
m
e.
(4
)
I
a
m
co
n
ce
rn
ed
th
a
t
m
y
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
co
u
ld
b
e
u
se
d
in
w
a
y
s
I
co
u
ld
n
o
t
fo
re
se
e.
7
-p
o
in
t
(S
h
en
g
et
a
l.
,
2
0
0
8
)
b
a
se
d
o
n
(D
in
ev
a
n
d
H
a
rt
,
2
0
0
4
;
S
m
it
h
et
a
l.
,
1
9
9
6
)
A
tt
en
ti
o
n
C
h
ec
k
1
(1
)
P
le
a
se
se
le
ct
so
m
ew
h
a
t
d
is
a
gr
ee
fo
r
th
is
st
a
te
m
en
t.
7
-p
o
in
t
-
P
er
ce
iv
ed
R
ea
li
sm
(1
)
I
fo
u
n
d
th
e
d
es
cr
ib
ed
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
re
a
li
st
ic
.
7
-p
o
in
t
-
A
tt
en
ti
o
n
C
h
ec
k
2
(1
)
T
h
e
a
d
v
er
ti
se
m
en
t
I
sa
w
in
tr
o
d
u
ce
d
a
..
.
5
p
ro
d
u
ct
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
*
-
G
en
d
er
(1
)
W
h
a
t
is
y
o
u
r
g
en
d
er
?
m
a
le
/
fe
m
a
le
-
A
g
e
(1
)
W
h
a
t
is
y
o
u
r
a
g
e?
1
8
-9
9
-
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
s
li
st
ed
in
sa
m
e
ch
ro
n
o
lo
gi
ca
l
o
rd
er
a
s
a
sk
ed
in
th
e
qu
es
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
in
th
e
sc
en
a
ri
o
-b
a
se
d
ex
pe
ri
m
en
t.
*
W
ei
gh
t-
lo
ss
p
ro
d
u
ct
/
G
a
m
bl
in
g
p
ro
d
u
ct
/
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
/
S
T
D
tr
ea
tm
en
t/
A
lc
o
h
o
li
c
be
ve
ra
ge
90 Social Influence and Visual Attention in the Personalization Privacy Paradox
A3.3 Overview of Variables Used in Analysis and
Data Collection Method
Table A3.3: Variable Overview
Variable Operationalization Collection Method
Personalization Experimental treatment: (1)
Personalized if scenario text
matches advertised product
category, (2) Non-personalized
if scenario text does not match
with advertised product cate-
gory
Experiment
Informational Social Influence Experimental treatment: (1)
Inclusion of friends’ profile pic-
tures and number of friends
that like the advertised prod-
uct to trigger informational so-
cial influence, (2) Friends’ pro-
file pictures not included
Experiment
Privacy Concerns Measured with survey items Questionnaire
Attention Fixation duration on advertise-
ment in milliseconds
Eye tracker
Consumer Response Binary variable indicating
whether a participant clicked
on the ad or not
BeGaze eye tracking software
Product Category Experimental treatment: (1)
Gambling application, (2)
STD treatment
Experiment
Gender Survey question Questionnaire
Age Survey question Questionnaire
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A3.4 Logit Regression for Click Probability
We re-run our analysis from Table 3.3 including also experiment participants that did
not recall the product category that was advertised to them. Table A3.4 presents our
results which remain consistent with the main analysis in which these participants are
excluded.
Table A3.4: Logit Regression - Click Probability
(1) (2) (3)
DV: Click Logit Logit Logit
personalization 3.653∗∗∗ 3.750∗∗∗
(0.565) (0.580)
informational social influence 0.848∗∗
(0.394)
gender control Yes Yes Yes
age control Yes Yes Yes
product category control Yes Yes Yes
constant 2.224 1.630 1.323
(2.569) (3.224) (3.220)
Observations 205 205 205
Chi2 6.128 87.887 92.663
-2 Log Likelihood 248.419 166.660 161.884
AIC 256.419 176.660 173.884
BIC 269.711 193.275 193.822
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A3.5 OLS Regression for Privacy Concerns
We re-run our analysis from Table 3.4 including also experiment participants that did
not recall the product category that was advertised to them. Table A3.5 presents our
results which remain consistent with the main analysis in which these participants are
excluded.
Table A3.5: OLS Regression - Privacy Concerns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV: Privacy Concerns OLS OLS OLS OLS
personalization 0.622∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.186) (0.258)
informational social influence 0.039 0.095
(0.187) (0.288)
personalization × informational social influence −0.111
(0.382)
gender control Yes Yes Yes Yes
age control Yes Yes Yes Yes
product category control Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 1.960 1.570 1.541 1.489
(1.350) (1.305) (1.311) (1.345)
Observations 205 205 205 205
R-squared 0.027 0.079 0.079 0.079
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A3.6 Serial Mediation Model
We re-run our serial mediation analysis including observations of participants that
were not able to recall the advertised product category correctly. As our sample size
includes the observations for these 18 participants, we now analyze the model with
205 observations. Figure A3.1 presents our results.
We find, consistent with our main model, that personalization does significantly
increase privacy concerns (B = 0.62, SE = .19, p = .001) but privacy concerns do
not directly influence participants’ propensity to click the ad, consumer response,
therefore not supporting hypothesis 3. Similarly, personalization does significantly
increase consumers’ attention towards an ad (B = 0.85, SE = .33, p = .01), sup-
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porting hypothesis 6. Also attention is positively influencing consumer response
(B = 1.02, SE = .34, p = .003), supporting hypothesis 7. Privacy concerns do
not directly influence attention, therefore not supporting hypothesis 8A or B.
We use bias-corrected bootstrapping and generate 95% confidence intervals around
the indirect effects of privacy concerns and attention to test for mediation. Further,
we generate the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of the serial mediation
through both privacy concerns and attention. In case mediation is present in our
models the generated confidence intervals do not include zero (Hayes, 2013).
The bias corrected confidence intervals generated from 10,000 bootstraps reveal
that there is no significant indirect effect for privacy concerns (ab = −.13, SE =
.12; 95% LLCI = −.41, 95% ULCI = .08). Consistent with the main analysis, we
find a significant indirect effect for attention (ab = .87, SE = .49; 95% LLCI =
.23, 95% ULCI = 2.1).
Interestingly, the indirect effect for the serial mediation was found to be not
significant when including the observations from participants that did not recall
the advertised ad category in the analysis (ab = −.10, SE = .09; 95% LLCI =
−.36, 95% ULCI = .01).
Personalization
Informational 
Social Influence
Privacy 
Concerns
Consumer 
Response
Attention
.62 (.19)***
-.16 (.12)
.85 (.33)*** -.22 (.17)
1.02 (.34)***
4.07 (.65)***
.72 (.43)*
3.75 (.58)***
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
Figure A3.1: Results Serial Mediation Model - Full Sample
Recalling the ad category seems to be correlated with the extent to which consumers
process the ad content cognitively. We find that the effect of personalization on privacy
concerns is stronger in our main model. The remaining effects in the chain from
personalization through privacy concerns and attention to consumer response remain in
magnitude very close to the effects in our main model. Essentially, the serial mediation
effect becomes insignificant as we include observations from participants in the sample
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that spend less attention on the ad. A t-test reveals that consumers that remember the
advertised product category in the survey spent significantly more attention (fixation
duration) on the ad (meanattention = 5885.50) (∆M = 2254.87, t = 2.05, p = .04).
The comparison of these analyses leads back to our discussion regarding the dynamic
relationship between attention, personalization, and privacy concerns. Consumers
need to spend a sufficient amount of attention on the ad to retrieve and process the
information from the ad cognitively. This way, consumers will recognize that an ad
is personalized for them and might become concerned about their privacy as the
advertiser is making use of their personal information to personalize the presented
ad. When consumers do not process information in the ad, it is unlikely that privacy
concerns will arise. We elaborate further on this dynamic relationship in the discussion
section.
4
Pay For What You Get - Incentive Misalignments in
Programmatic Advertising: Evidence From A
Randomized Field Experiment
1
4.1 Introduction
Firms are serving millions of digital ad impressions to consumers on a monthly basis.
This makes it prohibitively expensive for firms to manually determine their willingness
to pay for serving a specific ad to an individual consumer. Ad platforms offer a solution
to this problem by providing ad allocation tools that firms can use to automate the
1Earlier versions of this study appeared in the following conference proceedings or were presented
at the below mentioned conferences and workshops:
• Frick, T.W., Telang, R. & Belo, R. (2018). Pay For What You Get - Incentive Misalignments
in Programmatic Advertising: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment. In The
Economics of Information and Communication Technologies, ZEW Conference, Centre for
European Economics Research, Mannheim, Germany.
• Frick, T.W., Telang, R. & Belo, R. (2018). Pay For What You Get - Incentive Misalignments
in Programmatic Advertising: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment. In Statistical
Challenges in eCommerce Research Symposium 2018 (SCECR), Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
• Frick, T.W., Telang, R. & Belo, R. (2017). Pay For What You Get - Incentive Misalignments
in Programmatic Advertising: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment. In Workshop
on Information Systems and Economics 2017 (WISE), Seoul, South Korea.
• Frick, T.W. & Telang, R. (2017). Pay For What You Get - Incentive Misalignments in
Programmatic Advertising: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment. In Conference
on Digital Experimentation 2017 (CODE), Boston, US.
• Frick, T.W. & Telang, R. (2017). Pay For What You Get - Incentive Misalignments in
Programmatic Advertising: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment. In NBER
Summer Institute 2017, Economics of Information Technology and Digitization Workshop,
Boston, US.
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purchasing of ad impressions called programmatic advertising. Simply put, these
tools use machine learning algorithms that determine the willingness to pay for a
specific ad impression on behalf of the firm. More precisely, as most opportunities
to display an ad are auctioned off, the ad platform makes the decision how much
to bid for an ad impression on behalf of the firm. This decision is based on large
amounts of data on individual consumers’ characteristics and online behavior. In
programmatic advertising, firms select an algorithmic optimization rule in line with
their campaign objective (e.g. generate traffic, opt-ins for newsletters, purchases, etc.).
The optimization algorithms implemented by the ad platform do then adjust the
bid for each impression with the goal to maximize the chosen campaign objective.
Recent industry reports show that in 2016, 50% of US firms spent more than half of
their marketing budget on programmatic advertising to optimize their bidding for ads
(AdRoll, 2017).
In general, firms want to increase profit with advertising. In performance marketing
firms advertise with the objective to increase purchases conducted by consumers and
quantify the performance of advertising. Although usually, advertising performance
is operationalized as purchases, it can also be measured with metrics that have a
less immediate impact on the bottom line, e.g. newsletter opt-ins. With the objective
to increase profit in mind, it becomes clear what the actual value of advertising for
firms is: The difference in profit when serving ads to consumers to the profit when
not serving ads to consumers. Therefore, when firms outsource the task to bid for ad
impressions to ad platforms they would like ad platforms to target consumers with ad
impressions whose profit contribution increases because of these ad impressions.
Historically, firms have strived to incentivize ad platforms for actual success con-
tribution. Therefore, advertisers in the digital ad industry have moved from simply
paying for ad impressions (CPM), to paying only for when consumers click on ads to
reach their websites (CPC), to eventually paying ad platforms only when consumers
addressed with ads conduct a pre-defined target action (CPA), usually a purchase2.
Even though firms have now commonly implemented CPA-based contracts, in which
they set a CPA value as their willingness to pay for a purchase reported by the ad
platform, they start to recognize that they should reward ad platforms only for the
increase in purchases caused by ads and not for all purchases from consumers that
2CPM stands for cost per mille (a thousand impressions), CPC for cost per click, and CPA for
cost-per-acquisition and cost-per-action which are used interchangeably in the ad industry. Besides
the wish of firms to incentivize ad platforms only for actual success contribution this evolution of ad
contract structures was also driven by technological developments, most notably cookie technologies,
that allow ad platforms to track clicks and target actions on firms’ websites.
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have been addressed with ads. This is the case as some consumers that are addressed
with ads would have purchased independent of seeing advertising. While conceptually
the value of advertising is clear to firms, it is often very difficult to assess the profit
contribution of advertising. The identification of the increase in profit caused by
advertising hinges on an experimental set-up where treatment and control group are
well identified. Ad platforms do not run such experiments which would allow them
to report actual ad performance, but instead report measures such as the absolute
purchase probability of or absolute revenue generated by consumers that have been
addressed with ads.
To deal with the fact that CPA-based contract structures reward ad platforms based
on the absolute purchase probability instead of the increase in purchase probability
caused by ads, firms deflate their willingness to pay for a purchase reported by an
ad platform. Deflating the willingness to pay for a reported purchase, i.e. deflating
the CPA value, has the aim to more closely match advertising’s profit contribution.
Nevertheless, to optimally deflate their willingness to pay for a purchase, firms need
to possess information on the increase in purchase probability caused by ads. In the
best case, such information is available from experiments in the past.
Additionally, despite such a deflation procedure, ad platforms are still being rewarded
based on the number of purchases conducted by consumers that were addressed with
ads. This means that ad platforms have an incentive to target consumers that are likely
to purchase independent of their reaction to ads. The impact of this incentive structure
for the firm has so far not been empirically investigated. In case, the ad platform
acts in accordance with incentives defined in the contract with firms and targets high
purchase probability consumers, the firm is facing a potential incentive misalignment.
Whether such targeting behavior is harmful for the firm depends on whether consumers
with high absolute purchase probabilities are more or less receptive to ads. The aim
of this study is to empirically investigate the potential incentive misalignments in
CPA-based contract structures in programmatic advertising by assessing the impact
of these contract structures on firms’ return on ad investments.
To do so, we run a large scale randomized field experiment in collaboration with a
European e-retailer. During the experiment, we randomly allocate consumers to seeing
either retargeting ads of the e-retailer or orthogonal charity ads, also called public
service announcements (PSA). This way, we are able to identify the causal impact of
ads on consumers’ purchase probability. To investigate whether ad platforms optimize
the bidding for ad impressions in the interest of the firm we let the ad platform in our
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experiment optimize the bidding for ads based on a CPA-based contract. This way,
we gain access to a data set that is unique with respect to several characteristics:
(i) We have detailed information on individual consumers’ browsing behavior and
the ad platform’s bids for individual impressions, allowing us to infer which
consumers the ad platform is targeting to which degree.
(ii) Through our experiment, we have a symmetric control and treatment group across
different consumer segments. We are able to employ a CPA bidding optimization
without introducing a selection bias into the control group, which has been
pointed out as a flaw in experimental designs for ad effectiveness measurement
in previous research (Johnson et al., 2017a). Therefore, with the help of our
experiment, we can precisely identify the change in purchase probability across
heterogeneous consumer segments.
(iii) Finally, our data set includes detailed information on consumers’ responses to
ad impressions such as website visits, ad clicks, and purchases.
We empirically investigate, the nature and magnitude of this potential incentive
misalignment between firm and ad platform. To do this, we measure the true increase
in probability of purchase for consumers who are more or less extensively targeted by
the ad platform. First, we find that ad platforms act in accordance with the incentives
specified in CPA-based contracts and systematically target users who are more likely
to purchase independent of the effect of ads. We find evidence that ad platforms
are using data on consumers’ browsing history and characteristics to identify high
purchase probability consumers. While advertising does generally increase consumers’
purchase probability, we do not find any evidence that consumers that are targeted by
the ad platform are more receptive to ads. There is no significant correlation between
a consumers’ inherent absolute purchase probability and the increase in purchase
probability caused by ads. This renders the ad platform’s targeting strategy sub-
optimal for firms. Furthermore, the ad platform’s optimization algorithm is also not
taking consumers’ heterogeneous profit contributions into account when optimizing the
firm’s bidding strategy, confirming that the employed bidding strategy is sub-optimal.
This work contributes to the literature on economics of advertising and expands the
understanding of how to assess advertising effectiveness as well as the implications of
incentives specified in contracts between firms and ad platforms. While previous work
has pointed out that incentives in contracts between firms and ad platforms are not
specified in the true interest of firms (Dalessandro et al., 2012; Johnson and Lewis,
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2015), we assess empirically whether this potential incentive misalignment is an actual
incentive misalignment. The actual presence of such a misalignment depends on the
behavior of the ad platform as well as the relationship between consumers’ inherent
absolute purchase probabilities and the increase in purchase probabilities caused by
ads. Our unique data set allows us to identify the causal impact of advertising on
consumers’ purchase probabilities and whether this causal impact is heterogeneous
depending on the height of bids that a consumer receives from the ad platform. The
setting of our experiment allows us to make use of the variation in bids without the
introduction of selection bias into our sample as the ad platform is optimizing the
campaigns for treatment and control group simultaneously.
We find that, in accordance with the incentives specified in CPA-based contracts, ad
platforms target consumers with high absolute purchase probabilities. We do not find
that these consumers react more positively to ad impressions. Using this empirical
strategy, we are able to show that what we theoretically present as potential incentive
misalignment turns out to be an actual misalignment. We do not find evidence of a
positive correlation between consumers’ purchase probabilities (as well as the bids
they receive) and the increase in purchase probabilities caused by ads.
This work has significant practical implications for the digital advertising industry.
While programmatic advertising and CPA-based contracts with ad platforms have
become very popular among firms, we show that these contracts are not beneficial for
firms. We show empirically that ad platforms follow the incentives specified in these
contracts and target high purchase probability consumers to increase their profits.
This behavior is harmful to firms as they pay more for ad impressions that are not
more effective. Therefore, we present evidence that shows that firms need to change
their ad allocation mechanisms with the aim to target more receptive consumers with
ads.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first provide an overview of
related literature in the area of behaviorally targeted advertising, ad effectiveness, and
ad auctions. Next, we lay out our theoretical explanation for the potential incentive
misalignment between firms and ad platforms. We then present the experimental
design of our randomized field experiment followed by our econometric analysis. To
conclude we summarize our theoretical contributions and practical implications of this
study.
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4.2 Related Literature
4.2.1 Behaviorally Targeted Advertising
Ad platforms’ capability to use extensive amounts of individual-level data on con-
sumers to target consumers has inspired research in the areas of both marketing and
information systems. In behavioral targeting, also called retargeting, ad platforms
utilize consumers’ browsing behavior on firms’ websites to readdress consumers with
relevant products on external sites. Lambrecht and Tucker (2013) find that consumers
are more responsive to generic retargeting ads instead of dynamic retargeting ads
which display specific products that consumers have visited before. Only when con-
sumers develop construed preferences, indicated by their visits to review websites,
dynamic retargeting ads outperform less personalized generic ads. Other research
finds that higher degrees of ad personalization with respect to product category and
brand advertised in an ad, do outperform ads with lower degrees of ad personal-
ization (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a). Nevertheless, ads with a high degree of ad
personalization decrease in performance faster over time when losing their recency,
the distance between a consumer’s website visit and the display of an ad based on the
behavior during that visit. Frick and Li (2016) find that retargeting ads that advertise
a specific product do generally outperform ads that advertise less specific product
categories. Furthermore, they suggest that socially targeted consumers might actually
react negatively to personalized ads due to the conflict of personalizing ads for a single
consumer with displaying names of friends in ads.
Commonly, studies in the area of retargeting compare the effectiveness of different
types of ads. Effectiveness is in these cases measured as ’how many consumers addressed
with a certain type of ad did conduct a certain action’ (purchased, clicked on the ad,
subscribed to a newsletter, etc.). Therefore, these studies do not necessarily measure
the effect of ads on consumers’ probability to conduct a certain action, the increase
in the probability, but rather the absolute probability that a consumer will conduct
a certain action given she was addressed with an ad. Such operationalization of
effectiveness might be problematic as a higher absolute probability to conduct an
action might not correlate with a higher impact of ads. In retargeting, consumers have
an inherently high purchase probability, independent of the confrontation with ads
(Dalessandro et al., 2012). This is the case as only consumers that have previously
indicated their interest in a firm’s product offerings, by visiting the firm’s product
pages, can be readdressed with this type of advertising. The generally high baseline
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purchase probability of consumers, independent of being addressed with an ad, makes
the context of retargeting especially interesting to investigate a potential incentive
misalignment between firm and ad platform. Retargeting allows ad platforms to more
easily identify high purchase probability consumers by making use of information on
their browsing behavior. In this context, success measurement is an important topic as
ad platforms can potentially more easily target high purchase probability consumers
independent of the effect of ads and in consequence over-report success of retargeting
campaigns.
4.2.2 Ad Effectiveness
While most of the research dealing with the design of targeted digital advertising
focuses on the question of how certain elements in ads should be specified to lead to
more positive consumer responses to these ads, the question of what the actual impact
of these ads on a firm’s performance is, is often neglected.
Dalessandro et al. (2012) discuss the issue of both ad effectiveness measurement and
attribution and suggest that a good attribution system needs to align the incentives
of both advertiser and advertising outlet which is contracted to serve ads. Last-click
attribution, that is assigning credit for a conversion to the advertising channel that
addressed a consumer last in the purchase process, is an example for these misaligned
incentives. Here, advertising outlets have an incentive to confront consumers with ads
as late as possible in their purchase process without taking an increase in consumers’
purchase probabilities into account. Under a last-touch attribution system, success is
attributed to the last ad channel that touches the consumer in the purchase process.
Depending on the contract with the advertising firm, these channels can charge a fee
from the firm for conversions of consumers addressed with ads.
The causal interpretation of an ad’s effect on a consumer’s purchase probability
hinges on the possibility to identify this effect. The classic solution to identify the causal
impact of ads on consumers’ purchase probability are so-called hold-out experiments
in which a certain percentage of consumers is randomly assigned to ads that are
assumed to be orthogonal to the firm’s ads, while the rest of the consumers are being
exposed to the firm’s regular ads. This approach is taken, since without serving ads
to consumers in the control group they can technically not be identified as members
of the control group. The difference between the consumers’ purchase probabilities in
treatment and control group can then be interpreted as the causal effect of ads on
consumers’ purchase probabilities.
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This approach has been criticized for being expensive, making firms spend money
on ads for consumers in the control group that are not contributing to the firms
success, as well as for neglecting the defensive effect of ads (Johnson et al., 2017a).
The defensive effect of ads describes that serving consumers unrelated ads does not
represent the true counterfactual. In the real world, consumers might be exposed
to ads of competitors that persuade them to purchase from the competitor instead
of the focal firm. Therefore, ads can have a defensive mechanisms circumventing
consumers to purchase from competitors that is not captured with these types of
hold-out experiments. Johnson et al. (2017a) propose a methodology to overcome this
limitation, called ghost ads, in which ad platforms are required to run hidden auctions
for consumers in the control group to determine which consumer would have seen an
ad if treated and should therefore be included into the control group. Although this
methodology is clearly superior to a hold-out approach, it hinges on the fact that it
needs to be implemented on the side of the ad platform. It may not be in the interest
of ad platforms to implement such a system and carry their costs when they are the
side currently benefiting from the incentive structure in programmatic advertising.
Related work has suggested to reward ad platforms based on the actually contributed
uplift in purchase probabilities and therefore incentivize them to take this metric
into account when bidding for ad spaces on behalf of a firm (Xu et al., 2016). Other
authors showcase how to increase the precision in estimating the impact of online
display advertising on oﬄine sales of a retailer by including covariates, and even
more drastically, by reducing noise in the control group by excluding observations for
consumers that would have not been treated (Johnson et al., 2017b).
Other work focuses on the pricing models that are currently implemented in con-
tracts between firms and ad platforms in which ad platforms are rewarded based on
the absolute outcome, instead of the incremental increase in the outcome variable
(Johnson and Lewis, 2015). We add to the discussion by empirically investigating the
implications of contracts with incentives that are not in line with firms’ true interest.
We acknowledge the fact that the most trivial way to solve the potential incentive
misalignment is to specify the contract between firm and ad platform differently.
Nevertheless, we focus on the empirical assessment of whether the currently specified
incentives do actually lead to an incentive misalignment between firm and ad platform.
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4.2.3 Ad Auctions
Over the last years, the way display advertising slots are sold to advertisers has
changed. Previously, advertisers were purchasing display ad slots in bulk, called ’direct’
buying or guaranteed contracts3, and paid a fixed amount per ad shown to consumers.
Nowadays, more and more ad slots are auctioned off in so-called real-time bidding
auctions. Direct buying of ad spaces limits advertisers flexibility with respect to
adjustments to traffic patterns or market conditions as agreements are made upfront
(Balseiro et al., 2014). Using auctions to allocate ad spaces is considered more efficient,
also as ad spaces are purchased by the advertiser that values the ad space the highest4
(Arnosti et al., 2016). Using auctions to sell digital ad space has been established in
search engine advertising where advertisers bid for pre-defined keywords that users
enter into the search field. Ad platforms use second-price auctions to sell off their
ad space (Edelman et al., 2007). In the most simple form of these type of auctions,
advertisers bid for an ad slot and are then ranked according to their willingness to pay.
The advertiser with the highest bid then buys the ad slot paying the price matching
the bid of the second highest bidder. It has been shown that the dominant strategy
for such auctions, also called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions, is to bid in accordance
with one’s true valuation (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; Vickrey, 1961).
As both the volume of impressions has grown as well as the decision of whom to
show an ad has increased in complexity, firms make use of bidding optimization tools
provided by ad platforms to guide their ad allocation process. These optimization
tools take firms’ campaign objectives, overall willingness to pay for advertising, as
well as detailed information of the respective consumer that can be addressed with an
ad into account. With this information, ad platforms decide, on behalf of the firm,
how much to bid for an ad impression.
4.3 Theory
Economic Value of an Ad Impression. When outsourcing the bidding for ad
impressions to ad platforms, firms have the goal to pay no more for an ad impression
than its actual value. The economic value of an ad impression i for a consumer j can
3An advertiser would individually negotiate a price for e.g. 100,000 impressions served over a
pre-defined time frame.
4Hinging on advertisers knowing their true valuation of an ad impression.
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be expressed by:
vi,j = E(pij |I = 1)− E(pij |I = 0)
where vi,j represents the value of an ad impression i for consumer j, which we write
as the difference between the expected value of profit when an ad is served to the
expected value of profit when no ad is served. pij is the outcome variable of interest
and takes monetary values when a purchase occurs (pij > 0) or equals zero in case
no purchase occurs. I equals 1 if an impression is served to a consumer and zero
otherwise. This equation can also be expressed as:
vi,j = P (pij > 0|I = 1)× pij − P (pij > 0|I = 0)× pij
which equals:
vi,j = ∆P (pij > 0)i × pij
where ∆P (pij > 0)i is the increase in purchase probability caused by impression i for
consumer j.
Nowadays, most online ad impressions are auctioned off in second-price sealed bid
auctions (Arnosti et al., 2016). We know that for these types of auctions the optimal
bid for an impression (bidi,j,optimal) equals the firm’s true valuation of the impression
(vi,j), given that one ad is auctioned off at a time (Edelman et al., 2007), as common
in display advertising. This means that the firms optimal bidding strategy for an
impression follows:
bidi,j,optimal = vi,j = ∆P (pij > 0)i × pij
Incentive Misalignment for Ad Platforms. Although there seems to be a well
established academic understanding of the economic value of advertising (Johnson
et al., 2017a,b; Lewis and Rao, 2014; Li and Kannan, 2014), unfortunately, most ad
platforms and advertisers cannot calculate or report the increase in a consumer’s
purchase probability caused by advertising, ∆P (pij > 0). Thus the most obvious
metrics that get reported by ad platforms are aggregate ad performance measures
such as conversion rate - which is the percentage of consumers addressed with ads that
conducted a predefined target action. For example, ad platforms report how many
purchases were generated per consumer that was exposed to ads:
Performance =
npurchases|I=1
nj|I=1
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where npurchases|I=1 is the number of purchases conducted by consumers that were
addressed with ads and nj|I=1 is the number of consumers that were addressed with
ads. This measure is commonly referred to as conversion rate. The conversion rate
measures the average purchase probability P (pi > 0) of consumers j that are addressed
with ads. This operationalization of ad performance by ad platforms overstates the
effect of ads, as some consumers would have conducted a purchase independent of
being confronted with advertising. Both the actual increase in purchase probability
∆P (pi > 0) as well as the profit contribution pi are not typically incorporated into this
measure.
Some ad platforms report profit contributed by advertising as:
Returnreported =
j∑
j=1
(P (pij > 0)× pij)
assuming homogeneous profit contribution, where every purchase generates the same
amount of profit, this equals:
Returnreported = P (pi > 0)×
j∑
j=1
pij = P (pi > 0)× nj|I=1 × pi
While the actual Return is:
Returnactual =
j∑
j=1
(∆P (pij > 0)× pij) = ∆P (pi > 0)× nj|I=1 × pi
Firms aim to reward ad platforms for actual success contribution. This is also why
firms have moved from paying for ad impressions, to paying for when consumers click
on ads, to paying only for when consumers addressed with ads conduct a pre-defined
target action, usually a purchase. Such an incentive structure is implemented in
CPA-based contracts. Firms have now commonly implemented CPA-based contracts,
in which they set this CPA value as their willingness to pay for a purchase reported by
the ad platform. Nevertheless, firms start to understand that they should reward ad
platforms at most for the increase in purchases caused by ads (∆P (pi > 0)) and not for
all purchases conducted by consumers that have been addressed with ads (P (pi > 0)).
Still, as the CPA-based contracts reward ad platforms based on P (pi > 0), firms face
the need to apply a deflation factor to adjust for the platform’s over-reporting of
returns to not overpay the ad platform.
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One common way to do so is to set the CPA value, representing a firm’s willingness to
pay for a purchase reported by the ad platform, below the absolute profit contribution
of a purchase, as the ad platform triggered likely only part of consumers’ purchase
actions (∆P (pij > 0)). Instead of paying the ad platform (Returnreported) firms set the
CPA value to adjust for ad platforms over-reporting with the aim to set the maximum
willingness to pay equal to Returnactual. The maximum CPA value can be defined as:
CPAmax =
∆P (pi > 0)× pi
P (pi > 0)
This restructuring of the formula for Returnreported is possible under the assumption
of homogeneous profit contributions (pij = pi). Although this seems, at a first glance,
like an adequate way for firms to adjust for the over-reporting of return on ad spend
by the ad platform, this adjustment proves difficult in practice for several reasons:
1. Firms can usually not determine ∆P (pi > 0) but in best cases have access to
historical information from experiments conducted at some point in the past.
Therefore, firms establish an approximate value for CPA.
2. The possibility to calculate a maximum CPA value hinges on the assumption
that the above equation is static. It is more likely though, that the values for
both ∆P (pi > 0) and P (pi > 0) change dynamically. As firms cannot set their
CPA value dynamically but need to pre-define a static CPA value this deflation
approach can never offer an optimal solution.
3. Most notably, the deflation approach does not address the actual issue, the
way that ad platforms are rewarded. Since the ad platform’s revenue function
remains:
Revenuead platform = P (pi > 0)× nj|I=1 × CPA
the ad platform’s interest to target consumers with high purchase probabilities
independent of the effect of ads remains intact. As the revenue function of the ad
platform does not contain ∆P (pi > 0), there is no incentive for the ad platform
to address consumers that are highly affected by ads. Increasing availability
of individual-level consumer information and analytical capabilities allow ad
platforms to identify consumers’ inherent purchase probabilities and target them
selectively with ads5.
5We show in Appendix A4.1 Table A4.1 that ad platforms seem to make use of consumer
characteristics and behavior to define the bid that they place for an ad impression for a consumer.
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However, whether such targeting by ad platforms is beneficial or harmful for firms
is not straightforward. It depends on whether high purchase probability consumers
are more or less receptive towards ads than low purchase probability consumers.
In short, such targeting benefits firms only if ∆P (pij > 0) is positively correlated
with P (pij > 0). This becomes clear when looking at the formula that firms use to
define their CPAmax. A sole increase in P (pi > 0) without a simultaneous increase in
∆P (pi > 0) would mean that the identified CPA value is inflated if not readjusted.
On the other hand, if ∆P (pi > 0) increases (over-)proportionally with P (pi > 0) this
targeting would actually be not harmful (beneficial). In short, if
corr(P (pij > 0),∆P (pij > 0)) ≤ 0
the ad platform has an incentive to target consumers with ads, by bidding higher
for their ad impressions, that are not more or even less receptive to these ads. The
adequacy of the deflation approach, using adjusted CPA values, does highly depend
on this correlation.
Incentive Misalignment with Heterogeneous Profit Contributions. For firms
that have a heterogeneous portfolio of products with heterogeneous profit contribu-
tions pij , the determination of a deflated CPA value becomes even more challenging.
Commonly, a CPA value, the firm’s willingness to pay an ad platform for a reported
purchase, is defined across the product portfolio, not distinguishing between different
products and their heterogeneous profit contributions. This essentially means that the
firm is applying a binary reward system in which the question is simply whether a
purchase occurred or not, instead of what the profit contribution of each purchased
product is. To derive an estimate for a suitable CPA value the firm needs to make an
assumption about the average profit contribution of products that will be purchased.
This means, not only unknown variation in ∆P (pij > 0) but also in profit contribution
pij makes the approximation more difficult. Firms cannot factorize out consumers’
absolute purchase probability after having seen an ad in the formula for Returnreported
without making an assumption about the average profit contribution pi to come up
with an approximated CPA value. Such an approximation might become especially
problematic when there is a negative correlation between pij and P (pij > 0).
corr(P (pij > 0), pij) < 0
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In this case, the ad platform has an incentive to target consumers that have lower
profit contributions inflating the firm’s CPA approximation. The assumption that
there is a negative correlation between the purchase probability and the profit contri-
bution seems plausible - consumers that are looking for high involvement (i.e. more
expensive, complex, and durable) products are less likely to purchase compared to
consumers that are in the market for low-involvement goods that usually require a
less intensive information search (Gu et al., 2012). This means that for firms that offer
heterogeneously priced products, the potential incentive misalignment might have an
even more severe effect if ad platforms target consumers with lower profit contribution
as they tend to be more likely to purchase. This might drive down the overall profit
contribution generated by consumers being addressed with ads. Therefore, it is not
only crucial for firms to think about the actual purchase probability uplift generated
by an ad campaign but also whether the ad platform might have an incentive to
target less profitable consumers as the ad platform is rewarded in a binary manner
independent of the monetary value of a purchase.
4.4 Ad Allocation Process and Infrastructure
In this work, we describe the implications of incentive specifications in contracts
between firms and, what we call, ad platforms that guide the allocation process of
digital ads to consumers in programmatic advertising. These two parties represent the
demand side of digital advertising, where firms purchase ad space and ad platforms act
as the trading platform for this ad space. What we describe as ad platform consists of
several distinct systems. While we are focusing on the case of an integrated ad platform
that comprises of all these systems, there are several players in the industry that
provide only part of the functionality of an integrated ad platform. As we are looking
at an integrated ad platform that is encompassing several roles and functionalities in
the ad allocation process, we refrain from dividing the ad platform into its distinct
technical roles in the main part of the paper. Nevertheless, in this section we aim
to give a better understanding of the ad allocation process from a more technical
perspective.
Importantly, in this work we are not taking the supply side in programmatic digital
advertising into account, consisting of publishers that sell ad space to firms via ad
platforms. These publishers, e.g. news websites, that sell ad space, are also connected
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to ad platforms, often through so called supply side platforms (SSP), to trade their
ad space.
The delivery process of ads in programmatic digital advertising is technically complex
involving several systems and providers that need to work together efficiently to allow
the execution of serving ads in milliseconds from an ad slot becoming available to
eventually serving an ad.
Commonly, the demand side of the ad allocation process is divided into the 4 main
functional parts consisting of (1) ad execution, (2) data enrichment, (3) analytics
and measurement, and (4) content optimization (Fisher et al., 2016). In the ad
execution phase the so called ad server takes the responsibility to decide which ad
will be served to a consumer on a publisher’s website. Further, the ad server records
consumers’ reactions to ads. These consumer reactions are communicated to firms via
reporting platforms that run under the analytics and measurement functionality. The
data enrichment functionality allows firms to incorporate information on consumers
that might be valuable in the process of deciding which consumer to address with
ads. Such information can include internally recorded information, i.e. consumer
behaviour on the firm’s website, but also externally received information. This type
of information is processed in the data management platform (DMP). By using this
data to categorize consumers, ad platforms can automatically define which consumers
should be targeted and which ad creative should be shown to a respective consumer.
The content optimization functionality encompasses a content delivery network (CDN).
This CDN is storing all ad creatives from which the ad server will eventually choose
the creative matching the criteria defined.
So-called demand side platforms (DSPs) span over the functionalities (1) ad ex-
ecution, (2) data enrichment, and (4) content optimization and are essentially the
main platform that firms use to coordinate their programmatic advertising efforts. “A
DSP is defined as an infrastructure that enables advertisers and agencies (buyers) to
manage their media buying via a single platform” (Graham, 2017). Usually, a DSP is
connected to several ad exchanges / ad networks, on which ad space is being traded,
allowing firms to manage their ad distribution to different publishers centrally as
ad inventory from several publishers can be accessed via a single platform. In our
case, we focus on the ad allocation via auctions, where ads are being sold off using
real-time bidding, compared to programmatic direct where ads are being traded directly
in bulk for a fixed price without the use of auctions. In real-time bidding, the DSP
submits bids for ad impressions on behalf of the firm where the supply side platform
(SSP) determines the winner, based on the highest bid submitted. The DSP then
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communicates the ad serving instructions with the SSP and makes sure that the right
ad is delivered from the CDN. The DSP provides so-called bidding agent services
(Johnson and Lewis, 2015) to the firm where the DSP, as part of what we call the ad
platform, is optimizing the bidding for ad impressions on behalf of the firm.
When talking about an ad platform in this work, we refer to an integrated player that
combines all of the above described functionalities on the demand side of programmatic
advertising.
4.5 Payment and Pricing for Ad Impressions
In our data analysis section, we are referring to the cost per ad impression that the
firm is paying instead of the cost per acquisition (CPA) that the firms specifies to
incentivize the ad platform. In practice, ad platforms need to reconcile different types
of contracts (e.g. CPM, CPC, CPA) that can simultaneously compete for the same
ad impressions. To achieve this, the ad platform needs to rescale all different bidding
systems to the cost per thousand impressions unit, allowing the ad platform to bid for
impressions across different contracts by using the same unit. The adjustment to this
common unit works as follows:
CPM = CPA× CR× 1, 000
where CR stands for conversion rate, giving the average share of ad impressions that
leads to a purchase. This allows the ad platform to rescale the from the firm defined
willingness to pay for a reported purchase (CPA) to an average willingness to pay
for 1,000 impressions (CPM). The ad platform than differentiates the bidding for
individual ad impressions while keeping the average cost per 1,000 impressions (CPM)
equal to the above described equation. This allows the ad platform to discriminate
between the bids for ad impressions for individual consumers while staying within the
boundaries of the firm-defined CPA value.
4.6 Experiment & Analysis
In collaboration with a major European e-retailer, we conducted a large-scale random-
ized field experiment to investigate the effectiveness of their retargeting advertising.
Retargeting makes use of consumers’ browsing behavior on the firm’s website to show
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products that a consumer has browsed on external websites (Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015a; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013). This ad targeting strategy clearly introduces an
upfront sample selection as consumers that are being targeted have shown interest in
the firm’s products prior to being addressed with ads. This is also why this context is
especially valuable to investigate a potential incentive misalignment between firm and
ad platform. In this context, ad platforms have richer data on consumers that can be
used to target consumers and optimize the bidding for ad impressions.
We randomly allocate consumers that have visited at least a product category page
of our partner firm’s website to being treated with retargeting ads on external sites
(80% probability of assignment) or with public service announcement (PSA) ads (20%
probability of assignment), that advertise the donation to a charity6. We follow the
commonly accepted assumption that PSA ads are orthogonal to our retargeting ads
in their effect on consumers, allowing us to identify the consumers in our control
group and measure the causal impact of retargeting ads (Johnson et al., 2017a). For
the duration of the experiment consumers remain in the treatment or control group
respectively.
Our partner firm selects a CPA optimization algorithm to guide the bidding for
the ads on the ad platform. We are aware of a potential selection of consumers that
might be introduced into our sample caused by the optimization algorithm. This can
be the case if the optimization algorithm selects different types of consumers into our
treatment and control group, biasing our ad effectiveness estimates. This happens if
the bidding for the retargeting and PSA impressions is optimized separately. In this
case, the ad platform has an incentive to select different types of consumers for the
treatment and the control group, as different types of consumers are likely to respond
positively to the retargeting ads than to the public service announcements (Johnson
et al., 2017a). To circumvent this issue, we pay significant attention to setting up
our campaigns in a way so that they are optimized jointly by the ad platform before
we start the experiment. After the end of our experiment and our data collection,
we run an extensive amount of randomization checks to make sure that consumers
in the control and treatment groups are not systematically different and that the
optimization was run jointly.
For our analysis we aggregate our data on consumer level (n = 20, 918, ntreatment =
16, 734, ncontrol = 4, 184) (see Table 4.1 for descriptive statistics). In our randomiza-
tion checks we find that there seems to be no significant differences between treatment
6We make sure that the share of consumers allocated to treatment (80%) and control group
(20%) is consistent independent of the height of the bid. More details can be found in Appendix A4.2
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and control group regarding both variables related to treatment and consumer char-
acteristics (see Table 4.2). We find that the average bid (in Euro) (meanbid = .011)
(∆M = .0003, t = 1.081, p = .280), as well as the average cost for an ad impression
(in Euro) (meancost = .0036) (∆M = 4.29e − 6, t = .063, p = .950) do not differ
between control and treatment group. Next to that, the number of impressions served
on average per consumer (meanimpressions = 20.095) does not differ between control
and treatment group (∆M = .213, t = 0.778, p = .437).
We also investigate whether different types of consumers might have been allocated
to treatment or control group. For this purpose, we assess consumer behavior before
the first ad treatment, as this behavior is influenced by our experimental treatment
and therefore not comparable after the first treatment. We find that the number of
activities conducted on our retailer’s website before consumers’ first ad impression
(meanactivities = 5.826) does not differ significantly between treatment and control
group (∆M = .045, t = .290, p = .772). There is no difference in the number of
visits between consumers in the treatment and control group (meanvisits = 1.361)
(∆M = .024, t = 1.268, p = .205), a variable indicating how often consumers visit our
partner firm’s website before their first experimental treatment. Also the time spent on
our retailers site before the treatment (in minutes) (meanactivity duration = 6.971) does
not differ significantly (∆M = .247, t = .922, p = .357). Further, variables such as the
number of visited product categories, number of visited product pages, as well as the
number of shopping cart visits, all characterizing consumers, do not differ significantly
between control and treatment group. These findings make us confident that although
the platform has been running an optimization algorithm for the bidding, no selection
bias was introduced as treatment and control group were optimized simultaneously.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
impressions 20,918 20.0947 15.8761 1 111
purchase 20,918 0.0564 0.2307 0 1
ad treatment 20,918 0.8000 0.4000 0 1
bid 20,918 0.0109 0.0160 0.00054 0.09118
cost 20,918 0.0036 0.0039 0.00001 0.08946
We move on to investigate whether the ad platform’s targeting mechanisms which
become explicit in the bids for impressions that we observe in our data follow an
optimal strategy for the firm.
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Table 4.2: Randomization Checks
Mean
Variable Control Treatment t-Statistic p-Value
bid 0.011 0.011 1.081 0.280
cost 0.004 0.004 0.063 0.950
impressions 19.924 20.137 −0.778 0.437
activities 5.790 5.835 −0.290 0.772
visits 1.341 1.366 −1.268 0.205
activity duration 6.773 7.020 −0.922 0.357
number of visited product categories 1.484 1.476 0.504 0.615
number of visited product pages 2.885 2.902 −0.191 0.849
number of shopping cart visits 0.100 0.101 −0.063 0.950
4.6.1 Bidding & Increase in Purchase Probability
We investigate whether the optimization algorithm implemented by the ad platform
is bidding in the interest of the firm. First, we assess whether ad platforms target
consumers with higher purchase probabilities in line with the incentive structure
present in contracts between ad platforms and firms. Generally, our analysis requires
variation in the endogenous variable for average bids for ad impressions placed by
the ad platform on behalf of the firm. The histogram of the average bid for an ad
impression for a consumer displays the variation in the bid variable (see Figure 4.1). A
coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to mean) larger than 1 (CV = 1.470)
of the bid variable further points to variation in the height of bids placed by the ad
platform.
Next, we investigate the average treatment effect of the ads in our experiment.
Lastly, we test whether higher bids are placed for ads that have a higher impact on
consumers’ purchase probabilities.
To do that, we estimate a logit model that investigates whether consumers for whom
the optimization algorithm does on average bid higher are more receptive to the ad
treatment.
Purchase ProbabilityRetargetingj =
exp(URetargetingj )
exp(URetargetingj ) + 1
URetargetingj = β0 + β1bidj + β2ad treatmentj + β3bidj × ad treatmentj + j
where bidj gives the average bid for a consumer j over the duration of the experiment
in Euro, ad treatmentj represents a binary variable indicating whether a consumer was
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Figure 4.1: Histogram Average Bid
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addressed with retargeting ads (ad treatmentj = 1) or PSA ads (ad treatmentj = 0),
and j represents the idiosyncratic error term.
The coefficient of the interaction between bidj and ad treatmentj represents the
focal aspect in this analysis. In case the ad platform does optimize the bidding in
the interest of the firm, we would expect a positive and significant coefficient for the
interaction term of bidj and ad treatmentj .
Table 4.3 presents the results for our analysis. We find that, in line with the
incentive structure in contracts between ad platforms and firms, ad platforms target
consumers that are more likely to purchase by bidding higher for their ad impressions
(βbid = 14.852, p < .001). In Appendix A4.1 we present evidence that shows that the
ad platform is using consumer characteristics to identify high purchase probability
consumers. Overall, the ad treatment does significantly increase consumers’ purchase
probabilities (βad treatment = .174, p = .032) pointing towards the presence of a return
on advertising spending. Nevertheless, we do not find evidence for a significant effect
of the interaction between bids placed by the ad platform and the ad treatment
(βad treatment×bid = .531, p = .880). This means that while the optimization algorithm
is bidding higher for consumers that are more likely to purchase, it fails to identify
and bid higher for consumers that are more receptive towards ads. The non-significant
interaction term of ad treatmentj and bidj also points towards no significant correlation
between consumers’ inherent purchase probabilities and their receptiveness towards
ads rendering the bidding strategy adopted by the ad platform sub-optimal for the
firm.
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Table 4.3: Logit Regressions for Purchase Probability
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit
bid 14.852∗∗∗ 14.895∗∗∗ 14.466∗∗∗
(1.377) (1.378) (3.158)
ad treatment 0.174∗∗ 0.165∗
(0.081) (0.098)
ad treatment × bid 0.531
(3.510)
Constant −3.071∗∗∗ −3.213∗∗∗ −3.206∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.077) (0.089)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We run additional robustness checks in which we analyze the relationship between the
maximum bid, the median bid, and the cumulative bid placed for an ad impression for
consumer j and their impact on consumers’ purchase probability (see Appendix A4.3).
When operationalizing the ad platform’s targeting behavior, visible in the ad platform’s
bidding for ad impressions, differently, we find consistent results.
To strengthen the argument that there is no significant correlation between con-
sumers’ inherent purchase probabilities and the increase in purchase probabilities
caused by ads we build a predictive model estimating consumers’ purchase probabilities
prior to the ad treatment (see Appendix A4.4). The purpose of this analysis is to
investigate the relationship between absolute purchase probabilities and the increase
in purchase probabilities caused by ads more directly, instead of looking at the bid
placed by ad platforms and the increase in purchase probabilities caused by ads. We
use these predicted purchase probabilities to test whether consumers with a higher
predicted purchase probabilities react more positively to our ad treatment. Consistent
with our claim, we find that consumers with higher predicted purchase probabilities
do not react more positively to the ad treatment.
To further assess the robustness of our findings, we investigate the possibility that
we do not find a significant interaction effect in our analysis because our experiment
has too low power. We assess the functional form of the relationship between bids
placed by the ad platform and the increase in consumers’ purchase probabilities. We
plot the average increase in purchase probabilities caused by ads per consumer and
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bid decile (see Figure 4.2). In case the ad platform is optimizing the bidding in the
interest of the firm, we would expect a monotonically increasing trend in the average
increase in purchase probability caused by ads with an increase in the bid decile. This
graph points towards the absence of a relationship between the bidding conducted by
the ad platform and the increase in consumers’ purchase probabilities.
Figure 4.2: Average Purchase Probability Increase per Consumer and Bid Decile
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Notably, firms do not pay their actual winning bid to serve an ad impression but
are being charged the second highest bid in the ad auctions. Our results remain
consistent when analyzing the impact of both the average cost per impression and the
overall cost for impressions served to a consumer over the duration of the experiment
(see Appendix A4.5). Firms are paying more for ad impressions that do not increase
consumers’ purchase probabilities more significantly. This means that firms pay more
for ads that do not deliver significantly higher value to them.
One explanation that would justify the ad platform’s bidding behavior is that the
ad platform’s optimization algorithm incorporates consumers’ profit contributions (pij)
into its optimization. In case the profit contribution is negatively correlated with the
increase in consumers’ purchase probabilities:
corr(pij ,∆P (pij > 0)) < 0
there might be a valid reason for the algorithm to not bid higher for more receptive
consumers but instead target consumers with higher profit potential.
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4.6.2 Bidding & Profit Contribution
To analyze whether the optimization algorithm does take profit contribution into
account we investigate whether consumers that purchase more expensive products
have received higher bids. The generated revenue seems to be an adequate measure
for this analysis as our retailer’s profit margin is a somewhat stable percentage of the
generated revenue. The generated revenue per consumer can therefore be seen as a
linear transformation of the profit contribution.
First, we analyze, for the consumers that conducted a purchase npurchase = 1, 113,
whether the ad platform bid higher to serve ad impressions to consumers that generated
higher revenue for the firm. We run the following OLS regression:
revenuej = β0 + β1bidj + j
We do not find that more valuable consumers receive higher bids, pointing towards
the optimization algorithm not taking the profit contribution into account (Table 4.4,
column 1). Due to the positively skewed distribution of our revenue variable we re-run
our OLS model using the log-transformed revenue variable as dependent variable
(Table 4.4, column 2). Still, we do not find that the algorithm bids higher for more
valuable consumers.
Table 4.4: OLS Regressions for Revenue
(1) (2)
VARIABLES revenue OLS log(revenue) OLS
bid 135.092 2.175
(394.685) (1.403)
Constant 255.859∗∗∗ 4.922∗∗∗
(12.494) (0.041)
Observations 1,113 1,113
R-squared 0.0001 0.0019
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Nevertheless, in this analysis we solely focus on the small share of consumers
that conducted a purchase and the non-significant values might simply represent the
challenge for the algorithm to predict not only the profit contribution but also whether
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a consumer will purchase or not.7 Therefore, we move on to investigate whether
the algorithm picks up earlier signs of profit contribution potential in a consumer’s
purchase process and incorporates them in its optimization.
We create a measure for the value of a product category within our sample. For
each product page that the consumers in our sample browse, we collect the price
of the featured product. We then calculate the average price of a product within a
product category. In a next step, we use information on which categories a consumer
has browsed to calculate a weighted average representing the potential for revenue
contribution for an individual consumer.8 For example, if the average price for a
product in the laptop category is 1,000 Euro and the average price for a product in the
TV category is 500 Euro, and a consumer has browsed 5 pages in the laptop category
and 5 pages in the TV category, we estimate the potential revenue contribution at
750 Euro. To check whether our measure for potential revenue contribution is a good
predictor for revenue we run the following model:
revenuej = β0 + β1revenue potentialj + j
We find that our measure for revenue potential is a significant predictor of revenue
contribution (βrevenue potential = .018, p < .001) (Table 4.5, column 1). In a next step,
we analyze whether higher revenue potential does also predict the average height of a
bid for a consumer that is placed by the optimization algorithm.
bidj = β0 + β1revenue potentialj + j
In column 2 of Table 4.5 we see that this is not the case. Our variable for revenue
potential is not a significant positive predictor for a consumer’s average bid for an ad
impression. Therefore the ad platform’s optimization algorithm does not abstain from
targeting more receptive consumers for the sake of targeting consumers with higher
profit contributions. Instead, our previously raised concern that the ad platform might
target consumers not only with higher inherent purchase probability but also lower
7In Appendix A4.6 we show additional analysis confirming our results.
8The data used to derive the revenue potential variable was collected some time after the
experiment had been executed. By this time, some products browsed by consumers where not
available on the partner firm’s website anymore. Therefore, we are missing values of the revenue
potential for 137 consumers that browsed products in unpopular categories that were discontinued
in between the experiment and collection of data to estimate the revenue potential of consumers.
It seems reasonable to assume that there is no relationship between the likelihood that the sale of
a product is discontinued and the targeting behavior of the ad platform that could influence our
results. Therefore, we run the analysis with the slightly smaller sample.
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revenue potential seems to be supported. We find a negative and significant coefficient
for the effect of our revenue potential variable on the average bid placed by the ad
platform on behalf of the firm (βrevenue potential = −9.15e− 7, p = .049). This finding
indicates that, as consumers that are browsing for more expensive products are less
likely to conduct a purchase, the ad platform targets consumers with lower revenue
potential that have a higher purchase probability.
Table 4.5: OLS Regressions Revenue Potential
(1) (2)
VARIABLES revenue OLS bid OLS
revenue potential 0.018∗∗∗ −9.15e−7∗∗
(0.004) (4.65e− 7)
Constant 8.007∗∗∗ 1.11e−2∗∗∗
(1.126) (2.00e− 4)
Observations 20,781 20,781
R-squared 0.0017 0.0002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.7 Theoretical Contributions
This study uniquely contributes to research in the area of behavioral targeting, ad
effectiveness, and ad auctions. While previous studies pointed out the inadequacy of
commonly used incentive schemes in programmatic advertising contracts as adver-
tising platforms have an interest to serve ads to consumers that conduct a purchase
independent of the effect of ads (Johnson and Lewis, 2015), we are able to investigate
the implications of these incentives empirically. Our unique field experimental set
up allows us to both identify the causal impact of digital advertising on consumers’
purchase probabilities while simultaneously exploiting variation introduced in the bids
for ad impressions by the ad platform that is targeting consumers.
We show that the ad platform is acting in accordance with incentives defined in the
contract. Ad platforms target consumers with higher inherent purchase probabilities
by placing higher bids on ad slots for these consumers. This finding confirms the
presence of a potential incentive misalignment.
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Up to now, it remained unclear how consumers with different inherent purchase
probabilities differ with respect to their reaction to advertising. In line with this
question, we show that firms efforts to mitigate this potential incentive misalignment
by reducing rewards for purchases reported by the ad platform hinges on the correlation
between the absolute inherent purchase probabilities of consumers and the increase in
purchase probabilities caused by ads. In case this correlation is zero or non-positive,
ad platforms have an interest to target consumers with ad impressions in a way that
is sub-optimal for the focal firm.
To assess the correlation between absolute inherent purchase probabilities of con-
sumers and their increase in purchase probabilities caused by ads we empirically assess
whether the purchase probabilities of consumers that receive higher bids increase more
significantly. This assessment is crucial when answering the question of whether an
actual incentive misalignment between firm and ad platform is present in the context
of programmatic advertising.
In our empirical analysis, we find evidence for the presence of the incentive mis-
alignment that has negative implications for firms. While ads do generally increase
consumers’ purchase probabilities and ad platforms target consumers with ads that are
more likely to purchase, independent of being served an ad impression, ad platforms
do not target consumers that are more receptive to ads. This means, ad platforms
do not target consumers whose purchase probabilities increase more significantly due
to ad impressions. We find no evidence for a positive correlation between consumers’
high inherent purchase probability and their increase in purchase probability caused
by ads.
We further show, that due to the bid optimization conducted by the ad platform
the firm is paying more for ad impressions that do not offer a higher return on
ad investment. This finding renders the ad allocation process conducted by the ad
platform on behalf of the firm sub-optimal for the firm. This work is the first to provide
actual empirical evidence for the presence of an incentive misalignment between firms
and ad platforms in programmatic advertising.
Our results remain consistent when considering the potential that ad platforms
might take consumers’ profit contribution potential in their ad allocation process into
account. As ad platforms become better at using individual-level consumer data to
predict consumers’ purchase probability this problem might be enhanced.9
9We show in Appendix A4.1 Table A4.1 that the ad platform seems to make use of variables
describing consumer characteristics and behavior to define their respective bids for an ad impression
i for consumer j.
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4.8 Practical Implications
The results of this research have major implications for firms that utilize automated
ad allocation tools provided by ad platforms. While ad platforms claim to optimize
the ad allocation process in the interest of firms, we find that this is the case only
when there is a positive correlation between consumers’ purchase probability and their
increase in purchase probability caused by ad impressions. In our empirical context,
we show that this is not the case, rendering the ad allocation process conducted by
the ad platform on behalf of the firm sub-optimal.
Aggravatingly, firms usually do not have the experimental data available that is
necessary to reveal this sub-optimal bidding behavior performed by an ad platform.
This issue arises as the ad platform is controlling the whole ad allocation process
including the selection of consumers, definition of bid, display of ads, as well as the
report of success metrics. Firms usually have no access to both experimental data
that allows for an investigation of the true impact of digital ads as well as the detailed
data available on consumers to assess potential heterogeneity that could be exploited
for targeting.
To resolve this incentive issue, ad platforms would need to disintegrate the different
steps in the ad allocation process, giving the firms more control over and insights
into whom to serve an ad at which price. Further, ad platforms would need to be
rewarded based on incremental purchases instead of the absolute number of purchases
conducted by consumers addressed with ads.
4.9 Limitations
Despite the fact that our study offers some interesting insights into the implications
of incentives specified in contracts within programmatic advertising, some limitations
need to be taken into consideration when interpreting our results.
When looking at the data that we analyze for our experiment, it is important
to mention that we only observe bids for ad slot auctions won by the focal firm.
This means that we only know how much the ad platform is bidding for impression
i for consumer j if the firm wins the auction for the respective ad impression. As
lower bids are less likely to win an auction for an ad impression, our data could be
truncated at the lower end of bids. We might not observe lower bids placed by the ad
platform as these auctions are not won by the firm. Therefore, it could be the case
that consumers receiving higher bids for impressions are the ones more responsive to
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ads. For consumers receiving low bids, that we are more likely to miss in our data as
the firm is more likely to lose these ad auctions, the treatment could be less effective.
Therefore, our data would simply not reveal a pattern where consumers that receive
higher bids are more receptive to ads. Even though, theoretically, such a problem
might exist, we think that this issue is of limited nature when looking at our data set.
First, we find that the coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to mean)
for the average bid for consumers is higher than 1 (CV = 1.470). A coefficient of
variation higher than 1 indicates rather large variation in a variable. Therefore, even
if we do not observe the lowest bids placed by the ad platform, there seems to be
sufficient variation that can be exploited for our analysis. The question of whether
ads with high bids have a higher impact on consumers’ purchase probabilities – given
that the ad auction is won – remains.
Further, when looking at the distribution of average bids per consumer placed by the
ad platform (see Figure 4.1), we see that the bids we observe are clustered relatively
close to zero, while we observe fewer high bids. The distribution of average bids that
we observe does stand counter the argument that our data might be truncated at the
lower end of bids as these is where our bids are concentrated.
Lastly, as we investigate the effectiveness of advertising for different bids in the
context of retargeting, it seems questionable whether the ad platform would bid
significantly lower for a certain type of consumer. The reason for this assumption
is related to the fact that consumers that visit our partner firm’s website – which
is required to be eligible for treatment with retargeting ads which use consumers’
browsing behavior for personalization – do have inherently higher purchase probabilities
compared to consumers that do not visit the partner firm’s website. This should mean
that the ad platform does not have an incentive to bid very low for consumers that
have indicated their interest in our partner firm’s products, making it less likely to
systematically lose auctions, truncating our data set.
Another issue we are facing is that our experimental design is not taking the so
called ’defensive effect’ of ads into account. As pointed out in former research (Johnson
et al., 2017a), using PSAs as control group for the ad treatment does not represent
the true counterfactual. The true counterfactual encompasses the possibility that
consumers are confronted with ads of competitors. The defensive effect of ads describes
that ads draw effectiveness not only from their direct impact on consumers’ purchase
probabilities but also from the fact that they prevent competitors from displaying their
ads. Our experimental design does not take this defensive effect into account. There
are two empirical challenges related to this limitation. First, as we do not observe the
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defensive effect with our design, we might underestimate the overall impact of ads
on consumers’ purchase probabilities. This issue seems negligible in our context as
we do find that ads generally increase consumers’ purchase probabilities. The second
issue is related to the identification of heterogeneous effects on consumers’ purchase
probabilities. In case the defensive effect is not symmetric for different bids, e.g. smaller
for lower bids and bigger for larger bids, we might not be able to detect a significant
increase in ad effectiveness with an increase in the average bid as we are not observing
the defensive effect.
To handle this issue, we conduct some additional analyses in which we try to
control for the competition for an ad impression (see Appendix A4.7). A measure
for competition should allow us to assess to what extent a defensive effect might be
asymmetric for different heights of bids. Both our measures for absolute and relative
competition indicate that competition for ad impressions that receive higher bids is
relatively lower. This indicates that if there is an asymmetric defensive effect, it is likely
to decrease with an increase in bids. This could mean that we are not able to detect
a decrease in ad effectiveness with higher bids, rendering the bidding optimization
conducted by the ad platform even less favorable for the firm. When controlling for
absolute and relative competition in our analysis, we find results consistent with our
main analysis. Higher bids do not yield higher ad effectiveness. Therefore, we are
confident that not being able to consider the defensive effect of ads in our analysis is
a problem that is not significantly affecting the contributions of our work.
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Appendices
A4.1 Bid Prediction with Consumer
Characteristics & Behavioral Data
In Table A4.1 we use a set of consumer characteristics and behavioral variables to see
how well we can predict the average bid for a consumer j placed by the ad platform.
We find that these variables do significantly predict the height of the average bid and
that we are able to explain 27.7% of the variation in the average bid and 33.3% of the
variation in the log transformed version of the average bid. This points towards the
ad platform making use of these type of variables, which characterize consumers, to
decide on how much to bid for an ad impression.
Table A4.1: Bid Prediction with Behavioral Data
(1) (2)
VARIABLES bid OLS log(bid) OLS
category browsing −0.001053∗∗∗ −0.046387∗∗∗
(0.000040) (0.001512)
product browsing −0.001338∗∗∗ −0.064929∗∗∗
(0.000039) (0.001451)
focus country 1 0.001358∗∗∗ 0.068786∗∗∗
(0.000039) (0.001520)
focus country 2 0.001017∗∗∗ 0.041928∗∗∗
(0.000038) (0.001439)
number of activities 0.000049∗∗∗ 0.000572
(0.000012) (0.000639)
number of visits −0.000366∗∗∗ −0.011718∗∗∗
(0.000057) (0.002907)
activity duration in minutes 0.000020∗∗∗ 0.001932∗∗∗
(0.000006) (0.000338)
number of visited categories 0.000212 ∗ ∗ 0.015485∗∗∗
(0.000083) (0.004267)
Constant 0.012331∗∗∗ −4.901002∗∗∗
(0.000199) (0.010082)
Observations 20,918 20,918
R-squared 0.276911 0.333471
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A4.2 Share of Consumers Allocated to Treatment
and Control Group
To make sure that consumers in treatment and control group are consistently dis-
tributed per bid and in accordance with our randomization rule (80% of consumers
allocated to treatment group, 20% of consumers allocated to control group) we analyze
the allocation of consumers per bid decile. To do so, we run two types of analysis. First,
we conduct a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on our ad treatment variable
investigating whether there are significant differences between the share of consumers
that are allocated to the treatment for the different bid deciles. The analysis is not
significant, F (9, 20, 908) = 1.37 (p = 0.197), meaning that the share of consumers
allocated to the treatment group per bid decile does not differ significantly.
Next, we run t-tests per bid-decile in which we test the null hypothesis whether
the share of consumers allocated to the treatment group per respective bid decile
differs significantly from 80%. Figure A4.1 plots our results. We find that there is no
significant difference to the 80% allocation rule for any of or bid deciles.
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Figure A4.1: Share of Treated Consumers per Bid Decile
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A4.3 Estimation of Purchase Probability Using
Alternative Measures for Bid
We re-estimate our main model by replacing the average bid placed for ad impressions
for a consumer by the maximum bid (see Table A4.2), the median bid (see Table A4.3),
and the cumulative bid (see Table A4.4) placed for a consumer over the duration of
the experiment. Our results are consistent with the main analysis.
Table A4.2: Logistic Regression Predicting Purchase Probability Using the Maximum
Bid per Consumer
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit
max bid 11.713∗∗∗ 11.736∗∗∗ 13.240∗∗∗
(1.107) (1.108) (2.491)
ad treatment 0.171∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.081) (0.109)
max bid × ad treatment −1.863
(2.781)
Constant −3.131∗∗∗ −3.270∗∗∗ −3.310∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.079) (0.099)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A4.3: Logistic Regression Predicting Purchase Probability Using the Median
Bid per Consumer
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit
median bid 13.896∗∗∗ 13.926∗∗∗ 12.352∗∗∗
(1.338) (1.339) (3.188)
ad treatment 0.171∗∗ 0.143
(0.081) (0.096)
median bid × ad treatment 1.926
(3.514)
Constant −3.049∗∗∗ −3.188∗∗∗ −3.165∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.076) (0.087)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4.4: Logistic Regression Predicting Purchase Probability Using the Cumulative
Bid per Consumer
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit
cumulative bid 0.202∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.096
(0.060) (0.060) (0.153)
ad treatment 0.166∗∗ 0.136
(0.081) (0.089)
cumulative bid × ad treatment 0.129
(0.166)
Constant −2.924∗∗∗ −3.059∗∗∗ −3.034∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.075) (0.081)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A4.4 Prediction of Purchase Probabilities
We decide to predict the purchase probabilities of consumers in our sample to both
investigate whether the bid placed by the ad platform is correlated with this prediction
as well as whether we are able to find heterogeneous treatment effects of the ad
treatment when comparing consumers with differently predicted purchase probabilities.
To do so, we randomly assign 80% of our data to train our predictive model, keeping
the remaining 20% as validation set. In a first step, we select a set of variables that
offers the highest area under the curve (AUC) when applied to our validation data (see
Table A4.5). We use logit model in the variable selection stage to select the variables
that maximize the AUC in our validation set.
Table A4.5: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Predictive Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
impressions after shopping basket visit 20,918 0.908 5.193 0 86
impressions after category page visit 20,918 4.034 10.09 0 81
impressions after product page visit 20,918 15.15 15.71 0 104
activity duration 20,918 6.971 15.50 0 656.9
number of visited categories 20,918 1.478 0.927 1 20
check-out page visits 20,918 0.0105 0.156 0 7
product page visits 20,918 2.899 5.092 0 168
homepage visits 20,918 1.027 2.536 0 47
shopping cart visits 20,918 0.101 0.838 0 32
unweighted revenue potential 20,918 1,620 3,359 0 165,489
country 1 20,918 0.694 0.461 0 1
country 2 20,918 0.295 0.456 0 1
In a next step, we compare the logit model’s performance with the performance of
a probit model (see Figure A4.2). We find that, when looking at the AUC values, the
probit model is outperforming the logit model. The performance difference between
the logit and probit model is significant (Prob > chi2 = .0186).
We predict the purchase probabilities for all consumers in the sample using the
probit model. We use these predicted purchase probabilities to first see whether they
can predict the average bid per consumer that is placed by the ad platform (see
Table A4.6, column 1). We find that our purchase probability prediction variable
is significant when regressing it upon the average bid placed by the ad platform
(βpredicted purchase probability = .129, p < .001). This once more points towards the
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Figure A4.2: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve
ad platform making use of consumer characteristics to determine the height of the
respective bid for an ad impression.
Then we investigate whether we are able to find a heterogeneous treatment effect of
our ads when comparing consumers with different predicted purchase probabilities
(see Table A4.6, column 2). Consistent with our main analysis (see Table 4.3), we find
that our ad treatment does significantly increase consumers’ likelihood to purchase
(βad treatment = .287, p = 0.03). At the same time, our predicted purchase probabilities
(by construction) significantly predict whether a consumer will conduct a purchase
(βpredicted purchase probability = 9.570, p < 0.001). Most importantly, we cannot find
evidence for the presence of a heterogeneous treatment effect when looking at the
interaction of the ad treatment with our variable for predicted purchase probabilities
instead of the average bid per consumer that is generated by the ad platform.
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Table A4.6: Impact of Predicted Purchase Probability
(1) (2)
VARIABLES bid OLS purchase Logit
ad treatment 0.287∗∗
(0.132)
predicted purchase probability 0.129∗∗∗ 9.570∗∗∗
(0.003) (1.584)
ad treatment × predicted purchase probability −2.214
(1.710)
Constant 0.004∗∗∗ −3.557∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.122)
Observations 20,918 20,918
R-squared 0.071
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A4.5 Alternative Cost Measures
In our main analysis (see Table 4.3), we investigate whether consumers that receive
an on average higher bid from the ad platform are more receptive towards ads.
Nevertheless, as the ad platform is operating a second-price auction, the firm is not
actually paying the bid placed by the ad platform but the second highest bid that
is placed on behalf of another firm that is competing for a respective impression.
Therefore, we investigate the robustness of our model by focusing on the actual average
cost incurred per impression and consumer.
We run our logit model for consumers’ purchase probability using the actual average
cost per impression and consumer that the firm is paying instead of the bid that is
placed by the ad platform on behalf of the firm.
Purchase ProbabilityRetargetingj =
exp(URetargetingj )
exp(URetargetingj ) + 1
URetargetingj = β0 + β1costj + β2ad treatmentj + β3ad treatmentj × costj + j
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where, compared to our main analysis, we replace bidj with costj which gives the
average cost of an impression for a consumer in Euro over the duration of the ex-
periment. Again, in case the ad platform would optimize the bidding in the interest
of the firm, we would expect a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction
term of ad treatmentj and costj . More expensive impressions for a consumer should
have a higher impact on the purchase probability. Nevertheless, our results remain
consistent (see Table A4.7): Generally, the firm is on average paying more to serve im-
pressions to consumers that are more likely to convert (βcost = 44.645, p < .001). Ads
have a significant positive impact on consumers’ purchase probability (βad treatment =
.166, p = .040). Nevertheless, the on average more expensive impressions for con-
sumers are not justified by a higher impact of ads on consumers’ purchase probability
(βad treatment×bid = −4.210, p = .738).
Table A4.7: Logit Regressions for Impact of Actual Incurred Average Cost on Purchase
Probability
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit
cost 44.645∗∗∗ 44.639∗∗∗ 48.035∗∗∗
(4.990) (4.983) (11.310)
ad treatment 0.166∗∗ 0.185∗
(0.081) (0.099)
ad treatment × cost −4.210
(12.608)
Constant −3.056∗∗∗ −3.191∗∗∗ −3.206∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.077) (0.089)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Additionally, we run our logit model estimating the impact of the overall cost for
all impressions served to a consumer over the duration of the experiment instead of
the average cost (see Table A4.8). This way we take the variation in the number of
impressions per consumer into account that is driving the overall costs that the firm
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needs to pay per consumer. We find that ad impressions are not more effective for
consumers for which the firm is investing more in advertising.
These analyses show that the firm is paying more for ad impressions that do not
yield a higher return, which would be represented by a more significant increase in
purchase probabilities of consumers for whose ad impressions the firm is paying more.
Table A4.8: Logit Regressions for Impact of Actual Incurred Overall Cost on Purchase
Probability
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit
overall cost 0.647∗∗ 0.644∗∗ 1.194∗
(0.268) (0.268) (0.638)
ad treatment 0.164∗∗ 0.214∗∗
(0.081) (0.098)
treatment × overall cost −0.657
(0.704)
Constant −2.925∗∗∗ −3.058∗∗∗ −3.100∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.076) (0.089)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A4.6 Revenue Regression
In the main part of this study, we investigate whether the ad platform bids higher
for consumers that generate higher revenue for the ad platform. We do this using
only the observations of consumers that actually conduct a purchase instead of the
whole sample of consumers. In this section, we explain why we decided to conduct
this analysis this way.
Most of the consumers in our sample do not conduct a purchase and therefore
contribute no revenue (npurchase = 1, 113; nno purchase = 19, 805). We need to be
cautious about how to investigate the moderating effect of bid height on ad effectiveness
(revenue generation) for two reasons.
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First, such an analysis mixes up two predictions the ad platform needs to make
when deciding whom to target: (1) Who will purchase? (2) How much will they spend?
These two questions are heavily intertwined as predicting who will purchase correctly
will lead to the ad platform automatically targeting consumers that generate higher
revenue compared to consumers that do not conduct a purchase.
Second, in a case with heavily skewed revenue generated by the consumers this
is especially problematic. The heavily skewed distribution of revenue and impact
of outliers might cause the results to rather represent a case of chance than actual
performance of the ad platform. The distribution of the revenue per consumer in our
sample is heavily positively skewed (see Figure A4.3). We have some very extreme
outliers (revenuemax = 3, 789.8). With a dependent variable that skewed these outliers
strongly affect the estimation results in our regression while they might occur by
chance. According to Tukey (1977)’s definition of outliers, all our observations with
revenue > 0 are considered outliers (see Figure A4.4).
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We therefore investigate the results from a more descriptive perspective. We plot
the average uplift in revenue per consumer for every bid decile in our sample (see
Figure A4.5). This graph depicts the difference in the average revenue generated
between treated and non-treated consumers for each bid decile, which is basically
representing the effect of the interaction between ad treatmentj and bidj on revenuej .
We see here that there seems to be no clear increasing trend with an increase in
the bid placed by the ad platform. In contrast, this graph seems to rather suggest
a decreasing trend in advertising’s contribution to revenue with an increase in the
average bid (especially when not considering bid decile 8 and 10). Further, we see
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that the impact of bid decile 10 seems to be particularly strong and positive. Such an
extreme value is likely to drive the results in the regression.
Figure A4.5: Average Revenue Uplift per Consumer and Bid Decile
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To remedy the effect of the heavily skewed distribution of revenue, we run our analysis
using the log transformed value of revenue10. Figure A4.6 displays the histogram
of the log-transformed revenue variable, in which the distribution of revenue values
moves closer together. This transformation decreases the impact of extreme revenue
values in the regression.
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Figure A4.6: Histogram Log(Revenue)
10We actually make use of the log(revenuej + 1) as we would otherwise lose the observations with
zero revenue.
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Table A4.9 gives the results with the log-transformed revenue variable as dependent
variable. Consistent with our main analysis, we find that there is no significant
interaction effect between treatment and bid. Once more, this suggests that the ad
platform does not target consumers that generate a higher revenue caused by ads.
Table A4.9: Log(Revenue) OLS Regression
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(revenue) OLS log(revenue) OLS log(revenue) OLS
ad treatment 0.039∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.024
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
bid 5.592∗∗∗ 4.431∗∗∗
(0.689) (1.269)
ad treatment × bid 1.479
(1.503)
Constant 0.233∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918
R-squared 0.0002 0.0063 0.0064
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A4.7 Controlling for the Effect of Competition for
Ad Impressions
A limitation of our work is that we compare our ad treatment to the orthogonal charity
ad treatment. We use this method to identify the causal impact of ads as we would
otherwise not be able to recognize the consumers in our control group. Previously,
researchers have argued that this method to identify the causal impact of ads suffers
from the limitation that the true counterfactual of an ad treatment would potentially
include ads from competitors (Johnson et al., 2017a). This means that ads might have
a defensive effect originating in the preemption of the display of competitors’ ads. In
our experimental setup we are not able to capture this defensive effect of ads as our
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counterfactual consists of charity ads that are orthogonal to our treatment excluding
competitors’ ads11.
To address this issue we generate a measure for how high the competition for an ad
impression is. We do this by subtracting the actual average cost for impressions for a
consumer j from the average bid placed for the consumer. The underlying idea is that
if the difference between the bid and cost is smaller, there is higher competition for
ad impressions for the respective consumer. Figure A4.7 shows the absolute difference
between bid and cost per bid decile. A higher difference, indicated by a higher bar,
would represent lower competition for a consumer. This means that when looking at
the absolute difference between cost and bid we find that for consumers that receive on
average higher bids there is less competition as other firms that target these consumers
bid lower for these ad impressions.
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
D
iff
er
en
ce
 b
id
−c
os
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bid decile
Figure A4.7: Difference Between Average Bid and Cost per Bid Decile
In a next step, we include this difference between the average bid and cost into our
main analysis. We call this variable absolute competitionj and rerun our logit model
estimating the purchase probability of consumer j. Table A4.10 give the results of this
analysis. We find that a higher value for absolute competitionj , which indicates less
competition, is correlated with lower purchase probabilities of consumers. This makes
sense as these consumers receive lower bids from firms competing for the purchase of a
11Consumers might still see ads of competitors but we are not able to directly control for this.
Furthermore, this effect is in our case symmetric between control and treatment group while with a
counterfactual including competitors’ ads it would be stronger for the control group.
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respective ad impression as they likely have not indicated their purchase interest with
these firms. Such behavior correlates with a lower overall purchase probability. Most
importantly, when looking at the focus coefficient of this study, bidj × ad treatmentj ,
that indicates whether consumers that receive on average higher bids for their ad
impressions are more receptive to ads, we still find no significant coefficient. This means
that these consumers are not more receptive even when controlling for competition
for ad impressions.
Table A4.10: Logistic Regression Predicting Purchase Probability Controlling for
Competition for Bids
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit
absolute competition 14.756∗∗∗ −21.720∗∗∗ −21.611∗∗∗ −21.606∗∗∗
(1.549) (6.093) (6.096) (6.101)
bid 33.648∗∗∗ 33.588∗∗∗ 33.524∗∗∗
(5.358) (5.359) (6.178)
ad treatment 0.171∗∗ 0.170∗
(0.081) (0.099)
bid × ad treatment 0.074
(3.560)
Constant −3.011∗∗∗ −3.120∗∗∗ −3.259∗∗∗ −3.258∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.040) (0.078) (0.091)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918 20,918
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Nevertheless, it is not directly clear whether the operationalization of competition for
ad impressions in an absolute manner is sensible. We decide to rerun the analysis using
a relative value for competition taking the height of the average bid into consideration.
In detail, we operationalize the variable measuring competition for ad impressions
as relative competitionj =
bid−cost
bid . This way we correct the difference between bid
and cost for the height of the average bid placed for a consumer. Figure A4.8 shows
the relative difference between cost and bid per bid decile. Again, a higher value for
relative competitionj indicates less competition. Once more, we find that competition
for impressions seems to decrease for consumers that receive on average higher bids.
We move on to re-estimate the logistic regression estimating purchase probabilities by
including our variable relative competitionj . Consistent with our main results, we find
that there is no significant coefficient for the interaction between bidj × ad treatmentj ,
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Figure A4.8: Relative Difference Between Average Bid and Cost per Bid Decile
rendering our results robust to the concern of the defensive effect of ads that we cannot
directly consider in our experimental design.
Table A4.11: Logistic Regression Predicting Purchase Probability Controlling for
Relative Competition for Bids
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit purchase Logit
relative competition 0.570∗∗∗ −0.130 −0.132 −0.132
(0.138) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
bid 15.605∗∗∗ 15.660∗∗∗ 15.248∗∗∗
(1.645) (1.646) (3.283)
ad treatment 0.174∗∗ 0.166∗
(0.081) (0.098)
bid × ad treatment 0.509
(3.501)
Constant −3.180∗∗∗ −3.013∗∗∗ −3.153∗∗∗ −3.147∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.079) (0.104) (0.113)
Observations 20,918 20,918 20,918 20,918
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5
Conclusions
In this dissertation we investigate the implications of advertising personalization
for firms, consumers, and ad platforms. We focus on the implications for, what we
consider, the three main stakeholders of personalized advertising on the demand side
of advertising.
Our research is guided by the research question:
How do firms’ advertising personalization strategies affect consumer
responses and how can these consumer responses be assessed using ad
platforms’ reporting systems?
We conduct three studies to answer this research question. When assessing the
implications of firms’ advertising personalization strategies, we find that more specific
ad personalization leads to more positive consumer responses. Nevertheless, such a
positive effect of more specific ad personalization can be harmed when combining
ad personalization with other advertising targeting techniques, e.g. social targeting.
In social targeting firms make use of consumers’ social connections to identify them
as members of a relevant target group and make these social connections explicit in
the ad text. We find that consumers that are socially targeted with personalized ads
respond less positive. This boundary condition of advertising personalization should
be incorporated in firms’ personalization strategies.
Despite the notion that higher levels of personalization come at the cost of increased
consumer privacy concerns (Awad and Krishnan, 2006; Sutanto et al., 2013), we find
that more specific ad personalization leads to more positive consumer responses to
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personalized ads. We further investigate the role of consumer privacy concerns and
the personalization privacy paradox for advertising by looking into their effect on
consumers’ visual attention towards ads. Previous research suggests that firms might
use consumers’ inclination to focus on negative information stimuli, i.e. the negativity
bias (Kanouse, 1984; Ka¨tsyri et al., 2016), to attract consumers’ attention towards
ads that cause privacy concerns. Our research shows that consumers tend to decrease
their overall attention towards ads if they experience higher privacy concerns, leading
to less positive consumer responses to personalized ads. Firms’ ad personalization
strategy should take into account that consumers’ attention cannot be attracted with
intrusive ads that trigger consumer privacy concerns.
To enable the personalization of advertising, firms need to have access to information
on individual consumers allowing for the inference of consumer preferences. The
requirement to have access to this data creates a selection in terms of which consumers
can be targeted with personalized ads. In case no information on an individual
consumer is available, this consumer cannot be targeted with a personalized ad. At the
same time, this selection carries the risk that firms target consumers with ads that have
already indicated an interest in the firm’s products, i.e. have a higher propensity to
purchase, leading to only a marginal effect of ads on consumers’ likelihood to purchase
from the firm. We find that ad platforms are incentivized to address consumers that
have an inherently high probability to purchase from the firm, independent of the
effect of ads. Our empirical analysis then shows that consumers that are being targeted
by ad platforms, i.e. high purchase probability consumers, are not more receptive to
ads. This means that the purchase probability of these consumers is not increasing
significantly stronger than for consumers that are targeted to a lower degree by the ad
platform. Economically speaking, the way the ad allocation is governed currently leads
to firms paying more for ads that do not deliver a higher value. We find empirical
evidence for an incentive misalignment between firm and ad platform that is harmful
for the firm. Firms need to take these underlying economic relationships with ad
platforms into account when assessing consumer responses to personalized ads to
correctly assess ad performance.
5.1 Synthesis of Findings
This dissertation was conducted with the aim to provide insights on the implications of
advertising personalization for firms, consumers, and ad platforms. We conducted this
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Figure 5.1: Synthesis of Findings
research with the intention to provide a holistic view on the interdependence of these
stakeholders within the context of advertising personalization. Additionally, we think
that this research can inform policy makers that need to make regulatory decisions
regarding the use of consumer data for ad personalization purposes. The synthesis of
findings from our three studies investigating different aspect of the relationships of
firms, consumers, and ad platforms, allows us to arrive at more general insights. We
depict the integration of the research conducted for this dissertation in Figure 5.1.
Our research makes clear that firms need to make strategic choices when defining
their personalization strategies with the aim to positively influence consumers’ re-
sponses to their personalized ads. Firms can benefit from increasing personalization
capabilities, provided by ad platforms, to reach consumers. Furthermore, firms can ben-
efit by making use of opportunities to measure the effectiveness of their personalization
strategies and inform their strategic choices.
Our research provides support for personalization leading to more positive consumer
responses to ads. We find that next to personalized ads compared to non-personalized
ads, higher levels of personalization specificity lead to more positive consumer responses.
Higher levels of ad personalization allow firms to address consumers with ads that
are closer to consumers’ preferences leading to more positive consumer responses.
These findings resolve contradictory findings with respect to the adequate level of
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ad personalization (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015a; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013) by
providing evidence from carefully designed experiments.
Nevertheless, not all personalization features lead to more positive consumer re-
sponses. We find that socially targeted personalized ads lead to less positive consumer
responses. This effect is enhanced with higher levels of personalization specificity. So-
cial targeting negatively moderates the relationship between personalization specificity
and consumer response. We challenge previous research that pointed towards positive
implications of social targeting on consumers’ responses to ads (Bakshy et al., 2012;
Tucker, 2016).
Interestingly, we find in our lab experiment that informational social influence does
positively affect consumer response. Although these findings from the field and the lab
seem to contradict each other on a first glance there several reasons for the differences
in how consumers respond to social targeting in the field experiment (chapter 2) and
information social influence in the lab experiment (chapter 3).
First, social targeting (chapter 2) and informational social influence (chapter 3)
are operationalized differently. Social targeting does not represent an experimental
treatment and instead can be seen as a consumer characteristic that is made explicit
in the ad text. Social targeting (chapter 2) is made explicit to consumers by displaying
their friends’ names in the ad (in case these friends are connected to the advertiser).
Informational social influence (chapter 3) is an experimental treatment and not
represented by friends’ names but by their profile pictures that are displayed to
experiment participants on top of the ad. One reason why informational social influence,
operationalized as social endorsements, leads to more positive consumer responses
while social targeting decreases consumer responses could be that consumers are more
intrigued by the profile pictures of friends. This form of social endorsement is rather
new, compared to including friends’ names, potentially triggering a more positive
perception.
Next to that, it remains challenging to create a realistic environment in a lab setting
(chapter 3). A lack of external validity might potentially influence how consumers
perceive the social endorsements. As the lab environment seems more artificial, safe,
and the presented scenario not fully realistic, consumers might respond differently
to the inclusion of social elements in ads. We tried our best to create a realistic
lab environment but simply face the common limitation of external validity of lab
experiments.
Lastly, there are vast differences between the type of products advertised in the field
experiment (chapter 2) and the lab experiment (chapter 3). In the field experiment, our
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partner firm advertises consumer electronics to consumers. We argue that the inclusion
of friends names in the ad text conflicts with consumers’ perception that an ad is
uniquely personalized for them. In contrast, in the lab, we advertise privacy sensitive
products, a gambling application as well as a STD treatment. The difference in product
categories might influence how consumers perceive the social component in the ad.
Especially, as consumers are unlikely to signal their identity with privacy sensitive
products, offsetting the conflict between personalization and social endorsements.
Firms compete online for consumers’ attention with other advertisers as well as
organic content such as news or social media posts. Personalization offers the means
to increase ad relevance and attract consumers’ attention. We find evidence for the
positive effect of personalization on consumers’ attention towards an ad. Furthermore,
we find that consumers’ attention is partially mediating the relationship between
ad personalization and consumer response. The more attention consumers dedicate
towards an ad the more likely they are to respond positively to the ad. Therefore, our
research supports the positive role of consumer attention for ad effectiveness (Wedel
and Pieters, 2007).
Nevertheless, consumers remain concerned about the use of their information for
personalization purposes. While ad platforms track consumer responses, such as
clicking on an ad or purchasing after having seen an ad, ad platforms do not provide
a direct measure that allows firms to assess consumer privacy concerns. Although
firms can infer which type of ad performs better or worse, attributing the superior
performance of an ad to a mechanism, for example that ads cause lower privacy
concerns, remains very challenging. Insights from lab experiments can help firms to
overcome such limitations. We find that personalization does lead to an increase in
consumer privacy concerns. Nevertheless, in our setting, we do not find evidence for
a direct effect of consumer privacy concerns on consumer response to personalized
ads. Therefore, we do not draw a connection between privacy concerns and consumer
response in our model (see Figure 5.1). We assume that this might be the case as
participants in our lab experiment did not perceive privacy to be a big concern in our
controlled lab setting.
Further, we find no evidence for a direct effect of privacy concerns on attention.
Interestingly, we find evidence for a negative serial mediation effect from personalization
through privacy concerns and attention to consumer response. Therefore we draw an
arrow from privacy concerns to attention to depict this path. As we do not find a direct
effect from privacy concerns to attention, we draw the arrow without mathematical
sign (see Figure 5.1). This serial mediation effect points towards privacy concerns
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playing a role as mediator in our context. Next to that, this finding provides evidence
against the potential role of a negativity bias that attracts consumers’ attention
towards information stimuli that trigger negative emotions (Fiske, 1980; Kanouse,
1984; Ka¨tsyri et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2003). Firms cannot make use of intrusive ads,
that attract consumers’ attention, to improve the performance of their ads.
Figure 5.1 also displays the powerful role of ad platforms that mediate the relation-
ship between consumers and firms and act as gatekeeper regarding information on
ad allocation and ad effectiveness. Ad platforms that automate the ad allocation for
firms and allow firms to adjust ad content for the individual consumer provide the
necessary technical infrastructure that builds the foundation for the personalization
process. To serve digital advertising to consumers, firms typically outsource the ad
allocation process to ad platforms. While ad platforms can, due to their scale, provide
an efficient technical solution for the ad allocation process, firms need to rely on
the ad platform both conducting the ad allocation in their interest and reporting ad
effectiveness accurately. We are able to retrieve insights on the ad platform’s targeting
by observing the bids the ad platform places for ad impressions for different consumers.
Next to that, we obtain our consumer response variable for chapter 2 and 4 from the
reporting systems of ad platforms. The ad platforms allow us to operationalize the
variable consumer response as clicks and purchases, but also as consumer responses
such as comments, likes and shares of an ad.
Our research shows that, under the currently common contract structures, ad
platforms conduct the ad allocation in a way that is not aligned with the firm’s interest.
Ad platforms are incentivized to target consumers with high purchase probabilities
independent of the effect of ads on their purchase probabilities. We advance related
research (Johnson and Lewis, 2015), by showing empirically that ad platforms adhere
to these incentives and that consumers that are targeted by ad platforms are not more
receptive to ads. This means that the ad allocation process is conducted sub-optimally
for the firm that would like to target consumers that are more receptive to the firm’s
ads.
Personalization of advertising coincides with the selection of consumers that can be
addressed with personalized ads. This targeting of consumers is conducted by the ad
platform by making use of information on consumers to infer consumers’ preferences. If
there is no information available on certain consumers, firms cannot serve personalized
ads to these consumers. Firms need to take this selection into account when assessing
the performance of their personalization strategy and how they reward ad platforms.
5.2 Academic Contributions 145
When focusing solely on the ad personalization strategy without properly evaluating
its performance, firms run the risk to use a sub-optimal strategy.
Ad platforms should consider which advertising features are beneficial for firms. We
find that socially targeted consumers respond less positive to personalized advertising.
In light of increasing consumer concerns regarding their privacy, ad platforms might
benefit both consumers and firms by abandoning advertising features that make use of
consumers’ information and do not improve ad performance. Such a step would likely
be in the interest of regulators, as becomes apparent for example in the European
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR aims to establish standards
that define how firms have to manage and can process consumers’ data (EUR-Lex,
2016). What became apparent during our research process is that a major share of
consumers’ personal information is being processed by ad platforms and not firms.
Often times, firms do not have access to this personal information (e.g. Facebook Ad
Platform) but make use of services of ad platforms that process consumer information
in the background.
Generally, our research implies that a firm’s personalization strategy needs to
incorporate not only how consumers respond to different types of personalized ads
but also the economic relationships underlying the personalization process. Only by
taking a more holistic perspective on advertising personalization, taking relationships
with both consumers and ad platforms into account, firms become able to both define
their personalization strategy as well as assess its performance adequately.
5.2 Academic Contributions
With the present research we contribute to the literature on advertising personalization
and economics of advertising. We are confident that our results promote both academic
research and the practical understanding. Such understanding is required to define and
implement personalization strategies as well as assess the performance of personalized
ads.
In Chapter 2, we offer firms insights on how to define their personalization strategy
to increase consumers’ likelihood to click ads and purchase after being confronted with
ads. More precisely, with the help of a large scale field experiment, we find that more
specific ad personalization, recommending specific products instead of less specific
product categories, leads to more positive consumer responses to ads. Further, we
present evidence that when personalized ads are socially targeted, their performance
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decreases. With these findings, we add to the theoretical discussion on adequate levels
of ad personalization. Results from previous research offered inconsistent insights in
that some work suggested lower levels of advertising personalization to outperform
more personalized ads (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013), whereas other research finds
that higher levels of ad personalization increase ad performance (Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015a). Next to that, we are able to provide empirical evidence for the conceptual
conflict of socially targeting personalized ads. As consumers expect a personalized
ad message is uniquely personalized for them, including peers’ names in the ad text
that endorse an ad conflicts with the idea of unique personalization. Therefore, we
challenge the previously established understanding of generally positive implications of
social targeting for advertising (Bakshy et al., 2012; Tucker, 2016). To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to empirically investigate personalized ads in combination
with social targeting.
In Chapter 3, we show that firms have an interest to increase consumers’ attention
towards their ads. Attention acts, as previously pointed out in marketing research
(Wedel and Pieters, 2007), as positive mediator between ad personalization and ad
performance. Theoretically, we find arguments for both an increase and a decrease
in consumers’ attention towards ads with an increase in consumer privacy concerns
triggered by firms’ use of consumers’ information to personalize ads. The negativity bias
in consumers’ attention, describes that consumers tend to direct their attention towards
negatively perceived stimuli (Kanouse, 1984; Ka¨tsyri et al., 2016). This suggests that
consumers dedicate more attention to ads when experiencing higher privacy concerns,
as privacy concerns trigger negative feelings of vulnerability within consumers (Aguirre
et al., 2015). Contradicting this notion, previous research in marketing found that
attention acts as enabler for advertising performance as consumers need to dedicate
attention to ads to ads to process them (Ho and Bodoff, 2014). Our results confirm
the previously established positive role of attention for advertising performance and
show that the negativity bias does not play a significant role when consumers assess
personalized ads. We show that a strategy in which firms try to catch consumers’
attention with intrusive ads that trigger privacy concerns, does not pay off as these ads
decrease consumers’ overall attention towards ads. With this work we contribute to
research investigating the personalization privacy paradox in an advertising context.
In Chapter 4, we find that the contracts that are currently implemented in program-
matic advertising to govern the ad allocation process between firms and ad platforms
are not favorable for firms. We show empirically that due to the currently specified
incentives in these contracts, firms end up paying more for ad impressions that do
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not deliver a higher return on ad investment. Ad platforms target consumers with
ads, by bidding higher for their ad impressions, that are not more receptive to these
ads. With this work we contribute to the literature on economics of advertising. We
present theoretical arguments for the potential presence of an incentive misalignment
in programmatic advertising. This misalignment is contingent on both the ad plat-
form’s actual behavior as well as the correlation between absolute and incremental
purchase probabilities of consumers. Next, with our unique empirical setting, we are
able to present evidence for the actual presence of this incentive misalignment. While
previous research has suggested that current contracts implemented in programmatic
advertising might not be beneficial for firms (Johnson and Lewis, 2015), we are able
to present actual empirical evidence for the presence of this incentive misalignment in
programmatic advertising.
5.3 Practical Relevance
In this dissertation, we focus on the implications of personalized digital advertising
for firms, consumers, and ad platforms. We consider these to be the three main
stakeholders on the demand side of personalized advertising (where the supply side
encompasses publishers that display ads to consumers on their websites and sell this
ad space to firms via ad platforms). We provide several insights of high practical
relevance that can help firms to improve their ad personalization strategies and assess
ad performance more adequately. We help consumers to understand the benefits
and costs of personalized advertising. Furthermore, we allow ad platforms to assess
limitations of targeting mechanisms and incentive structures in contracts governing
their relationships with firms.
Firms have identified the potential of personalized digital advertising but simulta-
neously struggle with how to define and implement their personalization strategies
(Adobe Systems Inc., 2014). In chapter 2, we present insights for firms on how to
define their personalization strategies to increase ad effectiveness. Chapter 3, suggests
to firms that more intrusive ads are not an adequate mean to attract consumers’
attention to ads. Lastly, chapter 4 cautions firms about the currently implemented
contracts between firms and ad platforms in programmatic advertising. Under the
currently specified incentives in these contracts ad platforms optimize the ad allocation
process in a way that is not in the interest of firms. Firms need to reevaluate how they
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structure the economic relationship with ad platforms to allow for a more favorable
ad allocation process.
Consumers can benefit from being addressed with more relevant personalized ads
instead of generic ads. In chapter 2, we confirm this notion and show that consumers
respond more positively to more personalized ads. At the same time, we show in
chapter 3, that consumers are concerned about their privacy when addressed with
personalized ads. These privacy concerns represent an economic cost that decreases
the benefits of ad personalization for consumers and limits the amount of attention
consumers are willing to dedicate to ads.
Ad platforms act as mediator between firms, that want to display ads, and consumers,
that are the recipients of these ads. Chapter 2 offers insights into the commonly
implemented advertising strategy of social networking sites. These sites operate using
an advertising revenue model (Schumann, 2014) and can therefore be considered as
ad platforms in the context of social media. We find that socially targeting consumers
with personalized ads backfires. Therefore, we are pointing ad platforms to reconsider
their default strategy to socially target consumers when ads are personalized. In
chapter 4, we show that ad platforms are optimizing the ad allocation process in
programmatic advertising rather in their own than the firm’s interest. Ad platforms
need to be cautious about the rising awareness of this behavior on the side of firms
and the implications on their business model.
While we focus on the implications of personalized advertising for firms, consumers,
and ad platforms in this dissertation, we also offer insights that are valuable for
policy makers. Chapter 3 emphasizes the importance for policy makers to stay aware
of consumers’ privacy concerns originating in firms’ use of consumers’ personal in-
formation for personalization purposes. Where firms go too far in the use of this
information, policy makers might need to intervene to protect consumers. Consumers
have generally been shown to prefer environments with less advertising and are less
willing to give access to their personal information for personalization of ads compared
to the personalization of other services (Awad and Krishnan, 2006; Sutanto et al.,
2013).
5.4 Limitations
The aim of this dissertation is to provide an integrated and more holistic view on the
implications of advertising personalization for firms, consumers, and ad platforms.
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Although we are able to shed light on the different relationships between these
stakeholders we want to acknowledge that this dissertation does not contain a study
that focuses on all three stakeholders equally at the same time. Instead, we focus on
specific relationships to be able to dive deeper into the implications of personalization
strategies and the assessment of consumer responses. We are confident that insights
from the different studies can still be combined to derive broader insights.
For both chapter 2 and 4 we face the difficulty that we need to rely on data provided
by ad platforms for our empirical analysis. It remains challenging for firms to assess
to what extent ad platforms report accurate data. Economically, ad platforms have an
interest to over-report the success of marketing campaigns to incentivize firms to keep
investing in their marketing budgets. We are aware of the limitation regarding the
data we are using in this dissertation. Nevertheless, the focus of this dissertation is
less on the quality and accuracy of data from ad platforms but focuses more on firms’
ad personalization strategies and the economic relationship between firms and ad
platforms. We are confident that our analyses can provide valuable insights regarding
these topics.
A major difficulty in field research is to not only identify the causal effect of
an experimental treatment but to disentangle the underlying causal mechanisms.
While field experiments offer the opportunity to run an experiment in a realistic
environment and use much larger sample sizes it is difficult to gain insights on these
causal mechanisms as consumers can seldomly be questioned about their underlying
motivations and perceptions. The difficulty to identify causal mechanisms most severely
affects chapter 2 of this dissertation. We conducted an extensive amount of additional
analysis with the aim to overcome this limitation and provide better insights on
underlying mechanisms.
5.5 Future Research
This dissertation lies in the intersection of marketing and information systems research.
We see this intersection as very fruitful and would like to encourage researchers to
continue to combine theories and insights from both fields to generate and dissemi-
nate new knowledge. Nowadays, information and communication technologies enable
complex marketing operations. Therefore, the combination of information systems
with marketing methodologies deserves further attention.
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There is a plethora of research opportunities within the area of advertising person-
alization. Below we want to present some of the directions that we find promising
based on the past five years of experience in this research area.
The ability to personalize ads often times heavily depends on the availability of
information on consumers underlying the applied personalization mechanisms. The
necessity of having access to information on consumers, leads to a ’natural’ sample
selection. Only consumers for whom the advertiser has information available can be
addressed with personalized ads. Firstly, we call for more research that more clearly
distinguishes the concept of ad personalization from ad targeting. It remains unclear
where the boundary between these two terms lies and when the terms actually explain
the same marketing technique. Next, further research should address the question
to what extent the targeting of consumers does actually lead to higher returns on
advertising investments for firms. In chapter 4, we have presented evidence that
ad platforms tend to address consumers with ads that are more likely to purchase
independent of the effect that ads have on these consumers’ purchase probabilities.
When targeting consumers for whom an ad is highly relevant, firms run the risk
to address consumers that would have purchased from them independent of seeing
an ad. A firm’s decision which consumers to target with advertising also includes
the decision which consumers to exclude from the target population. Commonly,
consumers are excluded because they are not interested in the advertised product. But
at the same time, firms should exclude consumers that purchase anyways, independent
of a treatment with ads. We call for more research investigating an adequate level of
advertising targeting balancing both the exclusion of non-relevant consumers as well
as overly-relevant consumers.
In chapter 3 of this dissertation, we combine several research methodologies to
investigate how consumers respond to ads. More precisely, we assess the role of
consumers’ attention within the personalization privacy paradox. While for this
study, we were still required to conduct this research within a lab environment, recent
technological developments allow researchers to potentially assess consumers’ attention
in the field. Latest developments in both software and hardware for smart phones
enable consumers to interface with their devices via eye movements. As the accuracy
of this data collection method increases, it allows researchers to collect eye movement
data in the field. This renders the necessity to put experiment participants in a lab
setting, which is often expensive and appears unnatural to participants, obsolete.
We suggest researchers to monitor opportunities that become available with the
development of this technology.
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In chapter 4, we present empirical evidence for the fact that currently implemented
contracts between firms and ad platforms, governing the ad allocation process, are not
favorable for firms. While the identification of such an economic incentive misalignment
is critical to trigger change, further research focusing on the economic implications
for adjusted contract structures can help the ad industry to switch to a setting with
aligned incentives. While researchers have suggested systems that allow ad platforms
to accurately track return on ad investment (Johnson et al., 2017a), we have seen
limited interest in the ad industry to implement such systems. Economic research
investigating the welfare implications for consumers, firms, and ad platforms can help
to identify a market structure in which a switch to a system with aligned incentives is
feasible.
While we focus on the application of personalization methodologies for marketing
purposes in this dissertation, personalization can be used to adjust different types of
services to consumers’ preferences. This ranges from personalization of music play
lists in music streaming services to personalized information matching consumers’
preferences on search engines. Often times, managers within large internet corporations
decide how this personalization is deployed with the aim to maximize the value of their
business. At the same time, such personalization algorithms, that determine which
content users of these services see at what time, have significant social implications.
When confronted with only information confirming one’s opinion, consumers’ chance
to challenge their preconceived opinions decreases. The social welfare implications of
such personalization algorithms requires further attention. We hope more research
will be conducted investigating the potential negative social welfare implications of
personalized services.
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English Summary
The increasing availability of detailed data on consumers’ characteristics online allows
firms to personalize advertising to the preferences of these consumers. The person-
alization of ad messages offers firms tremendous potential. If done right, firms can
address consumers with ad messages that are considered more relevant leading to more
positive consumer responses to ads. Firms understand the potential of personalized
advertising and aim to positively affect their bottom line with the personalization of
ads. Simultaneously, firms struggle with how to design and implement personalization
strategies. Supposedly, personalized advertising leads to an increase in firms’ return
on advertising investment. Nevertheless, firms face the challenge to correctly measure
and assess advertising effectiveness to inform their marketing decisions. With this
research, we advance the understanding of ad personalization and its implications for
firms, consumers, and ad platforms.
With the help of a large-scale field experiment, addressing 198,234 individual
consumers with personalized advertising, we present evidence for how firms should
design their personalization strategies. We find that high levels of personalization
specificity pay off for firms. At the same time, firms need to take the relationship of ad
personalization with other advertising features into account when personalizing ads.
We show that socially targeting personalized ads, where names of consumers’ friends
are included in the ad text, leads to less positive consumer responses to personalized
ads.
Firms need to be aware that the use of consumers’ information to personalize ads
can trigger consumer privacy concerns. These privacy concerns negatively influence
consumers’ responses to personalized ads. To advance the understanding of privacy
concerns in ad personalization, we conduct a lab experiment using eye tracking
technology to assess the role of consumers’ attention when confronted with personalized
ads. Our findings show that firms cannot use intrusive ads, which cause consumer
privacy concerns, to attract consumers’ attention. Such a strategy is harmful as it
decreases consumers’ overall attention towards ads, eventually leading to less positive
consumer responses.
In programmatic advertising firms outsource the ad allocation process, the decision
to which consumer to serve an ad impression and how much to pay for this impression,
to ad platforms. An examination of how ad platforms handle the ad allocation process
reveals that contracts between firms and ad platforms might not be in the economic
interest of firms. We show theoretically that ad platforms have an incentive to target
consumers that are more likely to purchase independent of the effect of ads on their
purchase probabilities. We conduct a large field experiment in which we analyze an
ad platform’s bidding behavior for 20,918 individual consumers over the duration of
seven weeks. Our empirical analysis shows that the incentives specified in contracts
between ad platforms and firms lead to an incentive misalignment that is harmful for
firms. While ads generally increase consumers’ likelihood to purchase, firms pay more
for ads that are not providing higher value to them.

Nederlandse Samenvatting
De toenemende beschikbaarheid van gedetailleerde gegevens over de kenmerken van
online consumenten stelt bedrijven in staat om advertenties te personaliseren. Het
personaliseren van reclameboodschappen biedt bedrijven enorm veel potentieel, omdat
het bedrijven in staat stelt advertenties te tonen die door consumenten als relevant
worden beschouwd, wat leidt tot een positievere reactie op de advertentie. Hoewel
bedrijven het potentieel van het personaliseren van advertenties begrijpen en ernaar
streven om hun prestaties hiermee zoveel mogelijk te verbeteren, hebben ze tegelijkertijd
moeite om hiervoor strategiee¨n te ontwerpen en te implementeren. Bedrijven moeten de
effectiviteit van reclame adequaat meten en beoordelen om marketingbeslissingen goed
te onderbouwen. Met dit onderzoek bevorderen we het begrip van het personaliseren
van advertenties en de bijbehorende implicaties voor bedrijven, consumenten en
advertentieplatformen.
Op basis van een grootschalig veldexperiment met 198.234 individuele consumenten
presenteren we bewijs voor de manier waarop bedrijven hun personaliseringsstrategiee¨n
moeten ontwerpen. Vergaande personalisatie van advertenties loont voor bedrijven.
Tegelijkertijd dienen bedrijven de relatie tussen het personaliseren van advertenties en
andere advertentiefuncties bij het personaliseren van advertenties in beschouwing te
nemen. We laten zien dat gepersonaliseerde advertenties die gebruik maken van social
targeting, waarbij namen van vrienden van de consumenten worden opgenomen in de
advertenties, leiden tot minder positieve reacties van consumenten op advertenties.
Bedrijven moeten zich ervan bewust zijn dat het gebruik van consumenteninformatie
om advertenties te personaliseren privacy-zorgen kan oproepen bij consumenten. Deze
zorgen hebben een negatieve invloed op de reacties van consumenten op gepersona-
liseerde advertenties. Om het begrip van privacy-zorgen in het personaliseren van
advertenties te vergroten, voerden we een laboratorium experiment uit met eye-tracking
om de rol van de aandacht van consumenten te beoordelen wanneer ze geconfronteerd
worden met gepersonaliseerde advertenties. Onze bevindingen laten zien dat bedrijven
geen opdringerige advertentie zouden moeten gebruiken, daar dit privacy-zorgen juist
aanwakkert. Dergelijke advertenties zijn schadelijk omdat de algemene aandacht van
consumenten voor een advertentie afneemt en uiteindelijk verkleint dit de kans dat
consumenten op advertenties klikken.
Vaak besteden bedrijven de toewijzing van advertenties (de beslissing aan welke
consument een bepaalde advertentie wordt getoond en voor welke prijs) uit aan
advertentieplatformen. Onderzoek naar de wijze waarop advertentieplatformen dit
aanpakken laat zien dat de huidige contracten tussen bedrijven en advertentieplatfor-
men mogelijk niet in het economisch belang van bedrijven zijn. We tonen theoretisch
aan dat advertentieplatformen een belang hebben zich te richten op consumenten
die waarschijnlijk al een hogere kans tot aanschaf hebben, ongeacht het effect van de
advertenties op deze kans. We hebben een groot veldexperiment uitgevoerd waarin we
het gedrag van een advertentieplatform gericht op 20.918 individuele consumenten
gedurende een periode van zeven weken analyseren. Onze empirische analyse toont
aan dat de gespecificeerde beloningen in de contracten conflicteren met de belangen
van bedrijven en schadelijk voor hen zijn. Terwijl advertenties over het algemeen bij de
consument de kans tot aanschaf vergroten, betalen bedrijven meer voor advertenties
die hen geen grotere waarde bieden.
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The personalization of advertising offers firms tremendous potential. If done right, firms can address 
consumers with more relevant ads, leading to more positive consumer responses. Nevertheless, firms 
are struggling with how to design personalization strategies and face the challenge to correctly assess 
advertising effectiveness. With this research, we advance the understanding of advertising personalization 
and its implications for firms, consumers, and ad platforms. 
With the help of a large-scale field experiment, we present evidence for how firms should design their 
personalization strategies. We find that high levels of personalization specificity pay off for firms. At the 
same time, socially targeting personalized ads, where names of consumers’ friends are included in the ad 
text, leads to less positive consumer responses.
To advance the understanding of privacy concerns in advertising personalization, we conduct a lab 
experiment using eye tracking technology. Our findings reveal that firms cannot use intrusive ads, that 
cause privacy concerns, to attract consumers’ attention. Such a strategy is harmful as it decreases 
consumers’ overall attention towards ads, eventually leading to less positive consumer responses.
An examination of contracts between firms and ad platforms exposes that these contracts might not be in 
the economic interest of firms. We conduct a large field experiment and our analysis reveals that currently 
implemented contracts between ad platforms and firms lead to an incentive misalignment that is harmful 
for firms. While ads generally increase consumers’ likelihood to purchase, firms pay more for ads that are 
not providing higher value to them.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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